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ABSTRACT 
Currently the “network centric operation” and “network centric warfare” have generated 
a new area of research focused on determining how hierarchical organizations composed by 
human beings and machines make decisions over collaborative environments.  
One of the most stressful scenarios for these kinds of organizations is the so-called 
“extreme events.” This dissertation provides a hybrid simulation methodology based on classical 
simulation paradigms combined with social network analysis for evaluating and improving the 
organizational structures and procedures, mainly the incident command systems and plans for 
facing those extreme events. 
According to this, we provide a methodology for generating hypotheses and afterwards 
testing organizational procedures either in real training systems or simulation models with 
validated data.  
As long as the organization changes their dyadic relationships dynamically over time, we 
propose to capture the longitudinal digraph in time and analyze it by means of its adjacency 
matrix. Thus, by using an object oriented approach, three domains are proposed for better 
understanding the performance and the surrounding environment of an emergency management 
organization.  
System dynamics is used for modeling the critical infrastructure linked to the warning 
alerts of a given organization at federal, state and local levels. Discrete simulations based on the 
defined concept of “community of state” enables us to control the complete model. Discrete 
event simulation allows us to create entities that represent the data and resource flows within the 
organization. 
iv 
We propose that cognitive models might well be suited in our methodology. For instance, 
we show how the team performance decays in time, according to the Yerkes-Dodson curve, 
affecting the measures of performance of the whole organizational system. Accordingly we 
suggest that the hybrid model could be applied to other types of organizations, such as military 
peacekeeping operations and joint task forces. Along with providing insight about organizations, 
the methodology supports the analysis of the “after action review” (AAR), based on collection of 
data obtained from the command and control systems or the so-called training scenarios. 
Furthermore, a rich set of mathematical measures arises from the hybrid models such as 
triad census, dyad census, eigenvalues, utilization, feedback loops, etc., which provides a strong 
foundation for studying an emergency management organization.  
Future research will be necessary for analyzing real data and validating the proposed 
methodology. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Background of study 
In order to model a system, people involved in simulation have a tendency to use the 
traditional techniques based upon either discrete or continuum approach. Practitioners rarely 
combine two or more techniques for representing their models.  On the other hand, simulations have 
been used extensively for modeling physical systems, and those do not adequately include methods 
for studying people making decisions in a collaborative environment.  
Simulations for representing decision making structures have been limited to the use of 
cognitive frameworks, and only a few models have been published based on either discrete 
simulations or agent-based modeling. In general, organizational simulations based on quantitative 
techniques are either scarce or poorly documented.  
At present, the network centric concept has enabled a new approach to mathematical analysis 
regarding how civilian and military organizations perform over a linked environment. In the 
previous context, the current challenge with modeling and simulating is dealing the scenarios in 
which the organizations have to make decisions under pressure due to extreme events (such as 
tsunamis, forest fires, urban chaos, chemical accidents, peacekeeping missions), since these 
problems take place either in the infrastructure supporting the network-centric process or in 
information, coordination, resource management, and synchronization of tasks. 
We suggest that a hybrid simulation implementation could be useful for modeling a network 
centric decision making environment. The collection of data obtained in this model would allow the 
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identification of bottle necks, procedure validation, quantification of reaction time, job loading, and 
new layouts, among other characteristics. 
This research proposes a hybrid simulation based exclusively on mathematical and 
simulation foundations, and it will not incorporate any cognitive framework. The goal is to create a 
framework to acquire knowledge about the organizational structure in different stages of crisis 
situations through metrics and measurements of merit. 
Problem statement 
In the past decades three simulation approaches have been used widely for representing 
discrete processes, aggregated levels, and agent-based behavior. However, this will likely change 
in the future, as complex organizational systems really require elements of all three approaches 
in order for their complexity to be appropriately captured (Dooley, 2002). 
We support the idea that the simulation community needs to combine simulation 
techniques that can represent the dynamic behavior produced in an organization in the loop. 
Mapping real entities into a simulated environment requires use of the three main simulation 
paradigms.  
Current simulation systems such as constructive simulation do not fit very well for 
analyzing organizational behavior, because in these systems the outcomes are produced by the 
models, and we need to collect data from the real human behavior and not that performed by 
synthetic models. 
However, when researchers have to analyze real organizations (such as organizations in 
the loop or C2 systems), the main  problem is how to collect data for modeling, validating, and 
evaluating those structures, especially when there are many decision making nodes and a great 
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deal of information being sent between them. For instance, if we analyze an organization with 
100 nodes (each node is composed of one or more persons) we could collect as many as 9,900 
types of pairwise interactions. 
The current network centric environment enables us to collect data from systems based 
on information technology; therefore, the procedures made for hierarchical organizations could 
be captured and modeled.  Lin (1994) stated that simulation provides insight for the evaluation of 
organizational designs with less cost than conducting human experiments, and once the main 
factors have been identified, human experiments can be done to test the theoretical results. We 
argue that the difficulties for simulating distributed decision making is still complex and likely 
never will be validated, but in the context of emergencies and disasters, the use of clear and well 
documented incident command system (ICS) and the data collection from the C2 systems should 
allow us to explore the design of synthetic models of contingency that enable the decision 
makers to know what happened, how it happened, and how could improvements be made in the 
future. 
This dissertation defines an emergency organizational structure as a “complex system 
which performs as a network,” and according to Dooley (2002) such a system should be modeled 
with a hybrid approach that incorporates the three main simulation techniques. Furthermore, we 
identify the need to combine simulations of organizational networks with a topological analysis 
of their structures and the identification of statistical properties which emerge from their 
behavior. 
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Scope of research and hypothesis 
A hybrid simulation based on the three main simulation paradigms – System dynamics 
(SD), Discrete event simulation (DES), and Agent based modeling (ABM) – will be the basis of 
our methodology for modeling the network centric decision making environment performed by 
an organization facing extreme events. The theory of social network analysis (SNA) will allow 
analysis of the dynamic changes produced in organization structures over time. The collection of 
data obtained from the models will allow the identification of metrics and measures of merits 
such as bottle neck, identification, procedure validation, reaction time measurement, job loading 
identification, dangerous event identification, automatic modification of security policy, and 
“just-in-time” modification of organizational procedures, among other characteristics. 
Furthermore, mapping real flows and critical tasks into a simulated environment will enable the 
detection of possible vulnerabilities. 
The simulation methodology should cooperate with the decision makers in three 
scenarios: 
• To assess the behavior of different nodes (in the after action review analyzed messages 
flows and resources flows). 
• To design better organization structures making use of micro-world scenarios. 
• To control the performance of different roles in real time (organization in the loop). 
Figure 1 shows a network centric environment in which an emergency organizational 
structure depicts dynamic behavior over time. The network centric environment is a system of 
systems with an initial layout, nodes, and endogenous variables; therefore relationships of 
causality can be identified, modeled, and simulated. The exogenous variables strike the system 
over a specific location, and they produce an immediate reaction of one node, a subset of nodes 
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or of the whole system. Notice this approach presents multiple opportunities for analyzing 
organizational layout, information flows, resources flows, and tasks synchronization. 
 
 
Figure 1: Representation of a hybrid simulation 
 
 
The hybrid simulation combines the network’s analysis with the procedural behavior and 
interactions shown by the nodes. Thus this dissertation proposes the following sets of 
hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: With the purpose of detecting metrics and vulnerabilities, a hybrid 
simulation based on DES, SD and ABM is an adequate platform to represent the dynamic 
sequences produced in an “organization structure” when it  faces different extreme events.    
Hypothesis 2: A hybrid simulation can be combined with social networks analysis and 
linear programming in order to assess the evolution of an organization structure over time, and 
this type of simulation is suitable for detecting bottle necks, quantification of reaction time, 
loading job, vulnerabilities, priorities, and synchronization, among other measures of 
performance. 
                       Network Centric Decision Making  
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Contributions 
There are three main schools of simulation practice; DES, SD, and ABM. Simulation 
researchers typically remain in one camp and do not work in all three domains.  Characteristics 
of each of the three simulation approaches are shown in Table 1 (Dooley, 2002). 
 
Table 1: Three main paradigms in simulation (Dooley, 2002) 
Simulation approach Condition for use Main characteristics 
Discrete event System described by 
variables and events that 
trigger change in those 
variables. 
Events that trigger other 
events sequentially and 
probabilistically. 
System dynamics System described by 
variables that cause change 
in each other over time. 
Key system variables and 
their interactions with one 
another are explicitly 
(mathematically) defined as 
differential equations. 
Agent-based System described by agents 
that react to one another 
and the environment. 
Agents with schema that 
interact with one another 
and learn. 
 
 
This research presents a hybrid methodology, since it puts together the three main 
simulation paradigms for modeling organizational structures facing extreme events. As the 
organization changes dynamically over time, the different states of the organization will be 
analyzed according to the social network theory (based upon graphs) and eventually linear 
programming.  Metrics and causal analysis will be obtained from the proposed hybrid model.  
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Therefore, these are the three main contributions identified in this research: 
• To propose a methodology to understand the relationships in complex systems such as 
ICS for emergency response based upon the combination of social network techniques 
and simulation techniques.  
• To propose a hybrid simulation scenario, based on DES, SD, and ABM, creating the 
conditions (if data is available) for modeling organizational emergency structures which 
develop their tasks over a network centric environment. Furthermore, the hybrid 
simulation could be applied to another type of organization, such as military 
peacekeeping operations and joint task forces. 
• To provide a framework for study of the lessons learned concept in military and civilian 
organizations and to support the after action review (AAR), base on the collection of data 
obtained from the C2 systems that an organization has in the network centric 
environment.  
Dissertation outline 
Chapter One presents the problem statement, scopes and hypotheses of this research. The 
main contributions also are named at the final part of the chapter.  
Chapter Two describes the literature review emphasizing in the terms of network centric 
warfare and network centric decision making. The concept of extreme event and its implications 
for a distributed decision-making process are defined. The literature review includes the previous 
intent for modeling and simulating organizations. The previous studies on social network 
analysis are explained in this chapter. A comprehensive review of the three main simulation 
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techniques are described and contrasted in a table that shows which one is best situated for 
modeling and simulating selected problems. 
Chapter Three presents the methodology and five semantic analyses of past extreme 
events.  
Chapter Four describes the domains in which an emergency organization performs its 
tasks and defines the properties of a digraph from an incident command system perspective and 
additional techniques are discussed.  
Chapter Five explains how to combine different simulation techniques, and also defines 
the conceptual hybrid model for analyzing organizational emergency structures.  
Chapter Six proposes the implementation of a hybrid model, keeping parallel with the 
configuration of the command incident system represented as a digraph. 
Chapter Seven presents the conclusions and proposes future studies for continuing this 
hybrid implementation.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Network centric warfare (NCW) and network centric decision making (NCDM) 
There are similar characteristics in the way military and civilian organizations make 
decisions under extreme events; as a result, it is possible to identify models and methodologies 
which are useful in both types of organizations. Thus, the Army’s network-centric approach to 
operations could serve emergency responders equally effectively (Committee on Army and 
Technology for Homeland Defense, C4ISR, 2004).  
 The NCDM takes its foundation from the NCW and network enabled capacity (NEC) 
concepts, the former from a US military perspective and the latter from a UK military 
perspective. NCW is the product of network connectivity, and the military uses this concept for 
increasing both strategic and tactical advantage in battle (MacMillan, Diedrich, Entin & Serfaty, 
2005). NCW essentially encompasses the idea of interconnecting a heterogeneous range of actors 
and objects in the battle-space through telecommunication and computer networks (Bakken, 
2004).  
 A fundamental assumption in NCW is that improving information infrastructures will 
improve military decision making and therefore military effectiveness (Hanzel & Fewell, 2004). 
Those characteristics could be useful for modeling and optimizing an emergency organization 
structure. One advantage is the gain which can be achieved by simply sharing information 
among the nodes.  As Moffat notes, 
If the nodes are distributed globally, and each having a 5 percent probability of 
possessing a given piece of information that is needed to make a plan successful and the 
planner only has access to organic information, he would only have a 5 percent chance of 
 10
generating a successful plan. If the planner has access to n sources, he would increase the 
probability of having the information necessary to develop a successful plan to [ 
n95.01 − ]…” (Moffat, 2003).  
 
 Even though that NCW theory proposes to achieve a tactical advantage by using 
information superiority and a well situated situation awareness shared by the whole organization, 
currently there are no systematic studies evaluating network-centric strategies versus alternative 
strategies (Finder, Fendley, Narayanan & Raymond, 2003). The author suggests that this 
research could be an initial test-bed for evaluating the alternative strategies mentioned by Finder 
et al. 
 Studies have been made to identify the benefits of NCW, but few have taken an analytical 
view and produced quantitative results. A study was conducted by five allied countries to redress 
the lack of quantitative evidence about network-centric capability.  Using queuing theory 
models, the concepts of shared situational awareness  and collaborative information environment  
were analyzed for improving anti-submarine warfare (Klingbeil & Galdorisi, 2004). 
 In a NCW environment there are intensive information flows between sensors, C2, 
shooters on a network of networks, and synchronization of information arrivals and updates. The 
elapsed time of each interacting component and the message delay can play a critical role in such 
scenarios. Estimation of delay is essential to verify if the system meets timing constraints. The 
message delays from each component system can change the order of task execution and may 
cause a synchronization problem.  
 In order to evaluate performance prediction of a NCW system, Shin and Levis (1999) 
implemented Petri net and queuing net for modeling functional and physical layers as shown in 
Figure 2. Their application modeled the information flow between sensors, C2, and shooters. An 
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experimental system design was established based on two rules of engagement, seven input 
parameters, and four output parameters. 
 
 
Figure 2: Functional and physical architecture models (Shin & Levis, 1999) 
 
The above study supports the goal of this dissertation in terms of finding analytical 
models for simulating NCDM during emergency and crisis situations.  
 Most of the current studies about net-centric environments are focused on complexity 
theory, which is difficult to apply to real crisis situations; however there are a set of 
mathematical and statistical tools (such as queuing theory) which have been validated, and  can 
support realistic organizational models for improving coordination and synchronization in 
emergency response organizations. The only premise for carrying out this goal is the requisite for 
collecting empirical data from real structures such as either a command and control system or 
organization in the loop (training system). 
Functional Architecture Model 
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 This research is intended for generalizing the network centric concept into a generic 
organization (civilian, military, or combined). Table 2 identifies similar features between NCW 
(military arena) and NCDM (organizational emergency environment).   
 
Table 2:  Contrast between NCW and NCDM  
Features Network  Centric Warfare Network Centric Decision Making 
Sensors Radar, units on the battlefields, 
UAV, airplane, etc. 
Seismographs, early warning tsunami, people on 
the ground, etc. 
Shooters Weapons, troops on the ground, 
ships crew 
Emergency responders for prevention or 
mitigation of the effects of extreme events 
Decision Support and 
Analytic tools 
Geographic information systems, 
expert systems, agents,  data 
mining  
Geographic information systems, expert systems, 
agents,  data mining 
Command, Control, 
Communication and 
Computers (C4) 
According to the scenario and 
units: different levels. 
According to the force: coalition 
Interoperability.  
According to the scenario and the event: different 
levels, but it is closer to C2 coalition 
interoperability 
Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
People, signals, sensors, 
photographe, satellite images, open 
sources information, UAV 
People, photographes, satellite images, sensors 
Situation Awareness Common operational picture Not well developed as of yet 
Nodes  Military units, weapons systems, 
C4ISR, point of logistic support, 
sensors, hubs 
Police, red cross, federal agencies, governor, 
mayor, C4ISR, NGO, fire rescue, sensors 
Infrastructure Military networks Civilian networks, military networks 
Grid  Communication grid 
Information grid 
Communication grid 
Information grid 
Scenarios  Battlefield (urban and ground ) Any place 
Structure Command chain Depends on extreme events, fuzzy 
Interoperability Hard among coalition forces Hard among different organizational nodes 
Measures of 
Performances 
In development. Do not exist 
Span of Control Very well defined Hard, fuzzy, depends on scenario, extreme event 
and time for reaction 
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 Using the military approach, network-centric systems can be defined as those that make 
users more effective “by networking sensors, decision-makers and emergency responders to 
accurately see, understand and act on the situation facing them” (Committee on Army and 
Technology for Homeland Defense, C4ISR, 2004).  
 This dissertation has as its main assumption that an organizational structure prepared for 
facing extreme events works over a network centric system. Thus a model to represent a NCDM 
should encompass the following capabilities performed through real-time networking:  
• All nodes of the network should have access to all networked resources according to their 
tasks and required knowledge for carrying out their missions (sharing of situational 
awareness). 
• Networked decision makers can make more informed decisions. 
• A networked organization can more effectively and efficiently synchronize its assets. 
Distributed decision making  
 Distributed Decision Making (DDM) is a neologism which captures the cumulative 
change in the nature of multi-person decision making. This process is usually supported by 
technologies such as satellite communications, electronic messages, teleconferencing, and shared 
databases (Committee on Human Factors, 1990). 
 DDM is performed by either teams or organizations; usually researchers merge both 
concepts and do not give enough attention for defining each one separately. Blau and Scott 
(1962) defined a formal organization as a “purposive aggregation of individuals who exert 
concerted effort toward a common and explicitly recognized goal”. On the other hand, Orasanu 
and Salas (1992) defined a team as a group whose members share a common goal and common 
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task.  Furthermore, Kang, Waised, and Wallace (1998) in their paper “Team Soar, a model for 
team decision making” argue that the most critical distinction between teams and groups is the 
degree of differentiation of roles or expertise relevant to the task and the degree of member 
interdependence. 
 Even though team and organization definitions present similar characteristics, general 
knowledge identifies the team concept as a small group of people who accomplish their task over 
a short timeframe and an organization as a long-lasting complex institution.  This research will 
use the organization concept for studying network centric decision making under extreme events, 
since an organization presents procedures and hierarchies, which can be summarized as protocols 
or a set of rules, attributes essential for modeling and simulating an organizational structure.  
 The literature regarding “team decision making” suggests that teams make better 
decisions than individuals, especially for complex tasks (Prietula, Carley & Gasser, 1998). 
Nevertheless, the team performance will depend of the previous knowledge that it has of its 
tasks, the role and position of its members and the configuration that exists in the team. 
 Hazen and Fewell (2004) did research about the history of decision-making models, and 
they defined two branches that are not always clearly separated; the first one defines the aim of 
decision-making models to assist decision-makers in making better decisions (for instance 
Bayes’s theorem). The second identifies models which describe how decisions are actually made 
in practice and quantifies the quality of those decisions.  This dissertation pursues the second 
approach, since the author is interested in simulating the way an organization performs under 
extreme events in order to collect the most significant parameters and enable quantitative 
analysis based on AAR and lessons learned methodology. 
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 The organization structures for responding to extreme events usually accomplish their 
missions in separate locations. Depending on the type of event, there are many actors who 
support the decision making process. Those actors have different skills, knowledge, missions, 
and resources. In the previous context, one of the main challenges is trying to measure the 
performance of an organization both as a whole and as an individual role (The reader should note 
that an individual role can be configured by many people performing known tasks). 
 This dissertation proposes that the performance of those organizations should be 
measured when they face complex scenarios. These environments of tension can be 
characterized by four main features:   
• The organization has clear procedures and structure for responding to the extreme events. 
• There is a short time for decision making. 
• Critical decisions must be made with vital results. 
• There is collaborative work among all actors in the organizational structure. 
Extreme event concept 
Sarewitz and Pielke (2000) defined ten properties of extreme events and their associated 
implications for decision making. See Table 3. 
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Table 3: Properties of extreme events (Sarewitz & Pielke, 2000) 
Properties Implications for decision making 
Rapid onset vs. 
“creeping change” 
The decision making implication may be quite different for 
different events. 
Rare Little opportunity for learning. Relevant experience may be 
lacking. May or may not be a factor in evolutionary 
psychology. Rare events may control system evolution. 
High consequence Attention will be focused on event. Decisions matter. 
High uncertainty Generally, extreme events are difficult to predict. They often 
occur with insufficient warning. Some extreme events may 
be predicted months or years in advance (meteor strike, 
Y2K) but that may still not provide sufficient time or 
motivation for action. 
Time pressure Limited time for analysis. Stress producing. 
Disruptive Normal activities may cease. Loss of constancy. Stress 
producing 
Pose complex, ill 
structured problem 
This lack of structure may encourage intuitive mode of 
responding when analytic mode is more appropriate. 
Potential to create long 
term change 
In the aftermath of an extreme event, decision makers may 
face a new environment. Again, loss of constancy and stress 
are likely. 
Affect large numbers of 
people and/or large 
ecosystems. 
Group decision, leadership, government action, trust, and 
cooperation/communication among stakeholders are 
important for implementation of effective decisions. 
Under-represented and 
disenfranchised groups 
tend to be 
disproportionately 
vulnerable. 
Equity should be explicitly considered in decision making.  
 
 
Generally speaking, the literature identifies extreme events with dangerous situations 
produced by man-made or natural disasters; we include the previous approach, but do not 
exclude those critical events which affect organizational structures, such as a problem in the 
banking system due to an unexpected stock market slump, a lack of raw materials in a factory 
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due to an interruption in the supply chain, or the sudden failure of critical infrastructures such as 
an electrical blackout.  This research is an attempt to identify and simulate similar pattern 
behavior in highly hierarchical organizations, with known procedures which must face critical 
and unusual situations. 
 Brunner (2000) described some extreme events as those which disrupt the routine 
practices of many people at the same time, such as the OPEC oil embargo in 1971 which 
produced long waiting lines at gas stations, among other consequences. Pielke (2000) described 
different models which represent the natural observable fact named extreme event, but he did not 
model the effect that these events could produce in an organization. 
 Mendonca and Wallace (2003) pointed out that extreme events are those which create the 
need for cooperation among responding organizations. Activities to mitigate the effects of these 
events can be expected to range from planned to improvised. Previous planning is fundamental 
for facing an extreme event, but it is necessary to collect data in order to understand how an  
organization and its decision making nodes react, especially when they must respond with 
improvisation because the extreme event was never considered a possibility. 
 A different approach is presented by Carver and Lesser (1994), who developed the theory 
of opportunistic planning; this assembles a solution to face extreme events using the library of 
cognitive and behavioral processes contained within an emergency and response system. This 
dissertation claims that the roles  under a crisis situation do not usually adhere to established 
procedures for coordination and resource utilization, and many of them present irregular 
behavior depending on how the situation changes over time. 
 A key element necessary for modeling organizational behavior facing extreme events is 
how the data on organizational decision making during emergency response may be captured.
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 A mathematical approach for the management of emerging phenomena is presented by 
Guastello (2002), who stated that it is possible to introduce mathematical structures that underlie 
organizational events and observe some patterns in the way an organization reacts to an extreme 
event. He proposes nonlinear dynamical systems theory for representing organizational behavior 
and suggests a structural equations technique for testing the nonlinear hypothesis. The Guastello 
approach matches with the purpose of this research in order to use SD combined with other 
techniques for simulating dynamic system behavior of different actors who accomplish their 
tasks over a NCDM environment.   
 Figure 3 shows a definition of four scenarios regarding events versus location made “to 
illustrate the range of situations against which potential command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) needs for emergency 
responders might be identified” (Committee on Army and Technology for Homeland Defense, 
C4ISR, 2004).  
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Figure 3: Eight emergency situation area shown with four scenario definitions 
 
 
The four scenarios previously identified are an initial attempt to develop a parameterized 
framework which would allow us to quantitatively study a NCDM environment. 
 Halachmi (1980) stated that several studies have demonstrated that unexpected extreme 
events within a social system may result in the same patterns of disruptive behavior, even when 
such events are anticipated. As a consequence of extreme events, he identified two stages:  first 
order effects and second order effects. The former are direct, unidirectional, and hard to control; 
they produce changes in organizational behavior, operational behavior, and managerial roles.  
The latter are the result of multiple interrelations and reciprocal influence, and organization 
behavior directly affects performance, for instance “during a crisis it is difficult to find a case of 
an available organization that does not try to play a part in the disaster effort” because it is 
expected that all roles develop new tasks in response to the disaster which may generate 
confusion, message overloading, and increasing demand for scarce resources. 
Single Location  
Single Event  
Multiple Locations  
Multiple Events  
Supermarket Fire  
Paraguay.  
2004 Complexity 1 
Kobe, Earthquake 
City collapse  
1995 Complexity 2 
Tsunami  
Asia 
2004 Complexity 3 
Earthquake/Tsunami 
Chile,  
1960 Complexity 4 
Wildfires  
San Diego-Santa Ana 
2003 Complexity 3 
San Francisco 
Earthquake,  
1906 Complexity 2 
Bombing attack  
Oklahoma City. 
1995 .Complexity 1  
Hurricane Mitch 
Honduras 
1999 Complexity 4 
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Initial requirements for simulating the effects of extreme events produced by terrorism 
acts were developed by Sandia National Laboratories in 1998. Even though this report considers 
only terrorism circumstances, it encompasses significant modeling and simulation requirements 
which could be applied to any sort of extreme event.       
 According to resounding effects, four scenarios were selected and the corresponding 
actors, simulation output, and modeling approach are described. All the scenarios require the 
“interplay and coordination of numerous decision-makers and resources to assist in response and 
recovery effort.” The simulations should be capable of calculating three types of outputs: social 
impact, economic cost, and organizational effectiveness. The report points out that “a primary 
use of the model would be to determine the optimum degree of organizational effectives to 
reduce the social impacts and the economic costs of any incident” (Pryor, Marozas, Allen, 
Paananen, Hiebert-Dodd & Reinert, 1998). 
 Smith (2002) presented a related approach that explored the concepts for creating a 
“simulation of national infrastructure” which could be used to explore the collective impact if 
some critical infrastructure sector is disrupted by an extreme event. He made a ranking of the 
most studied critical infrastructures, electrical power being the most studied, followed by 
telephone systems and water processing. Most of the literature uses the term extreme events for 
referring to terrorist attacks; this dissertation uses the terminology to describe events produced 
by man-made or natural disasters. 
 Peerenboom (2002) depicted the implications of multiple contingency events which may 
affect infrastructures. His main concern is centered on failures affecting the interdependent 
“systems of systems” infrastructure. Three general category failures are described: cascading 
failures, escalating failures, and common cause failures. 
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Modeling and simulating organizational structures 
According to most classical research in organizational theory (such as Taylor, Fayol and 
Weber) it is possible to define the best way an organization could perform in its environment. In 
contrast to classical scholars, current organizational theorists believe that organizational design 
depends on the size, technology, strategies, and environment that surround the organization 
(Borgatti, 2001). The latter approach is known as contingency theory.  
 In order to define contingency theory, Donaldson (2001) first describes the contingency 
approach in science, in which the relationship between two variables is part of a larger causal 
system involving a third variable known as the moderator factor. Thus the focus of the 
contingency theory” is to study the impact of a third variable on effectiveness and efficiency.  
 Burton and Obel (1995) summarized the application of mathematics in organizational 
studies, and they concluded that “information processing is the fundamental way to view 
organizations and their designs.” They defined “the contingency model of organizational 
design,” which makes a relationship between factors for organizational structure and structural 
configuration of the organization and its properties. The first criteria selected were “effectiveness 
and efficiency”. 
 Using contingency theory Burton and Obel presented several mathematical programming 
models of organizational design based on strategy, technology, size, and managerial style. They 
merged an information processing view of organization with contingency theory, in order to 
present a combined framework for considering organizational design choice. Table 4 shows the 
main models supported on classical organizational paradigm and contingency theory. 
 
 
 22
Table 4: Mathematical programming model (Burton & Obel, 1995) 
Model Implication 
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M-form organization modeled with 
coordination. Most of the examples apply to 
finance planning or allocation of resources in 
the industry, but the model fits well for 
analyzing a combined organization 
composed of civil, military and non- 
governmental organizations facing an 
emergency situation. 
 
 
In an organizational context, it is usually difficult for decision makers to evaluate the 
performance of similar units; likely the most successful models have been those known as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), which was introduced in 1978. The main purpose of DEA is to 
evaluate the performance of similar decision making units (DMU) with the same goals and 
objectives (Anderson, Sweeney & Williams, 2000). Using the previous approach, Zhu (2003) 
developed new DEA models for evaluating value chains and congestion measures. 
 Based on a classical organizational paradigm, Virtual Design Team was one of the first 
simulations which incorporated a hybrid environment to study the total duration of a complete 
C1 
A1 
B1 
b1 
bo 
C2 
A2 
B2 
b2 
Subunit 1 Subunit 1 
HQ 
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project along the critical path by means of sub tasking. The central idea of the Virtual Design 
Team was essentially “information-processing structures and communication systems.” The 
models were built under the paradigm of DES and “qualitative reasoning concepts derived from 
artificial intelligence” (Levitt, Cohen, Kunz, Nass, Christiansen & Jin, 1994). 
 This dissertation makes a distinction between simulation systems that allow for the 
collection of data directly from real people (organization in the loop) and those implemented as 
synthetic entities based on classical paradigms such as discrete simulation, agent-based 
simulation, or cognitive architectures.    
 Constructive simulation has been one of the most classical systems for simulating 
organizational structures, usually used for training military commanders and their staff. 
According to the Department of Defense glossary (DoD), (1995), this type of simulation means 
“models and simulations that involve simulated people operating simulated systems. Real people 
stimulate (make inputs to) such simulations, but they are not involved in determining the 
outcomes".  These sorts of simulations were the first attempts to improve organizational behavior 
in a military context, in particular those performed by the commanders and their military staffs. 
Even though constructive simulations are very useful for testing planning and execution, the data 
acquired from these simulations is produced by the models and not by human behavior.  
 MacMillan, Dirdrich, Entin and Serfaty (2005) completed a research project called 
“Measuring Organizational Performance in Simulation Environment.” They provide examples 
regarding the use of theories and constructive simulations to structure empirical data collection 
for organizational performance. They focus their research on organizational structures for 
military command and control, including new structures associated with the concept of NCW. 
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From this work, the author selected six meaningful findings which confirm the approach of this 
dissertation: 
• Computational organizational models can make predictions about the performance of 
organizations that do not yet exist. 
• Controlled experimentation and correlation studies are severely limited in their ability to 
consider dynamic causal effect over time. 
• Models can act as dynamic theories or dynamic hypotheses by making testable predictions 
about how multiple variables will interact to produce measurable outcomes. 
• At the heart of NCW is the challenge of creating new organizational forms and structures that 
can use the rapid movement of information to create and maintain a strategic and tactical 
advantage in military conflicts. 
• “The creation and use of constructive simulations to test new organizational concepts does not 
free us from the need to collect data through empirical human-in-the-loop testing”. 
The US Navy Tactical Decision Making under Stress (TADMUS) Program has been the 
most significant research so far in the area of decision making under stress, considering the issue 
of how individuals and teams are required to make critical decisions during changing and intense 
situations (TADMUS Report, 1998). TADMUS was the product of two critical events: the first 
was the USS Stark incident, where the commander did not engage an inbound aircraft which was 
not thought to be a threat to his ship, and 27 US naval personnel lost their lives. The second one 
was the USS Vincennes event, where the commander ordered his crew to engage the inbound 
aircraft which turned out to be a commercial airline and all personnel aboard were killed 
(TADMUS Report, 1998). 
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 In 1999 the US Navy published the main benefits from transitioning the TADMUS 
products and process to other types of civilian and military organizations that must execute their 
tasks in a collaborative environment, with little reaction time and facing critical decisions. The 
TADMUS report identified potential advantages to other organizations: 
Many operational environments have the same characteristics as Navy environments. 
Specifically, information from multiple sources must be processed quickly, events are 
fast-paced, situations are constantly changing, requiring acute situational awareness and 
the ability to make decisions quickly in the midst of seeming chaos, decisions can have 
major impacts (life or death), and teams of experts from various locations and agencies 
are formed on site and must quickly learn to function as one expert team (TADMUS, 
1998). 
  
Even though this dissertation will not incorporate cognitive task analysis, some results tested and 
validated by the TADMUS Project will be used as a basis for modeling an organizational 
structure to manage emergency situations. 
 An experiment was conducted using a synthetic environment reported to investigate the 
complexities of distributed team interaction and problem solving performance within a 
controlled setting (Fiores, Cuevas, Scielzo & Salas, 1999). Training performed with 25 
undergraduate students allowed the testing of hypotheses regarding problem solving measures 
and general metacomprehension. The study found that multiple computer-based methods of 
diagnosing problem solving performance can be used to assess knowledge acquisition for a 
complex synthetic team task. 
   Supported by these hypotheses, a novel methodology, designed by the Chilean Army 
and known as Training Organizational Behavior, was implemented by means of a collaborative 
software known as Simulation for Training Emergency Response, a web-based training system 
whose main purpose is to produce data to evaluate organizational behavior when critical 
decisions are to be made and response time is limited (SIGEN Project, 2003). This methodology 
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has been used in the training of more than 120 users that belong to civilian and military 
organizations, including an emergency system for Honduras facing an event similar to Hurricane 
Mitch, an emergency system for Chile facing an earthquake, and a peacekeeping operations 
battalion posted in Haiti. Although the system enables the improvement of collaborative decision 
making as a whole, individual behavior and information path analysis is still hard and time-
consuming for analyzing and determining the cause-effect relationship between decisions made 
in different roles. 
 Lin (1994) argued that “often, success is not guaranteed by the existence of a complex 
organization design nor by the existence of high-quality information alone.” His research showed 
that an organization with a high performance level must have an organizational design matched 
to the task environment, and he concluded that the best design is contingent.  
 Yasuhiko (2004) in a novel study defined an organization as “a complex system of 
interconnected human and nonliving machines” (Notice that the definition is comparable to a 
net-centric environment, previously described in this dissertation). In their research they identify 
two approaches to develop formal results for an organization: The first one is named “qualitative 
mathematics or organizational cybernetic theory” and the second one is named “computational 
approach.” Table 5 summarizes the two approaches. 
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Table 5: Contrast between two approaches for modeling organizations (Yasuhiko, 2004) 
 Organizational Cybernetic  
Theory 
Computational Organizational 
Theory 
Internal 
Structure 
Three layers, each one with 
very well defined functions. 
Less structure, there is a collection 
of processes and intelligent adaptive 
agents with a dynamic behavior. 
Components • Goal-seeking object 
• Goal-seeking activity 
(optimization, 
coordination, and 
adaptation according to its 
hierarchical position). 
• Process model  
• Agents 
• Tasks 
• Skills 
Methodology Mathematical qualitative 
approach. 
Simulation, expert system, and 
numerical analysis. 
Research  
Area 
Organizational design. Organizational design and learning, 
organizational and information 
technology, organizational evolution 
and change.  
Constraints Implicitly handled as 
constraints to a goal-seeking 
activity. 
Explicitly defined. 
 
Social networks  
A social network is a set of actors that may have relationships with one another. 
Networks can have few or many actors (nodes), and one or more kinds of relations (edges) 
between pairs of actors (Hannemann & Riddle, 2005). The use of a network for representing 
mathematical relationships among entities was started in the 17th century when Spinoza 
developed the first model. In 1937 Moreno introduced sociometry and sociograms and in 1948 
Bavelas founded the group networks laboratory at MIT. The concept of centrality was specified 
at this time and in 1949 Rapaport developed a probability-based model of information flow. In 
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the 1970s the social field emerged based on new features in graph theory and computational 
analysis of complex data sets (Freeman, 2000). 
 Based on SNA, Carley (1995; 1999) described the concept of computational organization 
analysis in which the organizations are viewed as inherently computational entities and she 
defined a set of key measurements for characterizing organizational architectures. Carley has 
developed significant contributions in the area of dynamic social networks, most of them 
supported by mathematical foundation and computational analysis.   
 In order to design the best possible C2 architectures for the Australian Defense Force, 
FINC (Force, Intelligence, Networking, and C2) methodology was implemented based on a 
social network foundation. The method allows the calculation of three metrics for every C2 
architecture: the information flow coefficient measuring tempo superiority, the coordination 
coefficient measuring coordination superiority, and the intelligence coefficient measuring 
information superiority. Based on a test-bed, it was possible to explore the impact of different 
organizational architecture under a range of different conditions (Dekkler, 2002).  
 Similar experiments have been developed at the Center for Computational Analysis of 
Social and Organizational Systems at Carnegie Mellon University. One of the most 
representative deals with “Measuring and Modeling Change in C3I Architectures” using 
PCANSS formalism, mathematically represented C2 architecture as a set of matrixes linking 
personnel, resources, tasks, and relations among them. Results pointed out the degree of 
similarity/difference in the various measures, the relative ability to predict performance, and the 
relative ability to predict adaptability in C2 Architectures (Carley, Ren & Krackhardt, 2001; 
Hazy & Tivnan, 2004). 
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 Simulation-based statistical inference for the evolution of social networks was presented 
by Snijders ( 2004), who asserted that single observations of networks are snapshots and the 
results of untraceable history, and then the more descriptively oriented type of statistical 
modeling of linear regression analysis cannot be transplanted to network analysis, where the 
focus has to be on modeling dependencies.  
 Extreme events analysis with data coming from real people and real events is expensive 
and time consuming for implementation. Mendonca and Wallace (2003) describe one of them:  
…interview data from Hurricane Camille, directed graphs were constructed, a total of 52 
interviews were analyzed and 106 response personnel in more than 85 organizations 
identified. Based on social network analysis, the results suggested that among the senders 
the most central organizations were the Police Department and the Emergency Operating 
Center; on the other hand, among the receivers the most central organizations were the 
National Guard and Radio Station. Additionally this analysis incorporated basic matrix 
operations applied to the adjacency matrix to examine the centrality of the network.  The 
study identified that the Police Department, the National Guard and the Radio Station 
played central roles as senders since their respective normalized degrees were greatest. 
These groups can be viewed as the ones that requested the appropriate authority for an 
update of the situation, announced to the public on the current condition of the Hurricane, 
and/or declared a curfew/warning…. 
 
This dissertation suggests that a social network could be combined with other simulation 
techniques, allowing the possibility for gathering different snapshots of organization states over 
time. The merged techniques may be used to describe behaviors of individuals and groups when 
there are digital systems that allow the logging of communications, tasks, and decisions. Figure 4 
shows two states of the evolution of an organization when it faces an extreme event.  
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  Police Mayor Navy FEMA NGO Measures and metric  Police Mayor Navy FEMA NGO Fire 
Rescue
Police  X 1 1 1 0 Degree 
 
Max.Flow. 
 
Police X 0 1 0 0 0 
Mayor 1 X 0 0 1 Mutually Connected nodes.
 
Noah effect  centrality Mayor 0 X 1 0 1 1 
Navy 0 0 X 1 1 Geodesic Paths. 
 
Sequence. 
 
Navy 0 0 X 0 0 1 
FEMA 1 0 1 X 1 Dependency. 
 
Cohesion. 
 
FEMA 1 0 0 X 0 1 
NGO 0 1 1 1 X Connectivity (nodes). 
 
Clique. 
 
NGO 1 0 0 0 X 0 
        Fire 
Rescue
0 0 0 1 1 X 
Figure 4: Networks and matrix to represent an emergency management organization in two 
periods 
 
This research requires identification of the main variables and states of an organization 
over time in order to decide which merged techniques are more suitable for simulating either the 
variables or the states.  
Lorrain and White developed an evolutionary approach for studying structural 
equivalence in social networks; their work was known as blockmodeling, which is characterized 
by two main aspects  
• To provide a way to analyze role structures (positions). 
• To allow identification of basic structures of social networks (usually organizational 
structures with more than 15 roles are difficult to analyze). 
Mayor 
FEMA 
NGO 
Police 
Navy 
Police 
Navy 
FEMA 
Mayor 
Fire 
Rescue  
NGO 
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In practical aspects blockmodeling seeks to reduce and simplify a large network which could not 
be well understood. The reduced network can be represented by its relational matrix known as an 
“image matrix” (Lorrain & White, 1971). 
There are several algorithms which are used to assign a block to a subset of data, one of 
the most well-known is CONCOR (convergence of iterated correlations), which is based on the 
convergence of iterated calculation of the Pearson correlations of pairs of either rows or columns 
(Netminer, 2005).  
To identify common behavior of actors working in an organization, Schwartz and 
Sprinzen (1984) identified that,  
the occupant of a common position will exhibit a common pattern of relations, across 
multiples relations, consistently tending to have certain relations with occupants of 
particular other positions and to not have the same type of relation with of yet other 
position”. 
 
In order to study transactions in interdependent relations, Buskens (2002) described social 
networks as a “valued directed graph with weighted nodes.” A valued network representing n 
nodes is a pair (π, A ), where π is a n-vector of weights indicating the importance of each node  
with  0,11 >=∑ = ini i ππ for all i, and A is a  n x n matrix where  αij, 0 < αij < 1, is the importance 
of the tie from node i to node j.   Moreover Buskens described “global network parameters which 
can measure the properties of a network as a whole and can explain interaction networks 
effects.” Several inferences on the effects of network parameters on information diffusion rates 
are summarized in Table 6 and Table 7. Implications are inferred according to this research. 
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Table 6: Individual network parameters (TR= Transition rate, RR=Reception rate) (Buskens, 
2002) 
Individual Network Parameters TR RR Implication for NCDM 
Out- 
degree iji
iji
ioutD αππ ∑≠−= 1
1)(
 
+ 0 Nodes with higher out degree could send more information 
and generate less uncertainty for situation awareness. 
In- degree 
jii
iji
iinD αππ ∑≠−=1
1)(  
0 + Nodes with higher in degree receive more information, 
likely more congestion, require more analysis. 
Out 
degree 
Quality  
),,()( απ outDFioutQ =
 
+ 0 Depend on network position. This parameter shows the 
extent to which a node is linked to nodes which have high 
degree themselves. We suppose higher degree quality could 
increase the transmission of information but could be 
dangerous if the initial or bridge nodes are critical points 
into a NCDM environment. 
In-degree  
Quality  
),,,()( απ outDFiinQ =  0 + If one node receives information from one node it receives partial information if the sender node receives information 
from only one node. Extreme consequence for decision 
makers if this node does not have certain autonomy. 
Local  out 
degree 
density   
),()( απFiLDout =    This parameter measures the extent to which a node transmits information to connected neighbors. In a NCDM 
environment it could be expected that information is 
transmitted more slowly if a node informs two nodes which 
have many contacts between themselves. 
Local in 
degree 
density  
),()( απFiLDin =    This parameter measures the extent to which a node obtains information from connected neighbors. Likely nodes with 
higher in degrees will receive information sooner than 
nodes with lower local in degree. 
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Table 7: Global network parameters (TR= Transition rate, RR=Reception rate; Buskens, 2002) 
Global 
Network 
Parameters 
Network Parameters TR RR Implication for NCDM  
Density 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑=∆
= ≠
= ≠
1 1
1
i j
n
i ij
ji
ijji
ππ
αππ
 
+ + Working on network centric environment. Could 
information be transmitted faster on networks with higher 
density? 
Out degree 
variance 
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- - Average variance in the out degrees nodes in the network.  
Centralization could accelerate information diffusion if the 
central nodes are important in the diffusion process.  
In-degree 
variance 
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+ + There are not clear inferences for centralization 
parameters; Buskens argues that likely the “information 
transmission rate and the information reception rate 
decrease with out degree and in degree variance.”  Note 
that this analysis is a “conjecture” in a social network 
environment; we are exploring possible tools for analysis 
in a NCDM environment. 
Network 
Size 
    N   Network size, because Buskens defines πi = 1/n then the 
numbers of nodes can have effects on information 
diffusion. 
 
 
Carley (2003; 2005) introduced the concept of dynamic network analysis, and she 
pointed out that “traditionally SNA has focused on small, bounded networks, with 2-3 types of 
links among one type of node at one point in time, with close to perfect information.” Dynamic 
network can deal with large dynamic multi-mode, multi-link networks with variable levels of 
uncertainty. Her analysis is based on three key innovations:  
• Meta-matrix – Focusing on people, knowledge-resources and tasks. 
• Probabilistic ties – The links in the meta-matrix are probabilistic. 
• Multi-agent network model – Using basic social and cognitive processes people can 
learn, do tasks and take part in events. 
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Carley's approach is an attempt to define a new theory named Dynamic network analysis, and 
her analysis is supported in numerous previous papers and toolkits such as PCANS, DyNet, and 
OrgNet. (Carley & Kanmeva, 2004) 
Discrete event simulation 
 In DES passive objects represent entities, which travel through the blocks of the 
flowchart and wait for getting a service. The literature shows few examples regarding studies of 
organization structures from a DES perspective. One of the main advantages of DES for 
modeling organizational structures is that it enables parallel, distributed, and interdependent 
organizational traffic flow across the network to be accurately simulated (Griffin & Skinner, 
2003). Moreover, DES enables tracking the status of individual entities in a shop floor 
(organizational structure) and estimates numerous performance measures associated with those 
entities (Venkateswaran, Son & Jones, 2004). 
 On the other hand DES simulation is not appropriate when state variables interact with 
one another on a continuous basis, and when entities and their internal mechanisms are a more 
important element of the simulation than an event, per se (Dooley, 2002). There are significant 
elements which are appropriate for modeling organizational structures, although this technique is 
not enough for gathering all the characteristics of an organization.   
 A DES simulation approach was used for modeling the critical decisions timeline 
performed by the crew of the USS Vincennes (Franceschini, McBride, & Sheldon, 2001). We 
estimate that significant activities performed by an emergency organizational structure can be 
modeled and simulated with DES, such as workload, priorities, saturation, timeline, service time, 
etc. 
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 A different perspective is presented by McGinnis (2005) who explored the concept of 
organizational simulation using the knowledge acquired from two domains: integrated circuits 
(ICs) design and discrete event logistics systems.  He said “in terms of design features, a 
contemporary IC is clearly a more complex artifact than could be contemplated.” ICs have many 
levels of abstractions in which at the lower level there is a small set of bases and simple 
functions, and thus very precise simulation models can be compiled and can predict behavior. 
Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Hardware Description Language is the technology 
which enables design automation for digital ICs. 
 However, a discrete event logistics system is not a completely formalized process and 
there is an absence of a formal modeling discipline (ad hoc discipline). As McGinnis (2005) 
notes, “Nevertheless a large portion of the organizational simulation problem domain consists of 
organizations which exhibit discrete flow of materials, people, or information, and whose 
behavior over time is intimately related to these flows.”. 
 Biswas and Merchawi (2000) reported the implementation of a discrete simulation model 
in conjunction with an agent based scheduling engine. Their implementation enabled validation 
of an adaptive scheduling using a discrete simulation software package in which several factories 
are simulated.  Controlled input parameters were sent through of a message broker to an agent 
based scheduler in which several agents make decisions based on their own individual priorities 
and rules. 
 On the other hand, Venkateswaran, Son and Jones (2004) modeled a hierarchical 
production planning using two levels, the first one named planning (higher decision level) and 
the second named scheduling (lower decision level). A SD model simulated “the production 
dynamics involved in the execution of the production plan,” and a DES model simulated the 
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operations carried out in the enterprise such as material processing, transfer, and storage. The 
interaction between SD and DES was made via a high level architecture. The results 
demonstrated that the hybrid simulation framework provides seamless integration between SD 
and DES models and can be used to analyze interdependency between planning and the 
manufacturing processes in an organization. 
 The two previous examples show the integration of two simulation paradigms in a 
manufacturing environment, and both applications enclose significant techniques which could be 
customized for simulating a network-centric process.  
 Searching by organizational structures which perform their tasks over a network-centric 
environment, this literature review summarizes the most complex model found based on a DES 
named “A Study on the US Expeditionary Warfare System.” The study was conducted at the 
Naval Postgraduate School and the model basically emulates an expeditionary force which is 
defined as a system of systems where ships, aircraft, vehicles, fuel, food, water and so on are 
linked on a network-centric environment. The simulation enabled the evaluation of three issues: 
• A system of systems analysis for a expeditionary warfare architecture.  
• The study of interfaces and synergies among ships, aircraft and systems within 
architecture.  
• The comparison of different operational concepts in terms of troops, vehicles and 
logistics support. 
 Even though the two models built provided significant knowledge about how to analyze a 
military organization in a dynamic environment, this simulation has some limitations: Some 
steps require user inputs; there is a constant rate of consumption based only on vehicles and 
troops; the simulation does not produce the best solution, and there are no optimization modules 
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in the system; and finally, the assets and resources are generalized into different categories 
(Students of the US Naval Postgraduate School, 2003). 
The Network Warfare Simulation is a discrete event simulation tool built under a net-
centric approach. The system allows the simulation of voice and data communication required 
during civil and military crisis events. The architecture is supported by commercial off-the-shelf 
software, and is made up of a set of libraries, a scenario builder, planning capacity, a simulation 
engine, and analysis tools.  Simulation can be used to model communication equipment, 
organizations, and information (Flournoy & Murphy, 2002). 
System dynamics  
The basis concept in SD is that behavior of a system arises from its structure.  In system 
dynamics this structure is modeled based on feedback loops, stocks, and flows (Sterman, 2000). 
Much of the literature points out that SD is a technique for dealing with complex systems 
because nonlinearity emerges as the most common behavior.  Mathematically, an SD model is a 
system of differential equations, in which the model works only with aggregates. The items in 
the same stock are indistinguishable and there is a global structural dependency (Borshchev & 
Filippov, 2003).  
In order to describe a problem in SD, the modeler has to show the system’s behavior as a 
number of interacting feedback loops, balancing or reinforcing. The system’s behavior must be 
first generalized from specific events associated with the system under study, and it requires 
investigation as to how the variables change over time. Therefore, when the behavior is known, 
the modeler can look for the system structure which is the cause of the behavior. Usually the 
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systems present four types of behavior patterns and each is generated by different structures. 
Tables 8, 9, and 10 show these behavior patterns (Kirkwood, 1998, Sterman, 2000). 
 
Table 8: Positive feedback loop (modifications to Sterman, 2000; Kirkwood, 1998) 
Pattern behavior Analytical solution System Structure 
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Table 9: Combination of positive and negative loops (modifications to Sterman 2000;  
Kirkwood, 1998) 
 
Pattern behavior Analytical solution System Structure 
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Table 10: Negative feedback loop (modifications to Sterman 2000; Kirkwood, 1998) 
Pattern behavior  Analytical solution     System Structure 
 
Negative (balancing) feedback 
loop. 
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In order to build a SD model, a modeler breaks down a known process into distinct stages and 
represents the interactions between the various stages. Such models are called “compartmental” 
and are graphically depicted by block diagrams (Nagle, Saff & Snider, 2004). 
 In the early 80s, Coyle (1980) published a model about “The Dynamic of the Third 
World War,” which represents a hypothetical war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
Although it is recognized that SD technique allows aggregate modeling (high abstraction for 
policy), the model showed real parameters combined with different strategies in a specific 
timeframe. Resources, vehicles, weapons, and forces were also incorporated into the model. 
Three main conclusions arose:  
• The model was an aid to understanding structures. 
•  It was proposed as a tool for analyzing contingency planning.  
• It was identified as a decision support at the heart of a C2 System. 
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 Twenty years later, SD simulation technique continues being used (beyond the business 
arena). For instance, Sandia Laboratory analysts have created several models to combine generic 
components of specific systems in order to simulate domestic infrastructure protection. “Their 
goal is to create a modeling structure and software module that can capture the 
interdependencies” between critical infrastructure (Smith, 2002). 
 Yerkes and Dodson ( 1908) developed a curvilinear relationship between stress and 
performance known as “Yerkes-Dodson Law of Arousal”, which states that an organism’s 
performance can be improved if this organism is aroused in some manner. However, if the level 
of arousal increases too much, the level of performance decreases. Using the previous 
relationship as an assumption, Rudolph and Repenning (2003) implemented a SD model to study 
how organizations react to an ongoing stream of interruption of normal activities; they 
demonstrated a new crisis archetype, the quantity-induced crisis. Their study suggests that the 
strategies often proposed for mitigating a novelty-induced crisis – stepping back and reframing 
the situation – can be counterproductive when confronting a potential quality-induced crisis. As 
shown in Figure 5, any action that temporarily slows the interruption resolution rate can push the 
system closer to an unstable equilibrium, making collapse more likely. 
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Figure 5: Structure of disaster model (model developed for this dissertation, following the 
facsimile of Rudolph et al., 2003) 
 
Agent based modeling  
There is no universal definition to describe the ABM paradigm, and people are still 
discussing what type of properties an agent must have to deserve this label (Borshchev & 
Filippov, 2004). This literature review enabled the collection of several attributes which could 
characterize a piece of software named agent: decentralized behavior, learning from experience, 
bottom-up modeling, global behavior emerging from many individual entities, demonstration of 
some degree of intelligence, perception of the environment and that influence reactions, capacity 
for interaction, and social ability. 
 The agent definition which more faithfully represents the objectives of this research: 
“Agents are programmed software modules that scan their environment and make a decision” 
(Ilanchinski, 1996). 
 From an academic perspective, Wooldridge (2002) presented abstract architectures of 
intelligent agents; his main contribution is the “formalized view of agents.” Initially he defined 
the surrounding agents’ environment which is based on a finite set of discrete states (E={ e’, e’’, 
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,e’’’… }). The agents “are assumed to have a repertoire of possible actions available to them 
which transform the state of the environment” (Ac={,α’, α’’, α’’’ … }).  
 Interaction is produced when the agent chooses an action α  to perform on E= e.  Then 
the E responds with a number of possible states e; nevertheless the agent “does not know in 
advance” which will be the future state. Thus new cycles can be executed.   
In the context of this research, we consider significant three attributes defined by 
Wooldridge: 
• Agents are assumed to be deterministic. 
• The environment is history dependent and implicitly non-deterministic. 
• Agents make decisions about what action to perform based on the history of the system. 
This literature review found few examples regarding applications of ABM to organizational 
structure analysis, and we are going to concentrate on those which combine two or more 
simulation techniques.  
 TalenSim is a prototype based on the SD and ABM paradigms. It enabled the 
implementation of different scenarios with respect to organizational transformations and their 
impact “on workforce without any of the real-world consequences such as lower performance, 
turnover, low organizational commitment, etc.” Three entity types are modeled in the simulation: 
environment, company, and individual (Prasad & Chartier, 1999). 
 Qudrat-Ullah (2005) pointed out that SD validation techniques can be applied to ABM. 
He argued that there are three strong similarities between both techniques:  
• They can model non-linear and complex systems. 
•  Both assume that micro-structures of a system are responsible for its behavior.  
•  Both aim at discovering the leverage point in complex systems. 
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 Kang, Waisel and Wallace (1998) used computational modeling with distributed artificial 
intelligence as a paradigm for studying team behavior. The architecture that they chose was 
TeamSoar, which enabled the interconnection of individual agents. A naval command and 
control team was modeled and simulated and its results indicated that simulation is adequate for 
studying teams and predictions can be obtained regarding what happened.  
Even though computational models are useful for analyzing team decision making, those 
teams are made up of few nodes (4 nodes were described by Kang et al.) and tasks are strongly 
linked to the environment in which the team executes its mission.  
 Borshchev et al. (2004) presented a methodology for transforming SD and DES models 
into an ABM: The idea behind this approach is to simulate more sophisticated behavior using the 
statechart design. This approach is congruent with the Prasad application named TalenSim 
developed four years before. Statechart design is based on state machines adopted as a part of the 
standard Unified Modeling Languages (UML). Statechart enables the capturing of different state 
transitions of agents, communication among them, and actions which are performed by each one 
(agents). According to Borschev et al., using statechart it is possible to “re-conceptualize” 
existing SD and DES models. 
 The previous statement does not mean that the ABM approach is a replacement for SD or 
DES; there are a lot of applications where both simulations fit very well to solve real life 
problems. Moreover, for many such applications, ABM will not make much sense, being less 
efficient, harder to develop, or simply not matching the nature of the problem. 
 After analyzing this technique based on Unified Modeling Languages-Real Time, this 
literature review found useful features for modeling an emergency organizational structure by 
linking the concepts of ABM and statechart. 
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In order to generate understanding and inform research into the dynamics of cellular 
receptors, a study was conducted to compare SD and ABM. The comparison measured the 
overall approach, the underlying mathematics and analysis, the easiness with which results can 
be communicated to others, research relevance, and educational potential. The results showed 
that SD is more conceptual than ABM and the modeler should be careful to select the appropriate 
level of aggregation.  Nevertheless SD is easier to implement and to conduct sensitivity analysis. 
On the other hand, ABM obligates the modeler to describe clearly the definition of agent and 
also the modeler needs to specify the rules which will control the agent’s behavior (Wakeland, 
Gallaher, Macovsky & Aktipis, 2004).  
Even though SD is a relatively high level technique (aggregation), it presents difficulties 
for identifying stocks and flows in a system such as an emergency organization structure.  This 
problem becomes fundamental if we want to model the reality into a synthetic environment.  
In contrast, SD provides the capacity for modeling “non-linearity” based on feedback 
cycles and delay functions, aspects that could be useful for modeling organizational behavior 
over a networked structure.  
Conclusion based upon literature review for “Modeling and Simulating a Network-Centric 
Scenario under Extreme Events” 
Based on the literature review, this research proposes and justifies the use of 
mathematical and simulation techniques for developing a digital network-centric environment in 
which generic organizations could validate, study, and predict organizational behavior under 
extreme events. The term “generic organizations” is used to represent civilian, military, 
humanitarian, non governmental organizations (NGO), or merged organizations which perform 
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their tasks over a collaborative scenario, in separate locations and where each one has clear 
procedures for dealing with the information. Note that a “generic organization” interacts over a 
communicational infrastructure where many devices present individual and collective behaviors, 
such as databases, sensors, hubs, and decision support systems.  
 In this step, some people could ask “why does this research incorporate a SNA and not 
consider graph theory?” The answer is simple: SNA has its foundation in graph theory, and 
researchers have found many findings supported by graphs. Therefore, we make use of their 
interpretations to analyze a network centric environment. 
 Table 11 presents the main characteristics of the three main simulation paradigms and 
SNA. The table merges the findings of Chapter Two with our experience using the named 
techniques. 
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Table 11: Comparison of SD, DES, ABM and SNA 
 System Dynamics Discrete Event 
Simulation 
Agent Based 
Modeling 
Social Network  
1. Level Appropriate for 
modeling the 
aggregate behavior 
resulting from 
effects (non 
interactions) among 
multiple types of 
categories.  
Appropriate for 
modeling 
details, known 
processes and 
different entities 
and levels.  
Appropriate for 
modeling movement 
and state changes of 
individual entities, 
their interactions and 
rules. Implementing 
different levels. 
Appropriated for predicting 
future layout. 
Appropriated for analyzing 
topological structures.  
 
2. Entities Undistinguished, 
only dimensions 
and categories.  
Distinguished 
entities. 
Distinguished 
entities with 
interaction but 
usually there are not 
transactions.  
Distinguished nodes, but there 
are not transactions among 
them.   
3. Best use Efficient for 
modeling large 
number of 
continuum 
interactions. 
Efficient for 
modeling large 
number of 
discrete 
transactions and 
processes.  
Inefficient for 
modeling large 
numbers of 
interactions. 
No interactions for modeling. 
Inefficient for large network 
analysis, requires “complex 
network analysis” technique.  
4. Parameters Parameters cannot 
be modeled in 
different levels. 
Parameters can 
interact in 
different levels. 
Micro and macro 
parameters can 
interact. Vertical 
influence. 
Parameters cannot be modeled 
in different levels. 
5. Actions Level and flow 
cannot represent 
actions. 
Can implement 
rules but not 
actions. 
Actions allow 
generating behavior. 
Nodes and ties cannot represent 
actions. 
6. Internal 
structure 
Good for showing 
system’s structure 
and numerical 
results. 
Good for 
capturing 
processes and 
measuring 
performance. 
Good for showing 
the behavior of 
individual entities. 
Difficult to 
implement structure; 
it emerges naturally. 
Good for display topology and 
relationship between nodes. 
(dependencies, connections, 
centrality, cohesion, 
equivalency) 
7. 
Mathematic 
Numerical 
integration of 
difference 
equations. 
Stochastic 
processes 
Queuing theory 
and stochastic 
processes. 
Logic, algorithms, 
and probabilities. 
Graph theory and structural 
analysis. 
8. Abstraction Abstract, via state 
variables and 
equations that are 
solved to simulate 
behavior over time. 
Realistic, 
entities travel 
through several 
paths, server 
process, 
transform and 
sent to another 
server. 
Physical emulation 
of “agents” whose 
rules for behavior 
mirror the real world. 
Realistic and observable. 
Easy to implement physical 
emulation of locations and 
relationships.  
9. Behavior Difficult to identify 
unique behavior at 
the entity level. 
Easy to identify 
behavior at the 
entity level. 
Easy to identify 
unique entity 
behavior. 
No behavior is shown.  
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 System Dynamics Discrete Event 
Simulation 
Agent Based 
Modeling 
Social Network  
10. Systems’ 
understanding 
Useful for 
increasing 
conceptual 
understanding. 
The system 
must be known 
before 
modeling. Does 
not increase 
conceptual 
understanding.  
Useful for 
understanding 
interactions and 
global behavior, but 
it requires a previous 
conceptual 
understanding. 
Requires a well known layout, 
based on location, and 
relationships. System’s  
properties must be emulated.  
11. 
Inaccuracy 
Modeler can easily 
define a high level 
of aggregation 
which may not be 
adequate for 
simulating a 
system.   
Modeler easily 
can define the 
right physical 
layout for 
simulating a 
system.  
Modeler must 
consider the 
definition of agents 
in the right level. 
Selecting the 
adequate rules and 
interaction could be 
a possible source of 
mistakes. 
Two sources of mistake could 
be found: 
 Input data set and 
Data interpretation. 
Requires knowledge of the 
system under study.  
12. Data 
Inputs 
Does not require 
exhaustive data 
collection. 
Requires right 
empirical evidence 
and right input 
parameters. 
Requires 
exhaustive data 
collection and 
accurate 
distribution 
probabilities.  
Requires observable 
rules and interactions 
with the 
environment.   
Requires exhaustive data 
collection, which makes for 
difficult identifying and 
collecting.  
13. Data 
outputs 
Many outputs; if the 
empirical evidence 
(policies) is 
modeled using 
wrong parameters 
the outputs will be 
worthless.  
Notice, outputs are 
tendencies 
(policies). For 
current 
methodology, it is 
not allowed to 
apply statistical 
analysis. 
Many outputs, 
statistical 
analysis is 
required. 
Good for 
performance 
analysis.  
 
Many outputs, 
difficult to select the 
right measurement of 
performance.   
Outputs are new metrics 
deduced from new 
configurations, nodes size, ties 
and positions.   
14. Validation Validation could be 
easy if it is 
implemented at a 
high aggregated 
level. Hard if the 
aggregate level 
presents many 
parameters or there 
is a high level of 
abstraction. 
No calibration. 
 
 
 
Depending on 
the simulated 
system and 
historic data 
available.  
Available 
information does not 
enable a conclusive 
answer.  
Yes 
 48
 
 
System Dynamics Discrete Event 
Simulation 
Agent Based 
Modeling 
Social Network  
15. 
Intelligence 
No No Yes, but the modeler 
must specify what 
type of 
“intelligence.” 
No 
16. 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Well situated for 
sensitivity analysis. 
Better situated 
with DOE. 
No information 
available. 
 
Yes 
17. 
Optimization 
No No No No 
18. Dynamics 
Changes 
No. No. Yes. No. 
 
 
 
 
Twenty one significant conclusions are derived from the literature review: 
• Currently there are no models which use a hybrid simulation technique to represent the 
performance of an organization structure under an extreme event. The few models are 
based on linear programming and ABM. 
• General simulations based on quantitative techniques are either scarce or poorly 
documented.  Mendonca and Wallace (2003) reported an analysis of Hurricane Camille 
using a SNA technique; Doreian et al. (2005)  used the same technique for analyzing 
“Interorganizational SAR Network” formed after a small tornado flipped a boat on Lake 
Pomona in Kansas.  
• The USS Vincennes' incident and “A Study on the US Expeditionary Warfare System” 
are the only research efforts which mention the use of DES technique for simulating an 
organization.  
• Data output collected from either training systems (those which the author named 
“organization in the loop”) or real systems such as C2 is not used for implementing a 
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“synthetic organization in the loop.” In the past, researchers have preferred to implement 
synthetic entities based on cognitive architectures.  
• Organizational in the loop, C2 systems, and surveys are the only means for collecting real 
data. 
• Most of the analysis found is performed in laboratories for testing hypothesis about team 
performance and cognitive task analysis, but usually does not involve real people with 
their real roles, working on the real organization structures facing real threats. This 
research is based on real organization structures, and the data input collected comes from 
digital training exercises and case analysis. 
• The literature does not show any operational system which allows implementing the 
AAR based on quantitative analysis.  
• The network centric environment presents characteristics which could be applied to 
military or civilian organizations facing extreme events, and this environment could be 
modeled using traditional simulation techniques. This dissertation argues that 
“technological organizations walk toward a network-centric environment” (Organization 
structures for dealing with extreme events are technological organizations).   
• In the content for modeling network-centric environment, the literature review found 
significant studies whose purposes are modeling and simulating some aspects of a 
network centric process. Most of these studies use DES. 
• The contingency theory provides a framework for modeling NCDM since it supports the 
concept that organizational designs must be in accordance with the contingency 
environment. 
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• Extreme events should be modeled in their consequences for critical infrastructure and 
their disruptive effects over emergency management. 
• Mathematical programming and SNA fit well enough for evaluating organizations before 
facing extreme events. 
• DOE could be a useful technique for improving organizational behavior. 
• The literature review found few examples about combined applications of SD-DES and 
SD-ABM. 
• In the context of emergency response, the literature review found few examples regarding 
to applications of SD, DES, ABM and SNA. 
• In two older studies SNA was used for representing a small emergency organization’s 
response. The Australian Army has experimented modeling a network-centric 
environment with SNA technique. 
• Guastello (2002) proposed NDS for modeling organizational reactions to extreme events; 
this idea is in accordance with the objectives of this dissertation. 
• Sandia Laboratories works with SD techniques for analyzing vulnerabilities of critical 
infrastructure. 
• Dynamic network analysis is a novel technique, which does not consider the traditional 
simulation paradigm, even though it is based on SNA technique. 
• There is no concrete definition of agent based simulation. Two possible definitions of 
agents are: “emergent behavior arises from microscopic entities” and “entities which 
present some degree of intelligence.” 
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Past research efforts and comparisons shown in Table 11 enable us to build dynamic hypotheses 
for evaluating different configurations and circumstances in which organizations face extreme 
events.    
Gaps identified in the literature 
Table 12 shows the area in which this research will be conducted and describes other 
research efforts evaluated at the present time. 
 
Table 12: Research gaps relevant to this dissertation 
Simulation technique Planning and Decision 
Support  
Command and Control 
Systems 
Network Centric 
Decision Making 
Social network 
analysis 
Carley 
Mendonca & Wallace 
CASOS, CMU. 
 
Carley, Ren, & 
Krackhardt, 2001 
Mendonca & Wallace, 
2003 
CASOS. CMU. 
Care, 2005 
Dekker,2002 
Care, 2005. 
Systems dynamics  Sterman,2000. 
Coyle, 1980. 
Sandia Laboratories. 
Smith, 2002. 
Literature does not 
describe examples. The 
author assumes 
confidential 
information.  
GAP 
Discrete events 
simulation 
Student of the US 
Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2003. 
Franceschine et al. 
2001. 
Hazen & Fewell, 2004. 
Agent based modeling Many researches and 
models 
Research without 
validation 
GAP 
Hybrid simulation Venkateswaran et al. 
2004. 
 Literature does not 
describe examples. The 
author assumes 
confidential 
information. 
GAP - Current research
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF 
EXTREME EVENTS 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the methodology we will use to conduct this research in order to 
map real entities into a simulated environment using the three main simulation paradigms 
combined with social network technique. 
 The literature review identified a consensus among researchers that complex systems can 
be modeled making certain abstractions regarding the entire system details but capturing the 
aspects that have more influence in the system’s behavior. 
We apply the previous assertion, since a networked environment is a complex system where a 
structured organization must deal with many tasks and uncertainties due to the nature of the 
extreme events, which makes it impossible to model and simulate a complete scenario with a 
high level of detail.  
Making certain abstractions regarding the characteristics of the extreme events, we will 
concentrate our research on the structure of the organization and its flows, since those elements 
usually are very well defined in the plans and system reactions of the organization. Processes, 
procedures, messages, synchronization, and metrics for assessment are the key elements to be 
simulated and studied in a hybrid simulation platform.   
We will use the term “nodes” to refer to the agents who integrate an emergency 
organization; such nodes can be human beings or machines, both integrated over only one 
system of prevention and mitigation of extreme events. Examples of nodes are command posts, 
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managers who manage facilities, sensors such as radar or satellites images, sensors such as 
tsunami warning alerts, or a commander and his staff.  
The existence of a plan, such as the Emergency Operations Plan described in National 
Incident Management System (NIMS, 2004), is significant for making some hypotheses 
regarding the future performance of the organization. This research identifies the initial 
configuration of an organization as a structure composed by nodes, connections, resources, tasks, 
and several procedures which are fired depending of the type of extreme event.  
The evolution of an extreme event causes the structure of the organization to change. 
Therefore, new connections, messages, resources, and procedures are generated, making it 
extremely hard to evaluate this type of system.  
There are similar patterns in how historically different emergency response organizations 
have reacted facing extreme events. This research illustrates and identifies those patterns as 
elements either to incorporate or analyze in a synthetic scenario. We argued that if the 
emergency response organization, in all the levels of reaction, has a clear incident management 
system, then it will be possible to identify vulnerabilities making use of mathematical techniques 
and simulation paradigms.  
This hybrid simulation methodology presents two techniques for analyzing the initial 
layout of an emergency response organization – social network and linear programming. This 
effort aims to identify areas in which both techniques can produce a synergy for evaluating the 
initial structure of the organization.  
Since graph theory and structural statistical analysis have enabled the development of 
many social network techniques, based on sociograms and matrices, we will use those 
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approaches for understanding, evaluating, and predicting the performance of an emergency 
response organization that performs its tasks in a networked decision making scenario.  
Someone could ask: why do we not directly apply graph theory in a network centric 
environment? The answer is simple: in past decades, researchers from the field of psychology 
have conducted a vast number of experiments to model and to evaluate the relationships among 
social entities; we argue that an emergency response organization is a social entity in which 
teams, leaders, supporters, decision makers, devices, machines and so on, are all integrated for 
protecting society before and after an extreme event. Therefore, a hybrid simulation that 
incorporates a mathematical interpretation of the dynamic relationships of different objects in a 
networked scenario could enhance the current response systems and plans for disaster 
management. 
Methodology for developing a NCDM analysis 
The way we will conduct this study is similar to the hybrid methodology proposed and only 
different in the analysis of five recent extreme events made with the purpose of detecting the 
features most significant for modeling and testing the different simulation techniques.  Figure 6 
shows the steps considered, and they are explained below: 
• Determine the organizational structure based on network centric concepts and 
contingency theory. Two critical documents provide a good portion of this information: 
the Incident Command System (ICS, 2005) and the Emergency Operation Plan (EOP). 
The use of databases (from command/control or training systems) could provide a more 
accurate structure of the nodes and their tasks. 
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• Using SNA technique and linear programming (LP), analyze the emergency 
organizational structure. The predictive outcomes should be shown to decision makers 
and stakeholders in order to infer the organizational behavior.  
• Identify the critical events according to the EOP of the jurisdiction.  Parameters should be 
entered according to the manner defined in this research. 
• If data exists, conduct a structural analysis (multivariate analysis) in order to identify 
correlated data. This information could be obtained from databases, surveys, expert 
interviews, and organization in the loop. 
• Identify the features most appropriate in DES, SD, and ABM for modeling the objects, 
attributes, and flows that represent the organizational structure under an extreme event. 
• Test the interoperability of models, variables, and parameters among the three simulation 
techniques. Calibrate the model. 
• Select a timeframe for capturing the matrix of relationships among the nodes; then apply 
network analysis for testing the evolution of the organization. Notice that so far, we are 
dealing with the simulation model, but the possibility is still open for applying network 
analysis to the organization in the loop or to a command and control system in real time.  
• If data exists, statistical analysis should be made in order to compare synthetic data 
(obtained from simulation) and data obtained from the organization in the loop. Provide 
measures of validation of the model. 
• If the model can be validated, then conduct a design of experiment (DOE) for optimizing 
either the structure or EOP of the organization. 
• If the model can be validated, define metrics and testing for identifying vulnerabilities in 
the organizational structure. 
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• Use the model to support the AAR in real scenarios and training organization in the loop 
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Figure 6: Methodology for implementing the hybrid simulation 
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Questions for testing in the simulated hybrid model 
We define two types of questions for testing the hybrid simulation model.  
Technical questions 
• What features of an emergency response organization are possible to simulate in a 
networked scenario? 
• Is there a more suitable simulation technique for modeling the interactions among nodes 
in an emergency management organization? (Testing best candidate simulation 
technique) 
• How could two simulation techniques work together in a network centric scenario? 
• How could a model enhance its usefulness when combined with graph theory?  
• What mechanism of control could a modeler use for controlling a hybrid simulation? 
• Is it possible to combine team performance with flows and tasks carried out by nodes in 
an emergency organization structure? 
• Can the hybrid simulation be validated for predicting performance of an emergency 
organizational structure? 
Operational questions 
• What social network metrics are more significant for designing an organizational 
structure? 
• Does the network diameter increase or decrease in an organizational structure when it 
faces an extreme event?  
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• How could the position and performance of a node in the network determine the behavior 
of the whole organization? 
• How could the agent technique improve the validation of a NCDM scenario? 
• Is the hybrid model simple enough to be used for decision makers and stakeholders to 
improve their ICS and EOP? 
• Could the hybrid model be suitable for supporting the AAR of a real disaster 
independently of its size and location?  
• Does the hybrid model improve organizational learning and lesson learned concepts?  
Assumption for modeling scenarios (types of events) 
We make a new categorization of extreme events based on the necessity for quantifying 
the concept of an extreme event. Some of the properties and implications defined by Sarewitz 
and Pielke (2000) are utilized in the elaborated categorization. 
 In the context of this dissertation, “scenarios” are defined as the combination of events, 
organizational deployments, tasks, resources, and policies for facing extreme events. These four 
characteristics allow visualization of a preliminary layout for modeling a NCDM environment. 
At the same time, the scenario definition provides a framework for developing a mathematical 
approach to the interrelationships produced among all the nodes which make up an emergency 
organization.  
We define an extreme event in an organizational context:  “Extreme event is an n 
dimensional vector which has two attributes named magnitude and direction. The dimension n is 
a function of the number of nodes which turn out to be affected, the event consequence is 
represented by the vector magnitude and the area affected is represented by the vector direction.” 
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According to this definition, in an organization with n nodes, we are able to identify three types 
of events: The first affects only one set of nodes and is known as an isolated event (IE); the 
second one affects n - k nodes (1< k <n ) and is known as a partial event (PE), and the third one 
affects the whole organization (many jurisdictions) and is known as a universal event (UE). 
Figure 7 shows an extreme event affecting an organizational emergency structure. 
 
 
Figure 7: Classification for modeling extreme events 
 
 
For instance, we can characterize one event as PE [3, 12, 5, 4], which means that this is a partial 
extreme event affecting 3 sets of nodes with magnitude 5, at 12 locations and it hits the locations 
at time 4. Note that the characterization will enable the measurement of performance in the 
organizational structure as a whole, since the type of event and its associated attributes will 
produce different reactions in the complete emergency structure, according to the fixed 
procedures previously designed by the organization. 
Extreme event CE affects 
many places with magnitude 
15. 
Extreme event IE affects only 
one set of  nodes, at location 1 
with magnitude 10. 
Extreme event PE affects two 
sets of nodes, at location 1 
and 2 with magnitude 12. 
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 A contrast between the classification formulated by Sarewitz and Pielke (2000) and the 
classification formulated in this research is shown in Table 13. We estimate that the vector 
representation allows preserving four properties from Table 3. 
 
Table 13: Contrast between Sarewitz and Pielke (2000) extreme event properties and those 
proposed in this research 
Properties Implications for decision making 
Rare Little opportunity for learning. 
Relevant experience may be 
lacking. 
Rare events may control system 
evolution. 
High 
consequence 
Attention will be focused on the 
event. 
Decisions matter. 
Time pressure 
 
Limited time for analysis. 
Stress producing. 
Affects large 
numbers of 
people and/or 
large 
ecosystems. 
 
Group decision, leadership, 
government action, trust, and 
cooperation/communication 
among stakeholders are important 
for the implementation of 
effective decisions. 
 
Vector for modeling 
different events. 
 
Main characteristics of an organization facing extreme event scenario 
In order to identify the main characteristics that an organization depicts facing extreme 
events, we analyzed five cases in which natural and man made disasters have produced a huge 
impact in the population.  Our attempt was to identify the most significant variables, nodes, 
flows resources, chains of command, sequences, signals, and others quantitative factors required 
for modeling the behavior of an emergency response organization. These are the events 
analyzed: 
X1= Number of nodes 
 
 
X2= Event magnitude 
 
 
X3=Number of locations 
affected 
 
 
X4=Event time 
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• Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster, 1986, Ukraine (Appendix A) 
• Oklahoma City Bombing, 1995, USA (Appendix A) 
• Kobe Earthquake, 1995, Japan (Appendix A) 
• Hurricane Mitch, 1998, Central America (Appendix A) 
• Hurricane Katrina 2005, USA (Appendix A) 
The five cases analyzed have in common that all of them could have had defined 
emergency procedures based upon information technology. Nevertheless, according to our 
research, only Hurricane Katrina encompasses all the characteristics required to be characterized 
as a NCDM scenario mainly because there are organizational and machine behaviors collected in 
the database of the C2 systems. 
The findings found in each event are presented in Appendix A with the structure shown in Table 
14.  
 
Table 14: Attributes used for analyzing the five cases of extreme events 
Extreme event Define scenario 
Features for modeling Information flow and resources flow. 
Disaster planning. 
Communication system.  
Situation awareness. 
Interoperability. 
Human Factors. 
Chain of command. 
Classification for 
modeling 
According to size, level, and 
consequences. 
Lesson learned Hints at direction for the simulation 
and after action review.  
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After analyzing the most significant factors in the deployment of an emergency response 
organization, we built Table 15 based on nine factors. Conclusions regarding the features useful 
for modeling and selecting the most suitable simulation technique are presented at the end of this 
chapter. 
  
Table 15: Comparing extreme events 
Factors Oklahoma 
Bombing 
1995 
Kobe 
Earthquake 
1995 
Mitch 
Hurricane 
1998 
Chernobyl 
Nuclear 
Disaster 
1986 
Katrina 
Hurricane 
2005 
Extreme event Isolated event: 
Bombing 
Earthquake 
followed by 
fires in urban 
areas. 
Disruption of 
public 
infrastructure 
Hurricane 
followed by 
floods and 
disruption of 
public 
infrastructure 
Isolated event: 
Reactor 
explosion 
Extreme 
consequences 
at the time 
Hurricane 
followed by 
floods and 
looting, 
disruption of 
public 
infrastructure
Area affected  Small area into 
Oklahoma City.  
Perimeter was 
rapidly 
delimited.  
Three main 
Japanese cities. 
Largest area but 
very well 
delimited. 
 
Largest area 
affected by three 
days, three 
countries 
suffered the 
consequences 
simultaneously  
Initially a 
small area 
which evolved 
toward a 
continuous 
event that 
involved 
several 
countries. 
Extense and 
dynamic area; 
there was an 
evolution of 
the magnitude 
of the event at 
the time. 
Actors Scalable 
participation of 
nodes. 
Local reaction 
was clearly 
significant. 
Many nodes 
were involved 
for several 
days. 
No well 
defined 
jurisdiction, 
unclear chain of 
command, 
confused 
response plan. 
Not all the 
resources 
available were 
used. 
Many 
organizations 
without any 
coordination. 
Lack of unity of 
control. 
Lack of 
command. 
No well defined 
jurisdiction. 
Scalable 
participation, 
from the local 
to national 
authorities. 
Required 
specialized 
commander in 
the incident 
zone. 
Nodes from 
Federal, State 
and Local 
level   were 
involved 
gradually. 
Local 
authorities 
played the 
main role. 
Delimited   
jurisdiction. 
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Factors Oklahoma 
Bombing 
1995 
Kobe 
Earthquake 
1995 
Mitch 
Hurricane 
1998 
Chernobyl 
Nuclear 
Disaster 
1986 
Katrina 
Hurricane 
2005 
Data base 
available 
Only semantic 
documentation.  
No 
quantification 
of sequences. 
Only generic 
reports or 
focusing over a 
factor. 
No 
quantification 
of sequences.  
Only semantic 
documentation. 
No 
quantification 
of sequences. 
Lots of 
research from 
a technical 
perspective, no 
decision 
making 
analysis. 
Sequence 
defined by the 
evolution of 
the event. 
Yes, not 
public domain. 
Federal 
government 
reported a 
quantitative 
analysis.  
Clear 
sequences of 
the reaction 
of different 
levels, clear 
delays in 
some 
authorities.  
 
 
Decision 
Making Process 
Clear. Flows 
could be 
identified and 
modeled 
making use of 
surveys.  
Poor, difficult 
to model chain 
of command.  
Unclear, it is 
difficult to 
identify chain 
of command.  
Confusing and 
there is only 
generic 
information. 
Technical data 
available but 
this does not 
have 
relationship 
with decision 
making 
process. 
The best 
extreme event 
suited from the 
perspective of 
decision 
making 
process. Good 
chance for 
modeling if 
all data were 
available in 
the database 
of the  
command 
and control 
systems. 
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Factors Oklahoma 
Bombing 
1995 
Kobe 
Earthquake 
1995 
Mitch 
Hurricane 
1998 
Chernobyl 
Nuclear 
Disaster 
1986 
Katrina 
Hurricane 
2005 
Readiness  No, mainly by 
the absence of 
previous attacks.  
No documented 
training before 
the attack, or 
any simulation 
model studied 
before of the 
attack. 
Yes, for the 
previous 
experience of 
Japan in Earth- 
quakes.  
Documented 
training at the 
local level. No 
simulation 
model known 
for studying 
organizational 
response.  
No, civilian and 
military 
authorities were 
unprepared for 
an event of that 
magnitude. 
No training 
before the 
event, no 
simulation 
model for 
analyzing a 
best response.  
No, reactions 
were assumed 
according to 
the evolution 
of the event. 
Training was 
made at level 
of technical 
people who 
managed the 
plant, no 
organizational 
training, no 
simulation 
model known 
for studying 
organizational 
response.   
Yes, based on 
National 
Incident 
Management 
System. 
(NIMS) 
No training 
known for 
facing 
Hurricane, 
but previous 
events 
provided the 
best lessons 
for 
diminishing 
the 
consequences. 
No simulation 
model 
regarding to 
NIMS is 
known so far.  
Communication 
systems 
Yes, event 
affected  small 
portion of 
telephone 
system, but 
demand 
collapsed the 
system. Problem 
with 
interoperability 
of radios in 
local authorities.   
Unclear and 
only based on 
physical 
communication. 
 
Lack of 
interoperability 
prevented 
communications 
among different 
groups and 
agencies.  
No 
information 
available. 
Initially very 
well defined. 
Command and 
Control 
Yes.  Based on Local 
authorities, but 
lack of unified 
command.  
National 
government 
did not realize 
the magnitude 
of the event. 
No sustained 
Command and 
Control.  
Confusion in 
the first three 
days. National 
government 
did not realize 
the magnitude 
of the event. 
Confusion.   
National 
government 
did not 
realize the 
magnitude of 
the event. 
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Factors Oklahoma 
Bombing 
1995 
Kobe 
Earthquake 
1995 
Mitch 
Hurricane 
1998 
Chernobyl 
Nuclear 
Disaster 
1986 
Katrina 
Hurricane 
2005 
Situation 
Awareness 
Very well 
defined likely 
by the 
characteristic of 
local event. 
It assumed a 
useful use of 
remote sensors 
like satellite 
images and 
GPS.  
Poor, local 
authorities did 
not transfer 
their 
assessments to 
other levels 
and horizontal 
agencies. 
It is assumed 
deficient use of 
sensors 
available since 
they were not 
used on time.  
Event 
magnitude did 
not permit 
assessment of 
the situation 
mainly because 
the agencies in 
charge of this 
activity also 
were affected by 
the event. 
No known use 
of sensors.  
Unclear, the 
worst situation 
awareness in 
the five events 
analyzed. The 
magnitude of 
the event only 
was known 
days after the 
explosion.  
The magnitude 
of the event 
did not allow 
situation 
awareness as 
defined by 
the National 
Response 
Plan (NRP) 
and Incident 
Command 
System (ICS). 
 
 
 
We formulated four conclusions useful for implementing a conceptual design of a network 
centric scenario.  
Conclusion 1: Organizational behavior and interactions among the nodes 
We concluded that there exist three types of behavior in a network centric scenario: 
causal, discrete, and internal behavior.  
Causal behavior triggers the sequence of reaction in an organization, this coming from 
either a natural or man made origin. In the context of extreme events, causal behavior can be 
represented as a continuous or discrete variable. Notice that we are not interested in modeling the 
physics, chemical or atmospheric characteristics of the event; our primary concern is to model 
the signals emitted by the event which fires the organizational reaction.  
 67
Those signals have different interpretations, and should be defined in the plans and 
management systems of an organization. Thus a type of signal could fire the reaction of a single 
local level, and consecutive signals could point out that it is necessary to involve multiple 
jurisdictions. Causal behavior is a candidate to be modeled as continuous or discrete signals in a 
NCDM scenario. 
Discrete behaviors are the pair-wise interactions between the nodes of an organization.  
Usually the incident reports, textual research, and technical analysis refer to the discrete 
behavior as flows. Nevertheless, in order to model different transactions in the network, the 
modeler will need to distinguish between types of flows. For instance, the primary concern in a 
disaster is to keep the communication systems working, and the interactions produced through 
those communication systems should be modeled as discrete entities. SD technique identifies 
those flows as information and resources. We take those expressions, but since our model is 
more rich in detail, we differentiate among different type of information and resources.   
Internal behavior is shown by the teams, task forces, agencies, commander’s staff, etc; it is the 
most difficult part for modeling and validating and involves the decision making process, we will 
suggest a internal discrete behavior based on discrete entities. 
Conclusion 2: Data available for modeling the NCDM scenario 
According to the five cases summarized for purposing the model, we defined three types of data:  
“semantic data,” “qualitative data” and “quantitative data.”  
Qualitative data is included in reports, public reviews, researches findings, and media 
reports. Qualitative data refers only to the event and its context. Always it describes the 
consequences of the extreme event as a function of the population affected and the public and 
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private infrastructure damaged. The main actors are clearly identified. Most of the time 
qualitative data contain fuzzy numerical data as an attribute of a determined situation.  
 Semantic data is included in technical reports, after action reviews, plans to manage 
incidents, and format messages used in the command and control system of the organization. The 
National Incident Management System (NIMS, 2004) and Incident Command System (ICS) in 
the USA are classic examples of semantic data. 
 Quantitative data is numerical data used in a specific context, and it describes a process 
by mean of quantities, timing, and sequences. This data can be obtained only from two sources: 
either databases of the command and control systems that the organization used for dealing with 
the emergency or a very well defined survey made in the after action review of the event that 
includes all the critical actors in the event.  
 Semantic and quantitative data for modeling and simulating the deployment and posterior 
evolution of an organization will depend on the command and control systems that the 
organization had before, during, and after the extreme event, and the plans and incident 
command systems that the organization implemented before the extreme event. 
 For instance Hurricane Katrina is the event with the most data available for modeling the 
behavior of the complete deployment that the incident command system did at the local, state, 
and federal level. The reason is because there was a standardized management system used in all 
the levels and a command and control system which supported the collection of digital data for 
subsequent analysis. No other extreme event in the history of the extreme events has recorded the 
data required for modeling what happened, how it happened, and how the incident systems can 
be improved in the future.  
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 In conclusion, data available for modeling a NCDM exists only in the database of the 
command and control systems of the organization; complementary data could be obtained from 
surveys and after action reviews collected from real people who were involved in the real 
extreme events. 
Conclusion 3:  Time scale and space scale in a NCDM scenario 
The mapping between a simulated environment and the timing collected from the real events 
does not permit simulating time scale and space. The granularity of a network requires that each 
critical object, named “node,” depicts its behavior simultaneously with other nodes. Thus the 
synchronization of the procedures only could be made if we consider one scale of time.  
 The space scale is not considered in this methodology, since our effort aims to understand 
the topological interactions among the nodes independently of their geographic location. 
Conclusion 4:  Main problems performed by an incident command system 
• In general there is no assessing of the information to identify which were the priorities in 
the process of decision making.    
• Sequences of events are not very well documented with the exception of Katrina. 
• Fuzzy procedures among the nodes yield information overload and delay for the decision 
makers. 
• Decision makers in the chain of command have a clear vision of the problem in their 
jurisdiction but do not have the complete situation awareness if the extreme event hits 
more than one jurisdictional zone. A higher position increases the decision maker’s 
situation awareness, but it requires time to build. 
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• A lack of a standardized international structure to implement an incident command 
system was identified.  
• After action reports make fuzzy identifications of actors, resources, capacities, and 
missions performed during the extreme event. 
• There is no analysis between the correlation of extreme events and team performance. 
• There are no models for simulating the chain of command. 
• There are no distribution probabilities associated to processes, sequences, and flows. 
• After action reports do not show any methodology for increasing situation awareness. 
• Most extreme events report lack of “unity of command” to ensure unity of effort under 
one responsible commander for every objective. 
• The integration of human beings and machines such as radar or an alert warning is not 
reported or its analysis is scarce in quantitative term.  
• After action reports do not include any measure of performance in the organization.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: MODELING DOMAINS AND APPLYING METRICS 
INTO AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION 
Network centric decision making under extreme events: Conceptual domain 
Ahvenainen (2003) described the relationships that take place in a network centric 
warfare scenario based on three domains: physical, information, and cognitive. These domains 
will be used in the context of this research to model the observable relationships when an 
organization deals with extreme events. 
• Physical domain: This includes the critical infrastructure which has a strong impact in the 
network centric processes. The main problem in this domain is the infrastructure 
interdependencies among the critical systems, as only one contingency event may affect 
the whole interconnected infrastructure of one or several locations. Therefore, this 
methodology provides a framework for incorporating this domain mainly as a continuous 
simulation, with feedback loops which may represent with more accuracy the 
interdependency among critical infrastructure. Since many of the systems are dependent 
upon electric power generation, we will include this topic in our test bed, leaving open 
the option for integrating more refined models with another critical infrastructure using 
the same technique.  As a result, we will attempt to demonstrate how either continuous or 
discrete flows of the interconnected infrastructure, could alter the behavior of an 
emergency management organization.  
• Information domain: This domain provides the capability to detect, process, and share 
information among human beings and machines in the network. According to the five 
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cases analyzed previously, we will model information domain as discrete processes in 
where there exists an influence of the physical and cognitive domain. Two techniques 
were selected for modeling this domain; discrete event simulation and state of transition 
techniques.   
• Cognitive domain: We modified the original Ahvenainen concept of the cognitive domain 
because our prime goal is to develop a framework for studying the network centric 
processes carried out in an organization composed mainly of teams and task forces. We 
will concentrate our research on providing a mechanism to model how an extreme event 
could disrupt the procedures and tasks that a group of persons must carry out in an 
extreme event.  
Making use of the Yerkes-Dodson curve, we will depict the curvilinear between stress 
and performance (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), and based on a System Dynamics technique we will 
incorporate the effects of the Yerkes-Dodson curve in an overall model (Rudolph, et al. 2002). 
Nevertheless, the methodology will still be open for incorporating other models either for team 
performance or cognitive decision makers’ processes.  
Figure 8 presents the interaction between each domain and the best candidate simulation 
tools to be tested in a hybrid simulation methodology.  
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Figure 8: Simulation techniques by domains 
 
 
In order to model the main scenario’s interactions, we will use the three main simulation 
paradigms and the technique of social networks, which supports its analysis in graph theory.  
After comparing the manuals, plans, and disaster procedures used for three countries 
(USA, Chile, and Honduras) and the reviews made by the United Nations, we concluded that 
there does not exist any standardized international design for dealing with the organizational 
structure, terminology, incident procedures, and interoperability in the management of extreme 
events.  
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Because of the lack of standards in this field, we will make use of terminology, structure, 
and procedures accessible in the National Incident Management System (NIMS, 2004) which 
coordinates federal, state, and local organizations to manage domestic incidents. 
We suggest the hybrid simulation methodology based on the following assumptions: 
• In a network centric scenario, the agents, processes, and alarms must be previously 
documented in an EOP, and historic data of the interactions of the emergency 
management organization should be available for performing a structural analysis.   
• The network centric scenario can only be modeled if there exists a comprehensible 
structure of relationships, procedures, and hierarchies between the levels of decision 
making. 
• The agents depict a discrete behavior and they transfer messages and resources in the 
network according to the extreme event evolution. 
• The agents make contact with other agents using the allowed channels previously 
established in the plans and EOP. 
• Agents’ behaviors are highly dependent of the position that they have in the emergency 
management organization and of the type of extreme event that affects their jurisdiction. 
• The network centric processes include interactions between human beings, remote 
sensors, and “intelligent” machines. 
These assumptions are an effort to capture the main quantitative interactions of an 
emergency management organization which performs its tasks in a network centric environment 
modeled mainly as discrete and continuous flows.  
In this chapter, we propose to study the changes in the topology of the organization by 
mean of graph’s index and by testing hypotheses based upon Monte Carlo simulations of random 
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and scale free networks.  Throughout the methodology, we will combine an object oriented 
modeling approach with graph analysis, allowing investigation of complex emergency 
management organizations, especially when data is available. Because of the strong relationship 
between social network theory and graph theory, we will use both theories as similar terms for 
referring to the network centric processes.  
Components of a network centric scenario and levels of aggregation 
The level of fidelity of a simulated system is strongly dependent on the granularity that 
the modeler can incorporate in the model. While a high level of decomposition can imply an 
ability to simulate complex behaviors and their interactions, a low level of granularity could be 
easier for simulating, but likely less inference could be made from its outcomes.  
Our approach enables us to make a mapping one to one between the real agents in an 
emergency management organization and the simulated entities in the model. This supports the 
hypothesis that if data is available, then it is possible to replicate some portion of how the agents 
perform their tasks when an extreme event affects their jurisdiction.  
The benefits derived from a granularity one-to-one are multiple. For instance, it avoids 
dealing with several aggregation levels in the simulation, allows a direct mapping between real 
data and simulated data, and allows analysis of the significance of an individual agent in the 
organization.  
Thus, we propose a methodology that distinguishes between the measures of performance 
for the agents’ properties and measures of performance for the entire emergency management 
organization. 
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A high level of granularity and fidelity require that the organization be modeled as a set 
of agents. In the context of this research, we will use the term nodes for referring to the agents 
which are components of an emergency management organization. A node depicts toward its 
surrounding environment a discrete behavior which must be validated with historical data.  The 
relationships between the nodes generate a network which represents the organizational 
interactions for responding to extreme events. We will refer to those relationships as flows. The 
overall network behavior arises from the isomorphism flows yield between two nodes, which are 
named dyad flows.  
The nodes are critical objects, which could carry out the following tasks: 
• Receiving data and resources and transferring those to others nodes. 
• Receiving, processing, and transferring the data and resources to others nodes. 
• Producing data derived of their perception of the environment and transferring it to others 
nodes. 
In time, some nodes modify their relationships with other nodes, according to the 
dynamics changes in the network centric environment. The set of changes through time is called 
longitudinal network.  
The flows carry pieces of data which we call messages. Using the SD terminology, we 
say that the flows can transfer either information or resources. The messages can have attributes 
according to the node sender. 
To test the hybrid simulation methodology, we define six types of primitive nodal 
classes, each one with different internal objects and parameters. This approach enables us to 
replicate hundreds of nodes performing their interactions over the network based on six types of 
behaviors. In fact, we are providing a methodology for testing the mathematical structure of a 
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graph merged with object oriented simulation technique, and thus take advantages of the synergy 
of both techniques. 
Table 16 shows the nodes classification and their attributes; this categorization is a 
simplification based on the literature review and the current emergency management systems. 
Nevertheless the methodology remains open for incorporating new type of nodes. 
 
Table 16: Types of nodes modeled in the test bed 
Classes  Who ( examples)  Attributes 
1.Decision Makers 
 
Chief of Federal 
Government. 
State Governor 
Mayor  
Commander Incident 
Chief of Local Police  
 
Command according to the rules of incident 
command system. 
At the lower level has a shorter chain of 
command. 
Have available resources. 
Require information to make decisions. 
Span of control no more than five nodes 
2.  Staff-Planning 
 
Operational Officer 
Logistics Officer. 
Intelligence Officer. 
Agencies 
Departments 
 
Present a high skill in their field. 
Require data for supporting the decision 
Maker. 
Close contact with the decision maker. 
Their opinions can be non conclusive. 
Propose alternatives to the decision maker. 
Coordinate with other decision makers. 
3.Situation Awareness 
 
Analysis Group 
Map Situation 
Data Base 
Provide contingency and timely information 
to other classes. 
In charge of keeping the big picture. 
4. Support 
 
People in charge of logistics 
resources.  
Chief of facilities. 
Hospital Director.  
Public and private entities which have 
resources available for supporting the tasks 
decided by the decision maker.    
5.Task Forces 
 
Police, Fire Fighter, National 
Guard, Ambulances.  
Work on the ground. Usually have double 
dependency from incident commander and 
their own authorities.    
6.Sensors 
 
Satellites, Radar, Warning 
Alert System.  
Send signal according to defined rules. 
Sometime provide the first warning alarm. 
Supporting to situation awareness nodes. 
 
 
The aggregation level enables n nodes which are instances of the six classes previously defined. 
The incorporation of individual node parameters permits us to distinguish among the different 
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object behaviors. The attributes showed in the six classes allow allocating to the node (class) in 
the network structure.  
Sequence for evaluating the networked centric structure 
Figure 9 shows a holistic approach of the steps considered for evaluating the structure 
and performance of the emergency management organization. The process begins with the 
identification of nodes, sequences, and procedures. In absence of data, the best sources for 
capturing the organizational structure are the manuals, emergency operation plans, and incident 
systems. That documentation contains the standardized mechanisms cross-jurisdictional, 
statewide, and interstate “for coordinating response and obtaining assistance during a large-scale 
or complex incident” (NIMS, 2004). 
Once the nodes and their relationships are identified, an analyst could apply social 
network analysis to study the position of the nodes in the network and to examine the 
characteristic of the whole network. This step can be enhanced with LP analysis.  
The previous analysis corresponds to a static study of the emergency management 
organization, and here there are no dynamic interactions among the nodes, but based upon these 
results, either the decision makers or stakeholders could formulate hypotheses regarding the 
organization’s future performance.  
The alerting sequence of the local, state and federal emergency organizations is a function 
of the event magnitude.  The event or set of events should permit for testing the synthetic 
reaction of the chain of command according to the EOP that each authority has generated for 
facing the most probably critical situations.  
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A significant subject in this methodology is how to simulate the internal nodes’ behavior, 
since there exists only scarce data of the interactions in an emergency management organization, 
and the modeling of decision making processes have not been adequately explored, modeled, and 
validated in the simulation community.  
Therefore, we make some abstractions of the internal structure of the nodes’ behavior, 
and modeling those as a function of different messages that arrive and depart from a node 
according to defined internal rules. If data is available, we propose an intermediate approach for 
modeling the internal node structure based upon distribution probabilities. 
The methodology proposes a way for selecting the flows of information and resources 
more relevant to the emergency management organization; nevertheless this topic should be 
tested with real data.  
Once the events are detected, then we define a time frame for capturing a new set of 
relationships among the nodes. The process is iterative and could continue according to fixed 
times. 
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Figure 9: Steps for modeling an emergency management organization 
 
 
Step 2 
Build as many as 
matrixes to represent  
the organization 
layout. 
Step 3 
Apply social network 
analysis and LP  to 
the matrixes.  
Step 4 
Make hypothesis 
regarding future 
organization 
performance    
Step 10 
Send randomly a 
vector event for 
exciting the 
organization.  
Step 6 
Define a discrete 
behavior for each 
node in the 
organization.  
Step 5 
Define the events 
according to the 
organizational 
objectives.   
Step 7 
Define flows and 
messages for 
transferring data 
between the nodes. 
Step 8 
Define a cognitive 
model for 
organizational 
performance.  
Step 9 
Test the  dynamic 
simulation with 
discrete and cognitive 
models. 
Step 11 
At time N get a new 
matrix based on the 
current simulation 
status. 
Step 12 
Analyze, modify, and 
back to step 3.  
Step 1 
Identify nodes, 
sequences and 
procedures in the 
organization. 
 81
Applying graph theory to the network centric decision making 
We describe an emergency  management organization by using graph theory, a  graph   G 
= (N, L) is defined by a  node set N = (n1, n2… nn)  and an  edge set L = ( l1, l2, …. lL ), elements of 
the Cartesian product N x N ={ (n,z)/n ε N, z  ε N }. (Adaptation,  Degenne & Forse, 1999; 
Wassermann & Faust, 1994).  
The graph G presents n nodes and lL edges; the total number of nodes in G is called the 
graph’s order. The connections among the nodes are called arcs when the graph is directed and 
edges when the connections are undirected. In a directed and undirected graph the number of 
arcs or edges converging to the node ni  is named in-degree and the number of outbound arcs or 
edges is named out-degree. The sum of both indexes is called node degree.  
Sometimes we need to use a graph as a set of edges and arcs; in this case:  
A graph is an ordered triple G = (N, L,D) where the set N is the node set of the graph G; 
L is the set of edges, and D is the set of arcs of G.  Notice the difference between the set L 
which stands for an undirected set of edges and the set D which stands for a directed set 
of arcs. If the set D =∅, the Graph G is undirected, and if the set L =∅, the Graph G is 
directed (Doreian,  Batagelj & Ferligoj, 2005). 
 
Most of the time, the nodes’ relationships in a hierarchized organization are directed arcs, 
especially when a contingency plan points out that the procedures, notifications, and  alarms 
must follow a determined path among the nodes; in this case each element li  ε  L must have a 
direction. A directed graph is also known as a digraph. 
A node is defined as an object which plays a role in the emergency management 
organization; that role is designated according to Table 16. In order to define the protocols of 
relationships, affiliations, and attributes of the different nodes, we consider three types of 
variables by each set of nodes (Netminer, 2005): 
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• Adjacency variables: Describing a set of relationships among the nodes using directed 
graphs and weights. We could find more than one adjacency variables in an emergency 
management organization. Each adjacency variable is a layer, and we could analyze 
simultaneously several layers of organizational interactions. 
• Affiliation variables:  Describing the clusters of relationships produced between subsets 
of nodes. The affiliation variables can be analyzed by using three main methods: co-
membership, overlap, and bipartite matrixes. Affiliation variable enable us to analyze the 
behavior of nodes which participate simultaneously in different events. The simulation 
community has not given enough attention to this variable due to the difficulty in 
controlling object behavior performed simultaneously in different scenarios.  
• Attributes variables: Describing the individual attributes of each node. The attributes 
incorporated have discrete values.  
We classified and described the network’s characteristics and node’s measures more 
suitable for this research. The starting point is the mode concept which explains how many sets 
of nodes are used in the network analysis. The most frequent social network studies consider 
one-mode, two-mode and ego-centered networks analysis.  
A one-mode network analysis is the study made over the graph G = (X, U) cited at the 
beginning of this chapter.  
A two-mode network considers the analysis of the graph N= (U1, U2, R, w), where the 
first network is denoted by U1={ u1,u2,…un} and the second network is denoted by U2= 
{v1,v2,…vn} with U1∩ U2 =∅; the relation  R ⊆ U1 x U2 is the set of edges between the nodes in 
U1 and nodes in U2; the w represents the weight in the graph. (Doreian, Batagelj & Ferligoj, 
2005). Researches have given little importance to multi-modal analysis with more than two 
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modes; nevertheless this kind of network provides a rich structure for understanding the 
organization performance with multiples tasks in different scenarios. We will analyze in depth 
the two-mode network and will leave the methodology open for a higher modal analysis when 
there exists more tools and research on this topic.     
An ego-centered network analysis makes a quantitative analysis of a focal node, named 
ego, and their adjacent nodes and connections. The ego-network of the node ni contains all the 
sub-networks which are focusing on node ni. The most significant tool for analyzing an ego-
network configuration is the concept of triad, which will be explained in depth because it has 
significant statistical consequences for the analysis of the whole network.  
A complementary approach considers two classifications: individual networks parameters and 
global networks parameters. Buskenks (2002) stated that in the context of information diffusion 
rates, some conjectures regarding the effects of individual and network parameters can be made 
to predict the performance of the network. 
Since a network-centric structure is strongly related with a one-mode network, we will 
use this configuration as a major source of network analysis. Complementary, to gain insight on 
the organizational structure, we use two-mode analysis and ego-centered analysis.  Nodes’ 
features that are not derived from their structural location in the network are named attributes 
and they improve the analysis of one-mode network analysis. This research models a framework 
which could be adaptable to any organization, independently of the type of extreme event.  
According to the empirical evidence found in the five cases analyzed and although the local, 
state, and federal authorities play the main roles dealing with extreme events, we incorporate the 
nodes that represent nongovernmental organizations and private entities which also play a 
relevant role in an extreme event.  
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The processes of decision making in emergency structures are scalable and depend on the 
size and type of the extreme event. In order to identify the complexity that arises in the 
organizational interaction, we designed a test bed, based upon ICS (NIMS, 2004). Thirty-seven 
nodes were situated in an adjacency matrix, which represents an emergency organization 
(Appendix 2). The relationships, affiliations, and attributes of the organization were arbitrarily 
located according to conventional EOP. Figure 10 shows the digraph derived from the adjacency 
matrix.  
The digraph shows the relationships between the components of an ICS and it includes 
the chain of command in the organization. In order to deal with complexity similar to that found 
in a real scenario, we incorporated a vector partition in the matrix to assign nodes to the federal, 
state, and local levels.  
 
Figure 10: Adjacency matrix used in the test bed of an emergency organizational structure 
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To increase the association between graph theory and simulation techniques, we identify 
five types of nodes and one type of arc in the adjacency matrix which could be modeled in either 
a discrete or continuous model (see Table 17).  
 
Table 17: Nodes classification in the adjacency matrix 
Isolate nodes Degree equal to 0 
Transmitter nodes In-degree is equal to 0, but Out-degree has a value. 
Receiver nodes In-degree has a value, but Out-degree is equal to 0. 
Carrier nodes The measures of In-degree and Out-degree are equal to one 
Ordinary nodes In-degree and Out-degree are greater than 1. 
Bridge node If it is removed, would disconnect the network 
 
Networks and measures classification 
In Figure 11 we suggest a network classification, a set of nodes’ properties and arcs’ 
features which can be used for testing a complex emergency management organization.  The 
mathematical foundation of each property is explained in the context of an emergency 
organization, and we propose in advance some relationships of those properties with either a 
discrete event simulation or system dynamics model.  
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Figure 11: Classification of networks and nodes properties 
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• Random Network (RN): Nodes are connected with others nodes according to a specific 
distribution.  This type of network has particular properties such as a large variation between 
nodes’ paths, low clustering, and random topology. Three main distributions are used for 
generating RN are uniform, normal, and Bernoulli, if the network has one of the named 
distributions then we state that they have a scale.  
o Over a network centric scenario, it is significant to understand the main 
implications of the RN behavior, since we may predict the performance of the 
organizational structure if it presents a similar configuration to that identified in a 
RN. Care (2005) proposed a minimum of fifty nodes in order to guarantee 
common properties in the digraph. The type of properties will depend on of the 
analysis carried out by the organization. 
o For instance a digraph with n nodes, generated from a uniform distribution 
implies that the probability of choices is )1(2
1
−nn . The idea behind this distribution 
is that each possible configuration of an adjacency matrix of n nodes which has a 
sample space of  )1(2 −nn  different configurations has the same chance of occurring 
(Adapted from Wassermann et al, 1994).  
• Small World Network (SWN): Network based on Milgram's experiment which showed that 
people in different locations are connected by a short chain of persons. This class of networks 
is very regular and has good clustering (Cares, 2006). According to Milgram in a SWN, the 
geodesic paths do not reach more than six steps (Milgram, 1967). 
• Scale Free Network (SFN):  Network with a Power Law distribution of the links among the 
nodes, where the probability that a node has exactly k links is bkkP −≈)( , where b is the 
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degree exponent. The SFN has a large amount of nodes with few connections, and a small 
number of nodes, known as hubs, exhibit a large number of connections.   
• Regular Network (REN): Usually named as Lattice networks, REN have the same ratio of 
connections among the nodes as the random network, but the clustering coefficient is 
uniform, and therefore its structure is more regular.  
• Hierarchical Network (HN): Formed by the structure of an organization, it shows the chain 
of command and the formal vertical and horizontal relationships among the nodes. According 
to our definition of HN, it could be classified as any of the four networks previously 
mentioned.   
One–mode network: Measures and implication for an emergency organization 
Centrality measures 
• Degree centrality: Standardized measure that shows the proportion of nodes adjacent to 
the node ni and the maximum value that could reach the ni in the network. This index 
allows comparing different network size.  
        
1
)( centrality Degree −= n
nd i
     )( ind  is the number of nodes adjacent  to ni. 
• Degree centralization: Measure of variation in the degrees of nodes divided by the 
maximum degree variation which is possible in a network of the same size. The index can 
be used to determine the degree of centralization of the whole network. The index reaches 
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the maximum value 1 when one node ni is connected with the n-1 other nodes, and the 
other nodes are connected only with ni. 
)]2)(1[(
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tion  centraliza Degree 1
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n
i
iDD
     
The )( iD nC are the n nodes degree indices, and  *)(nC D  is the largest observed value 
(Wassermann & Faust, 1994).  
• Betweenness centrality: Over an undirected network, the proportion of all short paths 
between pairs of nodes (geodesic path) in the network and the geodesics which go through 
the node ni. In an organization, assuming that the information and resources go by a 
geodesic path, the nodes with a high betweenness score will be in central positions and will 
play a vital role in the flows of information and resources.  
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• Betweenness centralization: The variation in the betweenness centrality of vertices divided 
by the maximum variation in betweenness centrality scores possible in a network of the 
same size.  
)]2()1[(
)]()([2
tion  centraliza  sBetweennes 2
1
*
−−
∑ −
= =
nn
nCnC
n
i
iBB
 
 90
• Closeness centrality: Useful index to measure the closeness of a node ni to the other nodes 
in the network. It is measured by the inverse of the sum of the distance from a node to all 
other nodes, which is normalized by multiplying it by (n-1). 
∑=
−= n
j
njnid
nni
1
),(
1 )( Closeness   
For a directed network, each of in-closeness centrality and out-closeness centrality is 
measured separately, depending on whether the distances 'from' or 'to' other nodes are 
considered. The idea is that a node is central if it can quickly interact with all others.  
• Closeness centralization: To measure group centralization using nodes closeness 
centralities. This measure enables us to know the variability of individual closeness 
centrality scores (Adapted from Netminer, 2005). 
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• Eigenvalue (Perron-Frobenius theorem): This measure guarantees that there exists an 
eigenvalue which is real and larger than or equal to all other eigenvalues in magnitude.  
The largest eigenvalue is often called the Perron-Frobeniuos eigenvalue of the matrix 
which is denoted by λ1(C) for a graph C. Further the theorem also states that there exists an 
eigenvector of C corresponding to λ1(C), all of whose components are real and non-
negative (Jain & Sandeep, 2002). The eigenvalue allows us to find out the presence or 
absence of closed paths in a network structure  according to the following proposition: 
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If in the network there is no closed walk, then λ1(C) = 0 
If in the network there is at least a closed walk, then λ1 (C) ≥ 1 
If in the network there is  a closed walk and all closed walks only occur in sub-graphs 
that are cycles, then λ1 (C) = 1 
Figure 12 shows four sub-graphs with different topology (Adapted from Care, 2005) 
 
 
λ =1.00 λ=1.19 λ=1.36 λ=1.52 
Figure 12: Measuring networked effects by using eigenvalues 
 
Neighbor Measures: Set of indexes to evaluate adjacent nodes in a network 
• Degree: Measure to identify the size of the direct connection between the ni node and its 
vicinity.  The number of flows that are incidents over one node is known as in-degree 
measures and the number of flows that a node sends to other nodes is named as out-
degree. Both measures allow identifying the type of node and the vulnerability of the 
distributed decision making. 
• Structural hole: Show six indicators to evaluate the position of all nodes in the network: 
redundancy, efficiency, effective, size, constraint, and hierarchy measures. These 
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measures show the separation between non-redundant contacts. Two criteria rule the 
creation of a structural hole: cohesion and equivalence.  
• Ego-network: Measure to analyze the local connection structure by each node; this index 
calculates the size and density of a selected focal node. 
Connection measures in a network 
• Geodesic distance: Index of the length of shortest path between a pair of nodes ni and nj. 
The geodesic distance is a function of the power matrix; mathematically it can be found 
from the formula: 0min),( >= pijp xjid  (Wassermann et al., 1994).  
• Dependency: Index to measure how the node ni depends of the node nj when the flows go 
to other nodes.  The dependency is calculated based on the betweenness centrality’s 
process (Netminer 2005).  The  betweenness centrality of node ni  is given by; 
kji
g
g
i i ij
ikj ≠≠∑ ∑ ; . 
 
Dependency basically shows the number of times that a node ni needs a node nk, whose 
centrality is being measured, in order to reach a node nj via the shortest possible path. It 
can be interpreted as the control that a certain node has over the amount of flows sent to 
other nodes. 
• Connectivity: Measure of the vulnerability of the network. Line connectivity between two 
nodes is the minimum number of arcs that must be removed to leave two nodes 
disconnected. Notice that the bridge concept arises from line connectivity since a bridge 
could leave two subsets of nodes disconnected.  Node connectivity is the minimum 
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number of nodes that if they are removed can leave a subset of nodes or the whole 
organization disconnected.  
Subset measures: Dyad and triad 
Dyads 
The isomorphic contacts between two nodes in the network are called dyads. In fact the 
contact or non-contact between two nodes is a sub-network of the whole network.  There are 
only three ways for how two nodes make contact between them; this concept is known as 
“isomorphism states.” If in the adjacency matrix N the values of ( i,j) and ( j,i) are located 
symmetrically, the dyad is named “mutual” and it is defined as Dij = ( 1,1)  (Wasserman et. al. 
1994). If  in the adjacency matrix N  the values of  ( i,j) and ( j,i) are located asymmetrically, 
then the connection between the  pairs of nodes can occur in two ways, when the Dij = (0,1) and 
Dij = (1,0). This kind of dyad is known as asymmetric. If there are no contacts between (i,j) and 
(j,i), then the dyad is defined as  Dij = Dji = (0,0) and this kind of non-relationship is known as 
nulls dyad (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Isomorphic type of dyads 
   ni    Dij = ( 0,0)     nj    ni    Dij = ( 1,0)     nj 
   ni    Dij = ( 0,1)     nj    ni    Dij= ( 1,1)     nj 
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The implications that dyadic isomorphism types have for a simulated network centric 
environment are relevant, from the perspective that our methodology deals with interactions in 
the organization, and each isomorphism state represents if there is transference of   entities 
between two nodes. 
The distribution probabilities of the flows will depend on the nature of the node 
simulated. For instance, if we assume the behavior of a node ni which is a tsunami sensor located 
150 miles from of the coast, we could assume that sensor has a Dij = (1,0) independently of the 
nj, which is being fed for the sensor. 
On the other hand, we have to consider the external events which govern the behavior of 
each node. In the case of a sensor, it reacts to physical events produced by nature, but in the case 
of nodes composed by human being, they react to the procedures and rules pointed out in the 
emergency planning. 
We may represent a Dij = (1, 1) as discrete or continuous flows between ni and nj, where 
the internal node behavior will depend on the event’s magnitude and the node’s position in the 
organization. According to this research, the dyad is the starting point to find out the 
performance of an emergency management organization in a networked environment. The 
statistical information derived from the connected pairs of nodes is defined as dyad census, and 
these indexes are a function of the matrix N, where:  
M= Number of mutually connected pairs of nodes and is computed according to: 
Dij = ( 1,1)  = (1/2)trace(NN); 
A= Numbers of asymmetrically connected pairs of nodes and it is computed according to: 
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A  = trace(NN’) – trace (NN); 
N = Number of not connected nodes and it is computed according to: 
Dij = ( 0,0)   =  n(n-1)/ 2 – trace( NN’) + (1/2)trace(NN’). 
Triads 
Three nodes (n1,n2,n3) ε N of the graph G = (N, L,D) with L =∅, the sub-graphs derived 
from the set T (n1,n2,n3) are called a triad.  
We highlight a significant issue: “To capture the structure of a directed network, we must 
proceed from dyads to triads” (Nooy, Mrvar, Batagelj , 2005). Lets explain why we consider the 
previous statement significant. Under an isomorphism analysis there are sixteen classes of triads. 
If we consider that each isomorphism graph represents different types of flows between the three 
nodes, we could conjecture a causal dependency between the number of triads and the efficiency 
of an emergency organization.  In fact there are ( )3n  triads in a graph with n nodes. Figure 14 
shows the sixteen types of triads.  
The standard for labeling the different types of triads is known in SNA as MAN. Based on 
the number of dyads, MAN convention uses three and four characters to identify the type of triad. 
The first M digit shows the number of mutual positive dyads. The second one, A, shows the 
number of asymmetric dyads, and the third, N, presents the number of null dyads in the triad. 
When required, a character is added to show if the triad is transitive (T), cyclic(C), or on its way 
is up (U) or down (D).  
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         1 - 003 
 
2 - 012 
 
3 - 102 
 
4 – 021D 
 
5-021U 
 
6-021C 
 
7-111D 
 
8-111U 
 
9-030T 
 
10-030C 
 
11-201 
 
12-120D 
 
13-120U 
 
14-120C 
 
15-210 
 
16-300 
 
Figure 14: Isomorphism classes in a triad 
 
The rate of repetition of each triad in a configuration is named triad census. It can be 
used to predict structural properties in the whole network. The force of the concept of triad 
emerges from the analysis of the sixteen types of isomorphism. Only a few networks have triad 
censuses that depart substantially from those generated by random networks of the same size and 
density. This finding reminds us that the range of possible structural patterns in a social network 
is highly constrained by its size and density (Faust, 2005). This assertion presents notable 
opportunities for fitting emergency structures composed by hundreds of nodes to random 
networks; nevertheless data will be necessary for testing structural hypotheses.  
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A similar statement is suggested by Nooy et al, (2005) who pointed out that “It has been 
shown that the overall structure of a directed network can be inferred from the type of triads that 
occur”.  
Both of these arguments confirm that tools exist for predicting complex network centric 
behavior.  Thus, we could analyze the complete structure of an emergency management 
organization by only analyzing the digraphs formed by three nodes. Heider and later Newcomb 
developed the balance theory, which provides the foundation for interpreting the quantitative 
aspects yielded on triple nodes (Wassermann et al., 1991). 
 The following are the main features of a network studied from the perspective the 
balance theory: 
• A path is a cycle in which the first and last nodes coincide.  
• A cycle is a closed path 
• A semi-cycle is a closed semi-path. 
• A semi-cycle and cycle are balanced if they do not contain an uneven number of mull 
dyads.  
• A digraph is balanced if all of its semi-cycles and cycles are balanced. 
• A digraph is balanced if it can be portioned into two clusters such that all arcs are 
contained within the clusters and all null dyads are situated between the clusters. 
• A cycle or semi-cycle is clusterable if it does not contain exactly one null dyad. 
• A digraph is clusterable if it can be portioned into clusters such that all arcs are contained 
within clusters and all null dyads are situated between clusters. 
The theory of structural balance is extremely polarized because the nodes can be 
grouped in only two clusters. Table 18 shows that it is possible to relax the balanced model in 
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five additional levels. Although the theory of structural balance was intended for applying in the 
psychology field, it provides an invaluable mathematical foundation for capturing the 
interactions produced in an emergency management system.   
 
Table 18: Balanced theoretic models (Nooy et al, 2005) 
Model Arcs within a Cluster Arcs between Ranks Permitted Triads 
Balance Symmetric arcs within a 
cluster. No arcs between 
clusters. 
Max two clusters. 
None 102 
300 
Clusterability Symmetric arcs within a 
cluster. No arcs between 
clusters. 
No restriction on the 
number of clusters. 
None 102 
300 
003 
Ranked Cluster Symmetric arcs within a 
cluster. No arcs between 
clusters. 
No restriction on the 
number of clusters. 
Asymmetric arcs 
from each node to 
all nodes on higher 
ranks.  Null arcs 
may occur between 
ranks. 
102, 300,003, 021D, 021U, 
030T, 120D, 120U 
Transitivity Idem Null arcs may occur 
between ranks 
102, 300,003, 021D, 021U, 
030T, 120D, 120U, 012 
Hierarchical 
Clusters 
Asymmetric arcs within 
a cluster allowed 
provided that they are 
acyclic. 
Idem 102, 300,003, 021D, 021U, 
030T, 120D, 120U, 012, 
120C, 210. 
No Balanced – 
Theoretic model . 
(Forbidden)  
 Idem 021C,111D,111U,030C,201
 
 
In the context of this research, triad census and balance theory will support the analysis 
of the dynamic flows between the components of an emergency management organization. Since 
the organizational structure can be mapped to a digraph, using a simulation technique those 
flows will take either continuous or discrete entities produced in the nodes. Thus, this 
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methodology merges two different techniques for understanding the complexity that arises in a 
networking centric scenario. 
We developed two examples for testing different patterns produced in an organizational 
structure. The first example shows three hierarchical configurations which could be found in an 
ICS (see Table 19). The three configurations have seven nodes, but the rules that control the 
flows are given for different dyad interactions. The vector T shows the sixteen triads types 
contained in the ( )3n  sub-graphs of each configuration. 
 
Table 19: Three hierarchical configurations for testing the 16 isomorphism triads 
 
Mutual Dyads : 0 
Asymmetric Dyads: 6 
Null Dyads : 15 
Density : 0.143 
 
 
Mutual Dyads : 6 
Asymmetric Dyads: 0 
Null Dyads : 15 
Density : 0.286 
 
Mutual Dyads : 9 
Asymmetric Dyads: 0 
Null Dyads : 12 
Density : 0.429 
TA=[ 12,16,0,3,0,4,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]    TB=[ 12,0,16,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,7,0,0,0,0,0] TC=[ 4,0,20,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,0,0,0,0,3]   
 
We could state that the model A has a low density and the relationships are asymmetric; 
in fact there are 16 asymmetric dyads and Triad 003 and 012 populate with more frequency the 
vector TA.   
C A B 
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Could the graph A apply to how we validate configuration in a network centric scenario? 
Earlier, we defined network centric decision making as how the interactions of human beings 
and machines lead to decision making, then the vector TA might perfectly represent a portion of 
the network composed of a set of three sensors which after checking their signals report 
automatically their data to four different nodes integrated by human beings. 
On the other hand, configuration B and C could present many types of interpretation. We 
only argue one respect to the level of situation awareness of an emergency management 
organization.  
Configuration B shows a classical ICS, with return feedback to the upper authority level 
in the chain of command. (The National Incident Management System recommends a span of 
control between three and seven nodes (NIMS, 2004).) The interactions only are verticals and it 
does not allow horizontal communication. The density of the network is 0.286. Configuration C 
increases the mutual dyads in three arcs, since that allows the interactions between nodes at the 
same level. Thus the density of C changes to 0.429. 
What is the most significant difference between configuration B and C?  If we analyze the 
level of situation awareness of a commander incident, we realize that configuration C provides 
more accurate information than configuration B, since the lower levels had the chance for 
checking the observables hints on the ground, and as consequence, the commander incident 
avoids confusion and duplicity of effort and he can react quickly to the variations produced in the 
complete scenario. 
Comparing only the vectors TB and TC, we can say that there are two isomorphic classes 
that modify the behavior of the configuration B and C; they are Triad 003 and Triad 300.  
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Network measures 
• Density: Proportion of the number of arcs present to the maximum possible on a network. 
• Average degree: Average degree value of all nodes in given network. 
• Inclusiveness: Proportion of all connected nodes to the total number of nodes in the network. 
• Reciprocity: Proportion of the maximum number of reciprocated arcs to the total number of 
arcs. 
• Transitivity: The proportion of the number of transitive triads to the number of potentially 
triads. 
• Clustering coefficient: Average of all nodes’ clustering coefficients. For each node the 
number of connections that could possibly exist between these neighbors is calculated; then 
the proportion of the connections that actually does exit is the clustering node coefficient.  
• Mean Distance: Average geodesic distance between any pair of nodes in a network. 
• Diameter:  The largest geodesic distance between any pair of nodes in a network. 
• Connectedness: Proportion of nodes which are not mutually reachable and the maximum 
number of possible nodes unable to reach other nodes in the network. 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
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• Efficiency: A network N with n nodes is composed of Ns sub-networks. The sum of all the 
connections over n-1 in N is known as E, and the sum of the maximum number of 
connections in Ns is named as Max E. The value of 1 minus the proportion of E and MaxE is 
denominated efficiency. 
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EefficiencyNetwork 1  
• Hierarchy: For each pair of nodes where ni can reach another nj, the second nj cannot reach 
the first ni. The number of unordered pairs of nodes that are symmetrically connected is 
named S and the maximum number of unordered pairs of nodes connected between ni and nj 
is named MaxS; thus the index of 1 minus the ratio of S and MaxS is known as Hierarchy. 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡−=
MaxS
SHierarchy 1  
• LUB (Least Upper Boundedness): “Within each sub-network each pair of nodes (ni and nj) 
has at least one least upper bound . An upper bound for a pair of nodes is a third node nk 
from which there is a path to each of the pair; a least upper bound is an upper bound nk that 
is included in at least one directed path from each other upper bound to each of the pair 
(ni,nj). Violations to this condition occur whenever a (ni,nj) pair of points in the sub-network 
has no LUB” ( Krackhardt, 1994 ).  
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡−=
MaxT
TLUB 1       where      ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−=
2
)2)(1( NnNnMaxT  
Every sub-network has at least Nn -1 connections and then has by definition at least Nn -1 
pairs of nodes that do have LUB. Krackhardt (1994) stated that LUB is the most complex 
measure to evaluate structure, since it is the only measure in a network sensitive to the 
direction of the nodes’ connections. LUB enables us to study the unity of command principle 
in our research and to analyze the position of a decision maker in the network centric 
scenario.  
 103
Two-mode network: Definition and implication for NCDM 
This kind of network presents two types of node sets in which the one set only can be 
connected to the nodes of the other set. Usually in the literature of social network a two-mode 
network is called membership network or hypernetwork.  The affiliation relation between the set 
of networks is referred to as an involvement relation. 
The first set of nodes is known as actors and can be denoted as: N = {n1,n2,..nn}. The 
second set of nodes is known as events and can be denoted as: M = {m1,m2,..mn}. The affiliation 
network matrix is called affiliation matrix and can be denoted as A = {aij}. See Table 20. 
The affiliation relation between the vector N and M can also be represented by a bipartite 
graph (Wasserman et al, 1994) in which the socio-matrix contains only 0 and 1 and represents 
the association between the node and the event. See Figure 15. 
 
Table 20: Affiliation matrix in two-mode 
Actor  Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
Node 1 1 1 0 
Node 2 1 0 1 
Node 3 0 0 1 
Node 4 1 0 0 
Node 5 0 0 1 
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Node 1 
Node 2 
Node 3 
Node 4 
Node 5 
Event 1 
Event 2 
Event 3 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Bipartite graph to a two-mode network 
 
Sometimes the nodes in a network centric scenario are involved in more than one 
simultaneous task. For instance the chief of a department of police, from his command post, 
could be making a decision regarding an incident that happened in sectors A and B of his local 
jurisdiction simultaneously. In this case a two-mode network could provide a better 
understanding of the behavior shown by the decision maker (chief of police) when dealing with 
two or more events concurrently. We describe a set of six two-mode metrics (Wasserman et al, 
1994): 
• Rate of participation 
• Reachability 
• Event Size 
• Diameter 
• Density 
• Connectedness 
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All the measures above are calculated over the bipartite graph but using the technique mentioned 
in one-mode network; nevertheless we need to keep in mind that we analyze the participation of 
a set of nodes in sets of simultaneous extreme event. 
Finding measures for testing in an incident command system  
According to the summarized analysis made over the five extreme events (Kobe 
Earthquake, Oklahoma Bombing, Mitch Hurricane, Chernobyl nuclear accident, and Hurricane 
Katrina) we could identify only in the case of Hurricane Katrina that the authorities had a well 
defined general plan for dealing with an extreme event, which is known as National Incident 
Management System. 
In the others four incidents, there did not exist a clear plan of response, and there also did 
not exist any system for integrating the different agencies, authorities, volunteers and non 
governmental organizations that were worked on site.  
The first question that arises is how can we apply the network metrics in a real scenario 
such as the previously studied? 
Initially, if an organization has a formal structure with systematized procedures tested in 
a training system, then we argue that the emergency management system can be analyzed 
analytically in the time T- (before the extreme event occurs) by using the mentioned metrics 
combined with LP technique. 
From the T0 (time that the alert system is activated) we will require data coming from the 
database of the organization.  Those data correspond to the interactions produced in a real time 
environment and should contain all the attributes necessary for populating the matrixes of a 
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hybrid simulation model. Figure 16 shows a schema in which the triad i, j, k  performs the 
interactions by means of an isomorphic class type 300.   
 
 
Figure 16: Model for capturing the interactions of the triad  i, j, k 
 
 
The process for collecting the information stored in the database with the attributes of the 
nodes i, j and k can generate plausible arcs which represent the interactions and their attributes. 
Notice that the scheme shown in Figure 16 is relatively simple to implement whether the 
organization has available either a command and control system or a training system for 
collecting data coming from an organization in the loop. 
Since the dyads are not persistent during the development of a crisis, the relationships 
between two nodes could be in three different states: mutual, asymmetric or null.  
 
Database 
Node k  
Node i  Node j  
Node Attributes 
• Type 
• Degree 
• Tasks 
• Position 
• Resources 
Message Attributes 
• Type 
• Time 
• Sender 
• Receiver 
• Classification 
 107
Therefore, we suggest that the systems more suitable for capturing those dynamics states 
are built over information technology.   
According to the network classification, a second question arises in our methodology: 
Could an emergency structure fit either a random or scale free network?  
We proved that the organization structure is well defined in the EOP and ICS.  Thus, nodes, 
positions, sequences and arcs can be collected from those documents and mapped to a simulated 
network. At this point, there are no dynamic interactions among the nodes, but surveys, 
interviews and analyses of the historic incidents could be useful tools for fitting the layout of the 
organization to a network model whose statistical parameters are known.  
On the other hand, once that emergency management organization is activated, the 
relationships between the nodes change according to how the situation evolves. Here we will 
require the mentioned systems based on technology of information for gathering those 
interactions. For instance, suppose that the different components of the organization can be fitted 
with a random network of size n and number of connections l, and suppose that we found that the 
uniform distribution is the best suitable distribution for analyzing the complex nodes’ interaction 
in the organization. Using the equation P (N=n), we could generate the adjacency matrix A 
distributed as a uniform random variable. 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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For comparing how the parameters affect the organizational structure of the random network and 
its measures of performance, we defined a longitudinal network in four moments of its evolution:  
• Timeframe 1: Random network with eight nodes and sixteen arcs. Density equal to 0.28. 
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• Timeframe 2: Random network with sixteen nodes and thirty-two arcs. Density equal to 
0.13. 
• Timeframe 3: Random network with thirty-two nodes and sixty-four arcs. Density equal 
to 0.06. 
• Timeframe 4: Random network with sixty-four nodes and one hundred twenty-eight arcs. 
Density equal to 0.03. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Longitudinal network generated with uniform distribution 
 
 
Table 21 shows eleven metrics found in the longitudinal network. We can identify 
dependent patterns in the four moments of the random network. The growth of the longitudinal 
network is explained by the incorporation of new nodes to the structure according to the 
evolution of the extreme event. 
  
Timeframe 4: Random Network with 64 
nodes and 128 arcs 
Timeframe 2: Random Network with 16 
nodes and 32 arcs 
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Table 21: Metrics obtained from four uniform random networks 
Nodes Arcs Density Inclusi- 
veness 
Recipro- 
city 
Transitivity Clustering 
Coefficient 
Mean Distance Diame- 
ter 
Connecte- 
dness 
Effici- 
ency 
Hierarchy LUB 
8 16 0.28 2 1 0.27 0.64 2.08 5 0.75 0.816 0.25 1 
16 32 0.13 1 0.25 0.07 0.19 2.63 6 0.30 0.92 0.67 0.9 
32 64 0.06 1 0.06 0.05 0.17 4.72 11 0.423 0.96 0.53 0.91 
64 128 0.03 1 0.03 0.02 0.09 4.34 10 0.427 0.98 0.48 0.90 
 
 
An alternative model was generated based on the parameters of a scale free network. We assume 
that the evolution of the structure of the organization follows a power law behavior. In order to 
test the same metrics used for a random network, we generated the second longitudinal scale free 
network based on the following parameters: 
• Timeframe 1: Scale free network with eight total nodes and two starting nodes. Density 
equal to 0.21. 
• Timeframe 2: Scale free network with sixteen total nodes and four starting nodes.. 
Density equal to 0.10. 
• Timeframe 3: Scale free network with thirty-two total nodes and eight starting nodes. 
Density equal to 0.04. 
• Timeframe 4: Scale free network with sixty-four total nodes and sixteen starting nodes. 
Density equal to 0.02. 
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Figure 18: Longitudinal scale free network 
 
Table 22: Metrics obtained from four scale free networks 
Nodes Arcs Density Inclusi-
veness 
Recipro- 
city 
Transiti-
vity 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
Mean 
Distance 
Diame- 
ter 
Connecte- 
dness 
Effici- 
ency 
Hierar-
chy 
LUB 
8 (2) 12 0.21 1 0 0.125 0.271 1.65 3 0 0.898 1 1 
16(4) 24 0.10 0.93 0.0 0.12 0.19 1.61 3 0.0 0.94 1 0.50 
32(8) 48 0.04 0.96 0.0 0.033 0.07 2 5 0.0 0.98 1 0.37 
64(16) 96 0.02 0.95 0.0 0.008 0.036 2.46 6 0.0 0.99 1 0.30 
 
Table 22 shows eleven metrics found in the longitudinal scale free network. We can identify 
dependent patterns in the four moments of the scale free network. With similar arguments we can 
say that the growth of the longitudinal network is explained for the incorporation of new nodes to 
the structure according to the evolution of the extreme event.  
Timeframe 1: Scale free network with 2 
initial nodes and a total of 8 nodes. 
 
Timeframe 4: Scale free network with 16 initial 
nodes and a total of 64 nodes. 
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Applying linear programming in a network centric scenario 
The after action  analyses carried out for understanding why a huge organization, such as 
an  ICS,  performs well or bad facing an extreme event always have been made from a 
qualitative perspective and  those analyses never consider analytic tools with numerical results 
that  support the conclusions of the analysts and stakeholders. 
In Appendix A we show that the five cases of extreme events do not consider any form of 
quantitative analysis that permits the enhancement of expensive and complex emergency systems 
which are usually composed by human beings and intelligent machines. 
The Vincennes incident is the exception to the rule, because extensive, detailed and 
quantified studies were conducted to determine why a very well-trained crew equipped with an 
advanced fire-control defense system   failed at a critical event. Those numerical results were 
used to improve the human-system interaction technologies and to design better decision support 
systems.  
Our proposal hereby is a hybrid approach that combines different techniques for 
enhancing the analysis and collaborative response to the disasters. In this context we suggest that 
LP is one of the techniques (likely the most rigid, but best understood) for improving the 
structures of an ICS and also for evaluating the performance of nodes at the federal, state and 
local levels.  
Notice that throughout this research, we emphasize the word hybrid, which applies such 
as the combined interpretation of the role and position of the nodes involved in a LP and SNA.  
We have identified four main features that are conducive for applying LP in an incident 
management system: 
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• Standardized incident protocols and procedures documented in the EOP which are 
mandatory for all responders at federal, state and local-levels to conduct and coordinate 
response actions. 
• The implementation of the ICS under the concept of unity of command which specifies 
that “each person within an organization reports to one and only one designated person” 
to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective (NIMS, 
2005). 
• The necessity of integrated planning at the federal, state and local levels, given that the 
incidents are managed at the lowest jurisdictional level possible, and the upper levels are 
involved as soon as the situation reaches state or national significance. 
• The incident command systems work over a network centric environment and the 
networks are well situated to analyze with linear programming. 
 We suggest three LP models among many other possibilities and we propose to enhance 
the interpretation of the LP outcomes by means of SNA technique; signal path optimization 
(network flow), deployment of resources (allocation) and data envelopment analysis (evaluation 
of performance). 
In Appendix B, we show the adjacency matrix which represents a theoretical structure of 
an ICS with 37 nodes. Each node must belong to the federal, state or local level. In social 
network terminology, the classification levels are known as a partition and it must be 
incorporated as an attribute vector of the adjacency matrix. Thus the digraph is shown in Figure 
19 according to the centrality values nodes and their partition attributes. 
At the federal level, blue nodes are governmental decision makers and agencies. At the 
state level green nodes correspond to organizations and agencies, and finally, at the local level, 
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red nodes correspond to task forces, mayor, incident commander, police, fire-rescue, private 
organizations, etc.  
 
 
Figure 19: Digraph of an incident command system at federal, state and local levels 
 
 
By simple visual inspection, we can distinguish the high centralization of two nodes in 
the local level: the incident commander and the mayor.  
At the state level, the governor is the node with the most incident connections and at the 
federal level, the High Emergency Management Agency has the most incident connections. 
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One of the most recurrent problems in an ICS is interoperability jurisdiction, which 
implies clear delimitation of authority levels, coordinated procedures, balanced assignation of 
tasks and synchronized transferring of flows and resources from federal to the state and local 
levels. In order to demonstrate how the study of a network centric environment is enhanced by 
using LP and SNA, we suggest the use of the Gould and Fernandez’s brokerage measures to 
analyze jurisdictional roles of the nodes in a network centric environment. By using the partition 
vector, the brokerage index counts the number of times each node is involved in five kinds of 
brokerage: coordinator, gatekeeper, representative, itinerant, and liaison relationships (Gould, & 
Fernandez, 1989; Netminer, 2005). 
Suppose we want to optimize the warning alarm flows sent simultaneously by the nodes 
Sensor, Police Department, and Hospital 1. In accordance with the ICS rules and the EOP, we 
could arbitrarily state that those data must be first known by two nodes at the local level, three 
nodes at the state level, and two nodes at the federal level.  
A number of twelve alerts (si) are sent by the three local nodes (gray color). Seven nodes 
(white color) feed different number of alerts (si) such as is shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Sender and receptor nodes at three levels 
 
 
The signal path optimization problem can be formulated as a classical minimum-cost 
network flow, where the sender nodes provide certain numbers of warning alert signals ( si ) and  
the receptor nodes  feed an exact number of si to  make decisions about activating  the ICS in its 
ego-digraph ( dyads connections of the receptors nodes). 
We assume the cost of the connections of each dyad is a function of the quality of the link 
and the performance of the nodes.  
To apply LP the number of alerts sent must be equal to the number of alerts fed by the 
nodes, which is represented by the equation: 
     ∑
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If there is an unbalanced alert flow yielded and fed in the digraph, we can apply the 
classical technique of dummy variables. Notice that the 27 nodes, which are not considered in 
Figure 20, play the significant role of transshipment in the digraph. 
By defining the decision variables such as: 
=ijx Number of alerts from the node i to the node j along connection i, j in the 
digraph. 
The minimum cost problem to optimize the warning alert system in the ICS is defined: 
Minimize z =      ∑177
),( Dji
ijij xcε
 
Subject to: sixx
Dij
ij
Dji
ij =− ∑∑ εε ),( ,),(  
0≥ijx  for all (i,j) ∈digraph. 
The objective function generates the total cost of the selected paths in the digraph, and 
the ijx  variables show the optimized path for transferring the data from the sender nodes to the 
receptor nodes. 
Early in the research, we defined the structure of the ICS, in which a vector partitions 
reminder us that we are working at three levels of decision making: federal, state and local. How 
could we know the patterns of jurisdiction   in the ICS due to the implementation of the 
optimized path obtained through LP? 
In order to deal with the number of times each node is involved in jurisdictional paths,   
we use brokerage’s measures to define the patterns of each node in the ICS depending if they 
belong to the federal, state of local level. 
Figure 21 shows the five brokerages in the context of an ICS. 
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Figure 21: Type of brokers according to Gould and Fernandez’s measures 
 
 
1. Coordinator (n1). Counts the number of times node 1 is a broker: 
S(n6) =  S(n1) = S(n7)      (State jurisdiction). 
2. Gatekeeper (n8).  Counts the number of times node 8 is a broker: 
S(n2) ≠ F(n8) = F(n9) (Federal and state jurisdiction). 
3. Representative (n3).  Counts the number of times node 3 is a broker: 
  F(n10) = F(n3) ≠ L(n11) (Federal and local jurisdiction). 
4. Consultant (n4).  Counts the number of times node 3 is a broker: 
 L(n12) ≠  F(n4) ≠ L(n13)    but  L(n12) =L(n13)  (Federal and local jurisdiction). 
5. Liaison (n14).  Counts the number of times node 14 is a broker: 
S(n14) ≠ F(n5) ≠ L(n15) (Federal,  state and local jurisdiction). 
Figures 22 and 23 show the two main nodes with the highest scores in the ICS diagraph 
according to Gould and Fernandez measures. 
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Brokerage :Coordinator 
Incident Commander = 106 
Mayor = 64 
 
Brokerage: Gatekeeper 
Mayor = 51 
State Government. = 30 
 
 
 
Brokerage :Representative 
Incident Commander = 33 
Mayor. = 29 
 
 
Brokerage :Itinerant 
HEMA = 3 
State HEMA = 2 
               Figure 22: Four brokerages measures in the Incident Command System 
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Brokerage :Liaison 
State HEMA = 13 
Mayor. = 8 
HEMA=8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brokerage :Total 
Incident Commander = 162 
Mayor. = 154 
State HEMA=53 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Brokerage liaison measure and total brokerage measure in the ICS 
 
 
The brokerage role in the optimized path enables us to test hypotheses to understand how 
the jurisdictional problems arise in the ICS. For instance if a determined brokerage dominates in 
a path, then the signal alert could require more or less time according to the interoperability of 
the components in the vector partition (jurisdictional levels). On the other hand, if we analyze the 
internal composition of a broker (node) then we could acquire awareness whether the node is 
prepared to carry out the broker role and its associated tasks. Thus, we have demonstrated as a 
combined interpretation of the Gould and Fernandez’s brokerage measures and the results of a 
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LP model can provide additional information to validate optimized transactions over the 
structure of an ICS.  
So far we have worked with the topological representation of an ICS and nothing has 
been stated regarding the incorporation of geographic measures in a networked emergency 
organization.  The identification of LP models in the deployment of resources and command post 
enables decision makers to solve potential difficulties during the period that the extreme event 
affects the geographic area. 
We mentioned that in the pre-event scenario, the social network technique is a good tool 
for analyzing the different relationships between the organizational nodes (topological analysis), 
but this technique is not enough for analyzing these issues: 
• Are the federal resources well placed   to augment state and local capabilities due to an 
extreme event? 
• Are the C2 systems geographically well located and topologically well assigned to the 
different nodes in the digraph? 
Thus LP could help to select a number of clusters for placing logistic areas and command 
post facilities to provide resources in better way to the nodes affected for an extreme event.  
By using the ICS digraph (Appendix B), in Figure 24 we describe a LP model to select 
three logistic areas from six propose. Assuming that the optimal solution areas are controlled by 
the nodes: Industrial Plant A, Airport Adm. and State Transport, in Figure 24 we show the 
geographic and the centrality deployment of the three nodes (yellow circles). 
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Figure 24: Deployment of resources in the ICS geographic and centrality areas 
 
 
The LP model and the centralities results enable us to conclude regarding to the 
interpretation of the optimal logistic areas and their centralization in the structure. 
Since the ICS digraph has an asymmetric adjacency matrix, the three nodes depict in-
degree and out-degree centrality values, which are shown in Figure 24. Notice in the concentric 
deployment the weak positions of the nodes Industrial Plant and Airport Adm.  
Therefore the combined analysis suggests that even though the so-called logistic nodes 
are the best situated geographically for supplying the ICS, their centrality values are low and 
easily they could be unreachable for other nodes in the information domain. As a consequence of 
this issue, many of the problems exposed in the Appendix A Disaster Analysis could happen 
again in an emergency structure. Besides of the degree centrality measures three additional 
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indexes can be used for testing a combined LP and social network analysis: closeness, 
betweenness and eigenvalues (Those were defined in the first part of this chapter). 
We have used an individual centrality measures to enhance the LP analysis; nevertheless 
there exists three overall degree indexes, which explain the degree centralization of the whole 
ICS, they are: in-degree centralization, out-degree centralization and degree centralization.  
In the digraph, the in-degree and out-degree centralization scores are 0.21 and its 
associated total degree is 0.18. The measures provide us a representation of the digraph 
configuration and allow comparing the structure with another digraph of the same size (a start 
configuration obtains a score of 1). Thus a LP analysis should be aware of either robustness or 
weakness of the digraph derived of the overall centralization values.  
The lack of quantitative analysis in the after action review of the extreme event is 
extensive to the evaluation of the efficiency in the components of the digraph. We suggest DEA 
as a tool to measure the relative efficiency of the nodes with the same goals and objectives in the 
ICS. 
In Chapter Three we defined three types of events, (IE, PE and UE) and we characterized 
the last one as a universal event that affects the whole ICS, at different levels and places.  
When a universal event occurs, it will be common to find multiple nodes with the same 
roles and objectives at different location, for instance multiple either fire-rescue teams or hospital 
facilities integrated in the ICS. In DEA terminology those nodes are decision making units 
(DMUs).   
In order to determine the efficiency of the DMUs, the logic of DEA model allows 
determining whether a composite node can achieve the same or more output while requiring less 
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input. We summarize the process in five steps (Anderson, et al., 2000; Mollaghasemi & Pet-
Edwards, 1997): 
• To create a hypothetical composite node based on the outputs and inputs for the nodes 
which have the same goals. 
• For each node output measure, the output for the composite units is determined by 
computing a weighted average of the corresponding outputs. 
• For each input measurement, the inputs of composite nodes are determined by using the 
same weights to compute a weighed average of the corresponding inputs for all nodes. 
• Constraints in the LP model require all outputs for the composite unit to be greater than 
or equal to the outputs of the nodes being evaluated. 
• The node being evaluated is inefficient if the input for the composite node is shown to 
have the same, or more output for less input. In other words, if efficiency is less than 1, 
the composite node does not need as many resources as the node being evaluated to 
produce the same level of outputs. 
In the context of an ICS, the identification of DMUs is not enough, because DEA does not 
consider the position of the DMUs in the organizational structure, thus nodes in a better 
topological position could improve their outputs and decrease their inputs. We suggest the use of 
REGGE algorithm (regular resemblance) to identify that two or more nodes are regularly 
equivalent if they are equally related to equivalent others. The result of REGGE is a symmetric 
similarity matrix which provides a measure of regular equivalence in the digraph.  This matrix is 
automatically submitted to a single link hierarchical clustering routine (Netminer, 2005; Borgatti, 
Everett &Freeman, 2002).  
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Figure 25 shows the hierarchical clustering of the equivalent nodes in the digraph, which 
enable us to apply DEA to the DMUs with the same goals and objectives. 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Hierarchical cluster of the regular equivalence of the nodes 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter we defined three domains for evaluating the behavior of an emergency 
management organization that performs its tasks over a networked environment.  
Using graph theory and the interpretation of the relationships given by social network 
technique, we defined a level of aggregation based on the concept of nodes and arcs. The 
methods selected enabled us to deal with the entire organizational structure rather than samples. 
The term one-to-one mapping will be used for identifying the level of granularity in our 
methodology.  
We provided a comprehensive classification of networks and measures which can be 
applied to the emergency management organization. Several index measures explained the 
concepts of centrality, neighbor and connection. 
We showed that if data is available, then a test of hypothesis by using Monte Carlo 
simulation could provide a statistical model for predicting the future performance of an 
emergency organization. 
An invaluable tool was analyzed by implementing the concept of dyad census and triad 
census. We supported the idea that relaxing the theory of structural balance could know the 
complete structure of an emergency organization and likely to project future organizational 
behavior, nevertheless testing the hypothesis over the organizational data is required to validate 
our assumptions. (In the field of social behavior, this technique is well explained by Wasserman 
et al. 1994; Nooy et al. 2005). 
 We tested eleven network measures using random network and scale free configurations. 
After modifying the density of both networks, we realized that patterns arise when we change the 
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size and number of arcs in the network. Thus we can expect that similar patterns might be found 
in the dynamic structure of an emergency management organization.   
Finally, we proposed to incorporate LP in the optimization of an ICS. By using three examples, 
we demonstrated the helpfulness of a combined analysis between LP and social network 
measures.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: COMBINING SIMULATION TECHNIQUES AND 
CONCEPTUAL-OPERATIONAL MODEL 
Introduction: Interaction between system dynamics and discrete simulation 
Network centric scenarios evolve dramatically according to the evolution of the discrete 
and continuous environments variables, and this produces new dyadic configurations in an 
emergency management organization. 
Most of the natural extreme events present a continuous progress over time. However, 
sometimes human beings do not realize that, and they perceive the evolution of the events as 
discrete spatial-temporal changes.  On the other hand, the majority of the man-made extreme 
events are carried out in a specific place and time, because they are intended for producing panic 
and physical damage in a selected location. According to those characteristics, we classify the 
man-made extreme events mainly as discrete events.  
In this research context, the organizational behavior can be viewed from two 
perspectives, the external and internal behaviors. The former are the dyads’ transactions made 
between the nodes, such as message chains, tasks, signals, missions, and movement of resource, 
all of which can be represented as discrete flows of entities. The latter are the internal processes 
carried out in each node, an aspect that suggest modeling as continuous and discrete variables.  
Rogalski (1991) pointed out that situations of emergency management can be considered 
as specific cases of dynamic environments, in which the notion of operational flows in any 
model of distributed decision making is a function of time. By operational flows, he defined the 
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“environment states, cognitive tasks, material tasks to be performed and on the other, networks 
of organization for communication and resources.”  
In agreement with the previous statement, this section presents several approaches for 
merging SD and DES techniques. In fact, we identify the mechanisms for interacting continuous 
and discrete variables for getting a specific behavior.  After that, we propose how to use those 
mechanisms for modeling several components of the network centric scenario, leaving open the 
methodology for implementing other models using the hybrid approach.  
In this research context, we do not discuss the foundation of SD and DES, and assume a 
previous knowledge regarding both techniques. We will focus on the state transition technique 
and the identification of the best candidate for modeling and simulating the interactions in a 
network centric scenario and the internal nodes processes.  Advantages and disadvantages of the 
named techniques will be presented.  
Finally, we present a conceptual and operational model for simulating a networked 
decision making scenario.  
System dynamics technique (SD) 
The SD technique is based on a clear structure of differential equations and auxiliary 
variables. The interactions of the levels, inflows, outflows, and parameters yield a complexity that 
grows rapidly with the size of the model and the number of feedback loops in the system. Thus, 
simple systems can reach exorbitant and uncontrollable non-linear behaviors in the variables of 
states (levels).   
Kampman pointed out, “It is still an open question whether the feedback loops concept is 
useful in large-scale systems” (Kampmann, 2004). Even so, SD presents many features which 
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might be useful for modeling nodes and their interactions in a networked scenario. For instance, 
the variable of state named level shows four useful features (Adapted with modifications of US. 
Department of Energy, 2006): 
• Have memory: Variable of state conserves the number of entities if the inflow and 
outflow are constants.  
• Change the time slope of flows: When there exists a feedback loop between level and 
inflow or outflow, the behaviors of both are modified.  
• Decouple inflows and outflows: Enables control of the entities by different variables of 
the model. 
• Create delay: Enables interruption of process of data and resources in time.  
Many attempts have been made to reduce the complexity of the structural behavior 
derived from many feedback loops. Research efforts have identified nine types of feedback loop 
structures named archetypes, because they describe similar patterns previously found in different 
SD models.  
Senge (1990) described a set of archetypes to recognize, and modifying specific feedback 
loops in a system. Wolstenholme (2003) summarized those archetypes in four models based on 
the two basic types of feedback loops (balancing and reinforcing), as shown in Figure 26: 
• Underachievement: The intended achievement fails to be realized. 
• Out of control: The intended control fails to be realized. 
• Relative achievement: The achievement is only gained at the expense of others. 
• Relative control: The control is only gained at the expense of others. 
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Figure 26: Set of archetypes in system dynamics (Wolstenholme, 2003) 
 
 
Archetypes are solutions for reducing the complexity of the system size, but those are not 
enough if we want to test if the SD technique is a good candidate for modeling a network centric 
scenario. In order to identify strengths and weaknesses of SD models we need additional tools 
for understanding the behavior of an emergency management organization.  
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One significant issue for using SD technique in the context of this research is to find out 
how many feedback loops exist in the structure of an emergency management organization. In 
Chapter Four we presented a preliminary approach to this problem by mean of the analysis of the 
vectors triads and dyads.  
Kampmann (2004) showed that in a SD model, the number of feedback loops in a 
maximally connected graph with n variable of state and p auxiliary variables reaches the number 
of 2np(n-1)! loops. Furthermore, he argued that there are no general formulas for finding the 
number of feedback loops for a given system, and he proposed an algorithm to identify all loops 
in a given graph. (According to the Kampmann formula we tested his outcomes, and they should 
be considered an estimation of the number of loops in a SD model). 
 
Table 23: Number of loops in a maximally connected system with n levels and p auxiliary 
variables (According to Kampmann (2004))  
n p 
 0 1 5 10 
1 1 2 32 1024 
2 3 8 1088 106  
3 8 34 68704 109 
4 24 192 106 1012 
5 89 1458 108 1016 
10 106 108 1020 1035 
 
 
We showed in Chapter Four that an emergency management organization has clear and well 
defined procedures, and the relationships among its components generate different 
configurations  before, during, and after the extreme event.  
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As those configurations are hierarchical digraphs which respond to well-defined 
problems, we might argue that systems for emergency management will have a number of 
reduced feedback loops, at least in the first period of an extreme event, when the organization 
can control the effects of the event. 
Two examples of the previous statement were showed in the Kobe Earthquake in Japan, 
and Hurricane Mitch in Central America (Appendix A). In both cases, we hypothesized the 
existence of initial configurations  with a reduced number of feedback loops due to the 
controlled chain of command, but according to the severe evolution of the extreme event, those 
“configurations” were losing their structures and the number of uncontrolled feedback loops 
increased dramatically. By using graph terminology, the number of graph components also 
increased, producing a lack of communication, coordination, and situation awareness in the 
organization. Analyzing the chain of command in Hurricane Mitch, the recurring question “Who 
is in charge?” is an example of the uncontrolled feedbacks loops that are produced at determined 
periods in the organization. (See Hurricane Mitch analysis in Appendix A.)  
Thus, we conclude that the number loops is relevant for a networked organization, and it 
might be a good indicator of the emergency management system performance. We argue that the 
identification of the number of feedback loops is the first step for testing the helpfulness of SD 
technique in a networked scenario.  
Researchers have developed few techniques for understanding the behavior of the feedback 
loops over time. The most significant of these techniques according to our research are: 
• Model analysis – Looks to explain the cause of the oscillations in the feedback loops by 
using “causal loop diagram” and polarity. 
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• Loop knockout technique – Useful for studying loop dominance, the modeler disconnects 
specific loops to analyze what loops have more significance in the system behavior.    
• Sensitivity test – Based on variations of parameters, seeks to identify the causes of the 
system oscillations. 
• Eigenvalues analysis– Measures that identify the loops that contribute more to the system 
behavior.  
Because the three first techniques are based on trial and error and they are time consuming, we 
will concentrate our effort into a mathematical analysis to evaluate the helpfulness of the 
eigenvalue measures in the study of the network centric scenario. 
Eigenvalues and eigenvalues elasticity for evaluating a networked organization 
Since SD is a set of nonlinear differential equations, this technique requires us to 
linearize the equations as a set of linear differential equations. The equation  dX/dt = A X+ b, 
represents the SD model under study as a set of linearized matrices with   X  being the state 
vector, composed by all the variables of states in the system. (Speller, Rabelo and John, 2004). 
The eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix A determine the expected behavior of the 
system. This behavior depends on the position of the eigenvalue on the complex plane. Figure 27 
shows the six possible behaviors based upon eigenvalues analysis. 
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Figure 27: Behavior of a SD model derived from eigenvalue analysis 
 
 
The real part of the eigenvalue will determine the mode stability. A negative real part will 
cause decay or goal seeking modes, whereas a positive real eigenvalue will cause exponential 
growth (positive or negative). A pure imaginary eigenvalue will cause never-damping 
oscillations.  
Complex eigenvalues, which always occur in conjugate pairs of the form a ±bi, where i² 
= -1, will identify oscillations and either growth or decay, depending on the sign of its real part; 
negative implies decay or goal seeking, positive indicates exponential growth (Speller et al. 
2006). 
a- bi-bi-a -bi
a-a
a+ bibi
Real Imaginary ( i ) 
-a +bi
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The question that arises is: Could SD be a good candidate for simulating the interaction 
among the nodes in a network centric environment? 
Let us answer the question by formulating a small example regarding how local and state 
authorities could react according to established procedures to a warning alert sensor which sends 
an alarm when a natural extreme event comes out in the jurisdiction of those authorities. (See 
Figure 28). 
The model presents seven variables of states and twelve flows. The reader should note 
that a SD model of an organization has fewer feedback loops than models used in others fields. 
There are two reasons that justify this apparent lack of complexity. The first one is the modeling 
of a hierarchical organization whose adjacency matrix (say digraph) is essentially asymmetric; 
the second one is the nonexistence of auxiliary variables that alter the correlation between the 
variables of states (it avoids, in part, the introduction of chaotic behavior in this simple model).  
We implemented a pulse as an in-flow to stand for the external behavior of an extreme event. A 
sensor is a variable of state (node) which represents a warning alert in a network centric 
emergency system. The sensor gets data from   the pulse, and sends a warning alert to the alert 
node.  
Basically, the warning alert is an increment in the rate flow to the next node. People in 
charge of the alert node activate the chain of command by sending modified flows to its 
connected nodes Situation awareness and Local decision maker. Thus the diffusion information 
is expanded through the digraph.     
The matrix C and the digraph show the connections of the decision makers who are 
modeled as variables of states. The main assumption in the model is while more flows of data 
arrive to the nodes, variables of states transmit data with more intensity to others nodes 
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(regulated by the flows). Thus,   we use the variables of states as control of the internal nodes’ 
behavior.  By using this technique, we are constrained to model only one type of flow among the 
nodes, and if another type of flows is required, then we need another SD model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      C= 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Adjacency matrix for a warning alert scenario 
 
The digraph, in Figure 28, contains seven nodes and thirteen connections.  The matrix C 
was used for collecting statistics information in regard to the sub-graphs produced by the dyad 
census, in Table 24. There are four mutual dyads and five asymmetric flows; also the census 
shows that twelve null dyads are produced in the emergency system.    
Figure 29 shows a sketch of the SD model which represents the adjacency matrix C. The 
blue arrow represent the feedback loops shown in the matrix C. A triad census was conducted for 
collecting the triads that arises from the SD model Table 25. 
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Figure 29: Triad census performed in a SD model with seven stocks (SD model was 
implemented in Vensim software and digraph analysis in Netminer software) 
 
 
In Figure 29 there is a dominance of the triad 003 and 012, the former points out a null 
connection among seven triads and the latter shows asymmetric flows characteristic of the 
hierarchy organizations without feedbacks.   
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Table 24: Dyads census 
Nodes: 7  Arcs: 13 Observed Expected
Number of Mutual Dyads 4 3.116 
Number of Asymmetric Dyads 5 5.884 
Number of Nulls Dyads 12 12 
 
Table 25: Triads census 
Nodes: 7  Arcs: 13 Observed  Expected St Dev. Std. Err. Variance
003 7 6.42 1.02 0.032 1.04 
012 10 9.42 2.25 0.071 5.09 
102 4 2.11 1.34 0.042 1.79 
021D 0 0.74 0.74 0.024 0.56 
021U 0 1.02 0.66 0.021 0.43 
021C 2 3.66 0.87 0.028 0.76 
111D 3 2.94 0.89 0.028 0.80 
111U 3 3.15 0.74 0.024 0.56 
030T 0 0.96 0.75 0.024 0.56 
030C 0 0.14 0.35 0.011 0.12 
201 3 1.17 1.04 0.033 1.09 
120D 1 0.25 0.44 0.014 0.20 
120U 1 0.33 0.49 0.016 0.24 
120C 0 1.12 0.76 0.024 0.58 
210 1 1.43 0.57 0.018 0.33 
300 0 0.013 0.11 0.004 0.13 
      
 
 
Four triads show a mutual relationship, and since that the system is composed by only 
seven nodes, we might suggest that the configuration presents a high grade of feedback among 
its components. It is consistent with the feedbacks loops produced by the four dyads found in the 
dyads census in Table 24.  
If we generate a random digraph with seven nodes and thirteen connections, we could 
expect the number of type of dyads and triads shown in Tables 24 and 25. By now, we do not 
compare the observed with the expected columns in both tables, because of the reduced number 
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of nodes in the digraph.  Additional conclusions we can get by analyzing the matrix C with the 
“one mode” social network measures showed in Chapter Four. 
By performing feedback loops analysis, we collected the outcomes in three nodes: Local 
Decision Maker, Alert and Situation Awareness. Table 26 shows the feedbacks loops of length 1 
to 7. 
 
Table 26: Feedbacks loops in the nodes local DM, alert and situation awareness (Loops 
generated by using Vensim software) 
Local DM Alert  Situation Awareness 
Loop Number 1 of length 1 
  Local DM 
       Send6 
Loop Number 2 of length 1 
  Local DM 
       Send5 
Loop Number 3 of length 1 
  Local DM 
       Send2 
Loop Number 4 of length 5 
  Local DM 
       Send2 
       Alert 
       Send1 
       Situation Awareness 
       Send3 
Loop Number 5 of length 7 
  Local DM 
       Send2 
       Alert 
       Send1 
       Situation Awareness 
       Send4 
       Regional DM 
       Send5 
 
Loop Number 1 of length 1 
  Alert 
       Send2 
Loop Number 2 of length 1 
  Alert 
       Send1 
Loop Number 3 of length 5 
  Alert 
      Send1 
      Situation Awareness 
      Send3 
      Local DM 
      Send2 
Loop Number 4 of length 7 
  Alert 
      Send1 
      Situation Awareness 
      Send4 
      Regional DM 
      Send5 
      Local DM 
      Send2 
 
Loop Number 1 of length 1 
  Situation Awareness 
       Send4 
Loop Number 2 of length 1 
  Situation Awareness 
       Send3 
Loop Number 3 of length 5 
  Situation Awareness 
       Send3 
       Local DM 
       Send2 
       Alert 
       Send1 
Loop Number 4 of length 7 
  Situation Awareness 
       Send4 
       Regional DM 
       Send5 
       Local DM 
       Send2 
       Alert 
       Send1 
 
 
 
A complementary insight we obtain from Table 26, since that triad and dyads census provided 
some hints in regard to static behavior of the system, now we find out the exact number of the 
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direct and indirect causal relationships that influence the final behavior of each node. Clearly 
those feedbacks loops are measures of the complexity of the system in each critical point.  
For instance the node Alert has four loops whose lengths are; 1, 1, 5, and 7.    
The fourth loop involves four flows and three variables of states, and it confirms the 
presence of one triad 210 (see Figure 29) obtained in the digraph analysis.   
Figure 30 shows the behavior of four nodes in the system, the simulation was 
implemented in a timeframe of 100 units of time. Tables 27 and 28 show the dynamic matrix A, 
at the periods 10 and 90. The reader should note as matrix A changes its values and its 
eigenvalues in time according to the equation Ax =λx, where λ is an eigenvalue of the matrix A, 
and x is its associated vector. 
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Figure 30: Behavior of node in the warning alert system 
 
In Figure 30 the graph sensor shows the behavior of the node which only is driven by the 
pulse generated by the extreme event, at time 4. Notice that this graph is consistent with the 
eigenvalue -0.00298 + 0.11864i shown in Table 27, Table 28 and Figure 27. Basically the 
damping oscillation decays constantly at the period t=10 and t=90. 
The graph Alert shows a decay behavior, which also is consistent with its eigenvalue  -0.1 
+ 0i shown in Table 27, Table 28 and Figure 27. 
The situation awareness shows a goal seeking behavior at the period t=10 and t=90. The 
eigenvalues do not change in the time. 
 142
The graph Local DM shows an oscillatory behavior which corresponds to permanent 
changes of sign in the real and imaginary parts of its eigenvalue (See Table 27 and 28. Data was 
obtained using Vensim Software, Analyzt software and Netminer software.) 
The feedback loops in Table 26 show that the behavior of either one or several variables 
could influence the behavior of others variables. In order to determine the magnitude of the 
influence, we calculate the elasticities of the eigenvalues. Basically, this index enables us to 
identify the loops that govern the behavior of a selected variable. 
Selecting as variable the node Alert (shadow value), we identified the intensity of the 
relation that exists between the feedback loops and the node Alert. At the times t=10 and t=90 we 
can see that the Sensor node is the main direct causal for the decay behavior of the node Alert.   
 
Table 27: Dynamic matrix A, time=10: Eigenvalues and eigenvalues elasticities 
Eigenvalue Analysis      Time = 10 
 
Regional DM- Sensor- Situation Awareness- Others- Police- Local DM- Alert 
Dynamic Matrix A Eigenvalues 
0.1     0.0      0.5     0.0    0.0       0.1     0.0 
0.0     -0.1     0 .0     0.0    0.0      0.0      0.0 
0.0      0.0      -1       0.0    0.0      0.0     -0.1 
0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0    0.0      0.0       0.0 
0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0    0.1      0.1       0.0 
-0.1     0.0      0.5     0.0   -0.1    -0.1       0.1 
0 .0     0.1      0.0     0.0    0.0    -0.1     2.31E-11
-0.99405      velocity 0i 
-0.00298      velocity  0.11864i 
-0.00298      velocity  -11864i 
  0.1              velocity  0i 
-3.97e-012    velocity 5.74e-007i 
-3.97e-012    velocity 5.74e-007i 
-0.1               velocity  0i 
 
Loop Elasticities 
Sensor →→Sensor                                          -0.99999               velocity NaN 
Regional DM→→Regional DM                      4.18458e-005      velocity NaN 
Situation Awareness →Situation Awareness  -2.20177e-005     velocity NaN 
Police →→Local DM→ Police                       1.89066e-005      velocity NaN 
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Table 28: Dynamic matrix A, time=90: Eigenvalues and eigenvalues elasticities 
Eigen value Analysis      Time = 90 
Regional DM- Sensor- Situation Awareness- Others- Police- Local DM- Alert 
Dynamic Matrix A Eigen values 
0.1    0.0     0.5    0.0    0.0    0.1    0.0 
0.0    -0.1    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
0.0     0.0    -1      0.0    0.0    0.0   -0.1 
0.0     0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
0.0     0.0     0.0   0.0    0.1   0.1     0.0 
-0.1    0.0     0.5   0.0   -0.1  -0.1    0.1 
0.0    0.09    0.0  0.0    0.0   -0.1  -1.19E-11 
 -0.99405        velocity 0i 
 -0.00298        velocity  0.11864i 
 -0.00298        velocity  -11864i 
  0.1                velocity  0i 
  7.4926e-007 velocity 0i 
 -7.5061e-007 velocity 0i 
 -0.1                velocity  0i 
 
Loop Elasticities 
Sensor →→Sensor                                          -1.0000               velocity NaN 
Situation Awareness →Situation Awareness  -4.29693e-005    velocity NaN 
Police →→ Police                                           -3.15856e-005    velocity NaN 
Local DM→→Local DM                                 2.04404e-005    velocity NaN 
 
 
 
Although SD technique is only based on the connection of three elements – inflows, 
outflows and variable of state – all connected by feedback loops, the non linearity that arises 
from the interaction of those variables is hard to control, especially in a model with more than 
three variables of state.  
By using eigenvalues, we demonstrated the stability of an SD model can be controlled 
and significant conclusions can be obtained from its analysis.  
On the other hand, if the feedback loops are an obstacle for evaluating the accuracy of the 
performance of an ICS, we can reduce the complexity by using the ego-net concept from Chapter 
Four, thus we might reduce the number of nodes and concentrate our effort over a sub-graph of 
the whole system. 
 
 144
Discrete simulation: A network centric approach 
Traditionally discrete simulation techniques have been used from a discrete event 
perspective such as manufacturing systems, services lines, business and supply chains. Whereas 
all those models are regulated by an event scheduling mechanism, little attention has been given 
to the combination of others discrete approaches such as petri net, agent based, finite machine, 
and state transition. This is likely because there exists a number of commercial packages for 
implementing discrete event simulation. 
In the context of a network centric scenario, we will analyze the synergy that arises from 
the interaction of two discrete simulation techniques, discrete event and state transition, making 
emphasis in the advantages that present the combination of both techniques for modeling an 
emergency management organization in a networked scenario.  Thus, for a network centric 
analysis, a comprehensive definition of discrete simulation is: “Modeling of a system over the 
time, where the state of the variables change according to either fixed mechanisms or by 
controlled algorithms over the processes.” 
Fixed mechanism makes reference to the two historically main approaches for advancing 
the simulation clock: next-event time and fixed-increment time advance (Law & Kelton, 2000), 
and as extended literature exists in discrete event simulation, we will concentrate our discussion 
primarily on state machine discrete approach. We will demonstrate part of our methodology for 
fitting a discrete simulation based on state transition with a standard discrete event approach, 
and we will show how both implementations might be used in a networked scenario. 
A model based upon state transition has four components (adapted and modified from 
Mosterman, Biswas and Sztipanovits, 1998): 
• I= {µo,…….. µk } the set of states describing operational modes of the system. 
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• ∑={σo,…….. σk }, the set of events that can cause state transitions. Events are generated 
by dynamic process, the closed-loop controller, and by external, open-loop control 
signals, i.e., ∑= ∑p x ∑c x ∑ x.: I x ∑→I, a discrete state-transition function that defines 
the new mode after an event occurs.  
• C= { Ik….... Ik } represent a community of set of states defined in the context of a network 
centric scenario. 
We characterize the state µi as the set of values shown by the variables and parameters of 
a system during a certain period of time. If we define a discrete event process over time as σi, 
then the state µi always could describe either the entire process or part of σi. 
On the other hand, we could use σi for driving the set of events ∑. Thus the discrete event 
model will determine when the discrete function φ  triggers the transition toward a new µk. 
The function φ is transitive and reflexive; it might transfer the control from one state to another 
or back to the original state. The final behavior of the system arises from the combination of all 
the states of the system.  
The implementation of a combined discrete event and state transition model presents 
multiple advantages for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of an emergency 
management organization, especially if data is available to simulate the interactions between 
nodes and to drive the scenarios that should face an ICS.    
Using unified modeling language (UML) definitions, we will describe four types of state 
transitions and we propose a fifth state named community of states which fits well for 
implementing our proposed hybrid methodology. 
• Sub-state: A state which resides within another state.  
• Sequential states: A chronological succession of states that occur one after the other.  
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• Concurrent states: States executed at the same time. 
• Composite states: A state composed of other concurrent or sequential states. 
• Community of states: A set of states located in either different composite states or 
objects for which signals are their main mechanisms of communication.  
The community of states enables the implementation of a concurrent behavior in more 
than one composite state, allowing the generation of a set of communities; thus   C= { Io,.... Ik } is 
the community of states describing the whole set of operational modes of the system.  
We propose a state transition technique for governing the external events which should 
produce a chain of reactions on the whole emergency management organization according to 
how it is regulated in the EOP.  The community of states transition should show the states space 
with the algorithms, events, and transitions.  
 For instance, the Figure 31 shows two classes with two composite states of transition 
each one for controlling the chain of command and decision making processes. 
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Figure 31: Community of states defined for a network centric scenario 
 
The community of state transition is well situated as a control mechanism that the 
modeler can use for testing different components of the whole system.  The succession of events 
over time could be regulated by using either random or deterministic variables for controlling the 
transitions, events, and actions.  
Integrating system dynamics and discrete event simulation 
So far, we have focused our methodology on continuous and discrete variables separately 
by using SD, DES, and state transition simulation techniques. Now we will concentrate our 
effort on identifying comprehensive mechanisms for modeling more complex behaviors putting 
together continuous and discrete variables. 
Class A 
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S2 S6 
S5 S3 S4 
S1
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The behavior of an emergency management organization depicts both discrete and 
continuous variables; the former might be resources, entities, process time, queuing messages, 
and activation alarms, and the latter might be the effect of stress on the team, time for 
accomplishing a task, and evolution of a physical event. 
By using both techniques we have to distinguish between two different modeling 
approaches:     
• Interactions of models 
• Interactions of variables  
Interaction of models means that one part of the system was modeled by using SD 
technique and the other part by using DES technique, and both models interact through a discrete 
interface.  
 
 
Figure 32: Interaction of models in hybrid simulation approach 
 
Figure 32 shows the two models; a continuous with a feedback loop based on SD, and a 
process flow, in which the entities follow a programmed sequence based on DES. Both models 
interact only through a discrete state transition interface that manages the changes of the 
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dynamic parameters. The configuration requires the use of sensors and signals for detecting 
when selected variables from both simulation techniques cross specific thresholds.  
Figure 33 shows that the second modeling approach, named interactions of variables, 
implies that there exists only one model implemented by means of two simulation techniques.  
Thus,   either the variables of the SD model could be dynamics parameters of the DES model or 
the variables of the DES model, such as number of entities in the queue or resources utilization 
could be dynamics parameters that modify the behavior of the variables of state (level) in a SD 
model.  
 From the interaction of variables arises the concept of dynamic simulation, since the 
parameters of the processes (DES) and flows (SD) change over time. 
 
 
Figure 33: Interaction of variables in a hybrid simulation approach 
 
By using the two previous approaches, the modeler of a network centric environment has the 
chance to capture six types of behavior as is shown in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34: Variables’ behaviors according to inputs and outputs mechanisms 
 
 
Since an input to the Node 1 applies the function F and produces a discrete output, this 
could be the case of a classical discrete event simulation.  
In contrast, if Node 2 is a state variable, then it seizes the flows and applies the function 
F to the in-flows (for those familiar with SD, F could be an information delay) and it releases the 
out-flows according to a fixed rate.  
 Node 5 shows the effect of discrete variables which produce a continuous behavior over 
the node. An example is a discrete extreme event such as an explosion that generates, by means 
of a function F, stress over the population; the effect of this stress is a continuous variable. 
 Node 6 receives continuous input and, after applying F, releases discrete outputs. A clear 
example of this kind of behavior is the effect of the fatigue over the number of tasks carried out 
by a team. It is assumed that as the team works more hours continually, the rate at which it 
completes tasks will decrease.   
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 Nodes 3 and 4 are combinations of the processes described for the other four nodes.  
Conceptual model of a network centric decision making scenario 
After discussing how to combine the main simulation techniques available for modeling 
continuous and discrete processes, we define a conceptual model of the organizational structure 
and the network centric environment in which it performs its tasks.  
By means of a conceptual model design, we specify three main sets of features of a 
modeled system: 
• Essential components of the organization structure. 
• The relationships of the nodes and their position in the structure. 
• The kinds of changes in either the environment or the emergency organization that affect 
the functioning of the complete structure. 
In order to present the design logically and according to the current “mental model” that 
the people and community have of an emergency management organization, the conceptual 
model was designed following the structure of a set of interconnected graphs. The model 
captures the essential elements of an ICS which was defined as “the combination of facilities, 
equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common 
organizational structure” (NIMS, 2004). Those essential elements are: 
• Structure representation of the emergency management organization based on an ICS. 
• Dynamic interaction into the elements of an ICS. 
• Identification of measures of performance and vulnerabilities in the organization 
structure.  
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• Evolution of the configuration over time by the effect of new events and interruption of 
the dyads flows.  
• Representation of resources available. 
• Representation of the internal structure of the elements in the networked organization. 
• The communication between the elements considers diffusion of information rate.  
Making use of the level of aggregation defined in Chapter Four, each element that plays a 
critical role in the structure of an ICS is modeled as a node, allowing a high level of granularity. 
Besides providing a model that aligns the mental models that the modelers and decision 
makers have of a networked emergency organization, the conceptual model enabled us to create 
fixed mechanisms for merging simulation technique with graph structure. Thus the static dyad 
and triad relationships of a digraph can evolve toward a simulated model that contains the 
configuration of an ICS at local, state, and federal levels. 
We conceptualized the model in five steps which represent the evolution of the processes 
of decision making in an ICS. See Figure 35.  
Step 1 captures the organization layout and the adjacency matrix N of the digraph 
associated with the organization structure. Figure 35 (shadow area) shows the asymmetric 
relationships among the nodes that correspond to the hierarchy’s emergency organization.   
Step 2 corresponds to the definition of the set of discrete and/or continuous events that 
begin the activation of the system by means of signals. A sensor should transfer the signal to the 
set of nodes in the organization. The signal is a function of the type of event and how it evolves 
over time.  
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Figure 35: Conceptual model 
 
 
Step 3 must consider the representation of the internal structure of the nodes based upon 
pieces of information received, processed, and transferred to other nodes. The complexity of the 
internal structure of the nodes is a function of the role and position that the nodes have in the 
digraph.  Thus nodes with similar roles like task forces should have similar compositions, but the 
parameters that govern their internal structure will be different. For example, a small team of fire 
and rescue personnel at a local level is different from a military engineering company specialized 
in rescue and construction, but their organizational processes are similar. 
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In step 4, the methodology contains the exogenous and endogenous variables, those that 
affect the organization performance. In agreement with the lesson learned from the five case 
studies, we have considered two types of models that influence the organization; team 
performance and the evolution of the extreme event.  
Step 5 considers the dynamic interaction among the nodes. This step is linked with the 
analysis of the longitudinal network pointed out in the previous chapter. Since there exist dyads 
that modify their behavior in time, the model captures those changes in fixed times to apply 
longitudinal network analysis. This step is highly dependent on the data available in the database 
of the organization. Those changes will be shown in the adjacency matrix N and as consequence 
will produce changes in the digraph.  
Finally, Step 6 conceptualizes the transmission of different types of data and resources 
between of the nodes.  
Operational model of a network centric scenario 
After defining a conceptual model, we present a blueprint of our vision of a networked 
scenario in which an emergency management organization performs its tasks according to well 
documented alarms and procedures contained in the ICS and EOP. This framework provides 
mechanisms for capturing, sharing, and communicating the essential objects and interactions of a 
given configuration and its surrounding scenario.  
Early, we defined the concept of a digraph for studying the mathematical structure of an 
organization and since the graphs enable a one-to-one modeling of the nodes components and the 
subsequent interactions that arise from the system, our approach combines these characteristics 
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with an object oriented (OO) design and language implementation of an emergency management 
system. 
By taking the best of these two worlds (graph and OO) it is possible to analyze complex 
networked organizations (hundreds of nodes with thousands of connections) by defining only a 
few pattern behaviors of the nodes.  
Someone could argue that that functionality has been already performed by an exhaustive 
digraph analysis, but this is incorrect because that digraph analysis examines the isomorphic 
relationships from a static perspective only. Here we additionally incorporate the analysis of the 
dynamics flows performed by the nodes and suggest the necessity of defining internal nodes’ 
behaviors and external objects that affect the performance of an organization studied as a 
digraph.    
For instance under an OO design we propose a decision maker behavior which represents 
the position and role of n nodes in the digraph. Thus, the decision maker is a class of the model, 
and the objects “decision maker_1, decision maker_2…decision maker_n” are instances of that 
class. By using this approach, a modeler might model different roles such as people in charge of 
a federal agency, an incident commander, or a city mayor in a county only changing the 
parameters of the named class.  
An object oriented approach provides us similar arguments by defining several subclasses 
that inherit the behavior of a super class. In this way, we are dealing with the complexity for 
providing behavior to the multiple nodes in the adjacency matrix.   
The starting point for combining a digraph approach with OO modeling is defined by the 
operational model depicted in Figure 36.  We portray an emergency management organization in 
three levels – federal, state, and local – and as consequence three clusters arise from the 
 156
organizational structure (Usually an adjacency matrix does not allow identifying clusters nodes, 
ego-net, or component digraph easily, and algorithms and statistical analysis will be required). 
The city and state levels have sensors for detecting automatically the signals that might send an 
extreme event; only in this case the dyads’ relationship between two nodes is always 
asymmetric. In all others cases the three dyadic isomorphism types can be found in the 
organization. 
 
 
Figure 36: Operational model based on the interactions among dyads of the digraph 
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Based upon the five disaster cases analyzed in Chapter Three, we suggest that the 
emergency organization have three different ways for realizing that a critical event arose (See in 
Figure 36 how events 1, 2, and 3 arrive in the organizational structure): 
• By a node that initially takes knowledge of the critical event and transfers the information 
to other nodes of the organization (e.g. a hospital director that detects in his facility an 
illness which might evolve into a pandemic). 
• By a set of nodes that simultaneously take knowledge of a critical event and transfer the 
information to other nodes (e.g. local authorities that simultaneously see a tanker truck 
fire on the local TV news).   
• By the whole organization that simultaneously takes knowledge of the critical event (e.g. 
an earthquake which affects an entire country). 
The dissemination of the data and resources in the networked organization is complex 
due to the multiple nodes that take part in the incident procedures and the different types of data 
that the dyads transfer between them.  
According to the structured and non-structured data transferred in real command and 
control systems and in simulated training systems (e.g. constructive simulations),  we propose a 
classification for modeling and simulating the data transferred between the dyads of an 
organization digraph (Figure 37). 
• Alarms. Standard procedures which are known by all nodes of the organization, provides 
the preliminary data for reacting to an extreme event.    
• Collaborative communication. Several non structured messages transferred by email, face 
to face, telephone, radio, and other electronic devices. Must always be classified 
according to their purpose, such as logistical, intelligence, operational, personnel, etc.  
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• Decisions. Given a critical event, a decision maker performs milestones named decisions, 
carried out after getting early situation awareness by means of collaborative tools. 
• Missions. Given a critical situation, it defines the tasks, units, goal, timeframe, and 
resources. These are mandatory messages format which are recorded in the database. 
• Tasks. Activities which must be accomplished by a task force; they are consequences of 
the missions and still recorded as message format in the database. 
• Resources. Physical equipment, supplies, or personnel required for carrying out a task. 
They are defined in the mission to support the way a task is achieved. 
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Figure 37: Summarized schema of the data and resources transferred among the nodes in a 
command and control emergency system 
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CHAPTER SIX: HYBRID MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
Introduction 
In Chapter Three we suggested that any emergency organization performs its tasks over 
three domains: physical, cognitive and informational. Thus this methodology proposes to 
incorporate those domains over a simulated environment by using graph structure, discrete event, 
states of transition, and system dynamics techniques. 
 In order to demonstrate the last part of the methodology process, we implemented a 
simulated model based upon the operational model exposed in Chapter Five.  
Based on the ICS digraph (Appendix B), we define a hypothetical structure of an ICS with 
thirty-seven nodes which are implemented at three levels: federal, state, and local.   
Through the first part of this chapter we explain the continuous and discrete components 
of the model that enables us to represent the internal and external behavior of the ICS digraph. In 
the second part of this chapter and according to the graph classification defined in Chapter Four, 
two sets of measures are used to explain the structure of the digraph that represents a networked 
emergency organization. These sets of measure are node level analysis, and sub-set and network 
level analysis. 
Finally in the third part of this chapter, we develop an experimental analysis of the 
discrete interactions of the thirty-seven nodes that encompass the digraph and combine those 
results with those obtained from the social network analysis. 
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Model implementation 
An overview of the proposed model is shown in Figure 38. Given that the model is a one-
to-one mapping of the hypothetical emergency structure, the thirty-seven nodes are represented 
as thirty-seven objects in the model.  
In order to provide one common interface of the whole scenario to other possible digraph 
configurations, we encapsulated the digraph and its surrounding environment in a super-class 
named main1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Encapsulated objects for representing the three domains in the digraph 
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The class Electric_power_system represents a portion of the critical infrastructure in the 
physical domain. The object electric_power_system is an instance of this class and contains the 
SD model of a power grid that feeds two big cities.  
In Chapter Five we showed how different simulation techniques could combine to 
produce a desired behavior. In this case, the power grid is a continuous network that is constantly 
monitored by a control system. When the electrical power either fails or reaches a critical level, a 
control system modeled as a state transition object sends a signal to an object named 
external_control, which is a set of states transition. Thus we are applying the defined concept of 
community of states. Figure 39 shows the SD class and the encapsulated state transitions. 
 
 
Figure 39: System dynamics model that feeds others simulation techniques 
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The SD model has five state variables, which are levels of accumulation of electricity 
produced by five sources named oil, coal, nuclear, gas, and hydro plants. A set of networks 
formed by the interactions of the states variables (squares), inflow (valves), out flow (valve), and 
auxiliaries’ variables (circles) show the causal dependency in the complete system.  
Four state variables are used for representing the transference nodes that carry the 
electricity toward the cities, and finally two variables of states called City_1 and City_2 stand for 
the accumulator levels required for supplying both cities.   
The power grid model represents a type of extreme event that might be useful for 
producing input to test the chain of command of the digraph.  Because of the OO design of the 
whole model, the implementation remains open to incorporation of other classes which might 
represent different events.  
In the context of a networked scenario, we suggest two approaches for relating a SD 
model with another simulation paradigm. The first is by means of a set of continuous variables 
that are shown as interfaces of the external model. Thus, other objects interact with those 
variable interfaces according to pre-established rules. The second approach is by means of a state 
transition interface which was used in the SD model shown in Figure 29.    
The best approach will depend on the type of system that the modeler is attempting to 
build. According to our methodology for simulating a networked scenario with three domains, 
we suggest connecting a SD model with the state of transition technique, because in this way the 
modeler can control the whole behavior of the model by means of conditions specified for 
triggering transitions to different states. 
According to the operational model, the extreme event will evolve as a set of differential 
equations where it is possible to distinguish three specific timeframes: 
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• The period previous to when the event reaches its threshold, which is named T-. 
• The exact time in which the event reaches the critical threshold and turns on the alarms in 
the emergency management organization, which is named as T0.  
• The period after the event reaches its critical threshold, which is named   T+. 
Notice that T- and T+ are periods of time before and after to the initial impact of the 
extreme event, and T0 is a defined instant of time. 
In agreement with an ICS, a scalable reaction of the emergency organization is expected 
depending on three factors: extreme event features, extension of the timeframe named T-, and 
location affected.  
The initial state State_Event represents the ordinary condition in which the organization 
executes its tasks; the evolution of the event in T- is regulated for both differential equations sets 
and communities of states. The values of the adjacency matrix of the digraph show the ties 
among the nodes according to the established procedures in the ICS. 
At the time T0 (which is regulated by the set of differential equations of the SD model) a 
transition triggers an alarm to the whole digraph, a subset of it, or only to one node.  
The community of states of transition enables the creation of transition branches for 
either sending the control to more than one state or for evaluating some clause before selecting 
the better suited state according to the clause. This characteristic presents enormous advantages 
for modeling the network centric scenario given that the community of states takes the role of a 
high control that regulates the behavior of the nodes, events, and interactions.  
Therefore, branch dynamics destination states could be well suited to replicate how in 
real life an ICS performs its communications and tasks. 
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In Figure 40, we show a proposed model of high control which is a composite of 
concurrent and sequential states to control the local, state, and federal levels.  
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Figure 40: Organizational control based on state of transition 
 
Using the UML definitions we suggest that the community of states emerges from the 
interactions of the global composite that resides in the main object and the composite states that 
reside in each object that represents a node of the emergency structure.  
A modeler that uses the community of states as a mechanism of control has four tools for 
controlling the model: 
• To define the sequence of states to control the possible extreme events. 
• To modify the parameters of the objects in the model, for testing a selected measure of 
performance. 
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• To close and open connections according to historical cases, modifying in this way the 
adjacency matrix. 
• To modify the discrete parameters in the nodes such as resources, time in queue, and 
utilization. 
The algorithms that control the connections of the adjacency matrix should be the result 
of the analysis of historical cases in which the chain of command of the emergency management 
structure was interrupted either by the extreme event or its consequences.  At this time, we make 
emphasis regarding the significance of this hybrid approach, since the mechanism of control 
based on state transition allows an evolution to the adjacency matrix, and as a result new 
interpretations based on social network analysis can be made for projecting the performance of 
the complete emergency structure.  
This methodology does not present a fully developed internal behavior of the nodes, and 
it is limited on purpose to a simple approach based on discrete entities that arrive to the nodes, 
and then are processed and sent to others nodes according to the adjacency matrix.  
The type of entity that arrives at a node ni  is a function of the sender node nj,  thus we 
could emulate the distribution probability that a real command and control system has performed 
in real situations.  
Table 29 shows the attributes’ data that a sender and a receptor could transfer between 
them in a standard formatted message of a real command and control system. 
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Table 29: Attributes of the data transferred between two nodes 
Organization  
Date and time 
Sender identification 
Receiver identification 
Message type 
Priority 
Resources 
 
 
Figure 41 portrays a layout of the internal nodes’ behavior, and since we have defined six 
types of roles in the digraph, the behavior of each role in the emergency structure is modified 
according to different parameters applied to each object. Basically the interactions inputs (I) and 
outputs (O) are made in the dyad placed in the asymmetric adjacency matrix. 
 In accordance with the node’s role and position in the organizational structure, it will 
require a certain number of pieces of data for processing and will produce one unit of 
information. We assume that the incoming data is combined with internal data produced by the 
node. Thus for each piece of data that is internally produced one piece of information is 
generated that is sent as output to the dyads in the adjacency matrix. 
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Figure 41: Internal node behavior (Implemented with Anylogic software) 
 
The Agent A based on states of transitions accomplishes four tasks in the internal node 
behavior: 
• Regulates the discrete behavior according to the type of event and parameter evolution of 
the external environment.  
• Opens or closes the connections in the adjacency matrix, modifying the asymmetry in the 
digraph.  
• Communicates to the external environment any continuous variables that might be 
required by another object.  
• Communicates to the internal environment any continuous variables that might be 
required by the internal objects in the node. This task also might be accomplished by an 
interface variable which is shown as a triangle in Figure 29.  
An example of the dynamic modification of parameters by means of Agent A or a 
continuous interface variable is shown in Figure 42. Given an exponential distribution of 
probability with parameter β0 to an object source that generates internal entities in the node, 
O 
I 
Create 
Process 
Process 
Merge 
Inputs 
Interactions Outputs 
Interactions  
A
Pieces of 
data  
 169
either the Agent A or the continuous interface variable might change the parameter in time by a 
continuous set of parameters β1, β2…βn and thus reach a required behavior that evolves according 
to the surrounding environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 42: Evolution of the generation of entities according to dynamic parameters 
 
An example of the cognitive domain was implemented based upon a SD model designed 
by Rudolph and Repenning (2002). Two variables of states combined with a set of in-flows, out-
flows, and constants allow quantifying the positive and negative effects of stress in a node. 
Basically, the model is composing of the following sequence: 
• A variable of state provides quantification of the number of interruptions currently 
pending.   
• The rate at which interruptions arrive is an exogenous variable. 
• A rate confronts and resolves interruptions. Interruptions handled incorrectly stay in the 
stock of interruptions pending. 
• The desired resolution rate represents the system's perception of how fast it needs to 
resolve interruptions. The desired resolution rate is equal to a first order exponential 
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smoothing of the indicated rate. The smoothing represents the delay in perceiving change 
in the number of interruptions pending. 
• A rate shows how interruptions should be resolved in order to achieve the desired 
resolution time. 
• Stress is equal to the ratio of the desired and normal resolution rates. The higher the 
desired resolution rate relative to how the system normally performs, the higher the 
stress. 
• A variable captures the positive influence of stress on productivity. It is captured by an 
upward sloping table function that uses stress level as an input. 
• A variable captures the negative impact of stress: As the system is overwhelmed, its 
ability to resolve interruptions decreases. It is captured by a downward sloping table 
function that uses stress level as an input. 
In accordance to the performance of the model shown in Figure 43, the dynamics of the 
variables is different if it operates on the upward or downward sloping portion of the Yerkes-
Dodson curve.  
An agent built as a state of transition gathers the most significant variables from the 
mathematical structure of the model. Those variables are used for modifying the behavior of the 
node named Hospital_1_A. 
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Figure 43: Example of a model for capturing the cognitive aspects of a node 
 
The digraph measures from a dynamic adjacency matrix 
In Chapter Five we defined three types of network properties; here we analyze the dyads 
and triad census, network properties, and one-mode metrics, and finally we will present some 
inferences regarding two-mode networks. 
All the analysis was made over the hypothetical digraph which was built based on an 
ICS. 
Sub-set measures: Dyad and Triad 
The dyads were obtained from the digraph and compared with the expected values of a 
random digraph that contain the same number of nodes and connections. The number of Monte 
Carlo simulations was 10,000. The results are shown in Table 30. 
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Table 30: Observed and expected values in the digraph 
 
 
 
From Table 30 we can conclude 55 relationships have reciprocity in the procedures for 
transferring information. On the other hand 67 flows are sent to others nodes and the node sender 
should not wait for feedback from the node receptor; essentially there connections are 
asymmetric. Finally, 544 dyads do not present any connection.  
Wassermann et al. (1994), among others, suggested that a dyadic analysis seeks to answer 
several questions about mutual, asymmetric, and null relationships: 
• How might we compare the fraction of mutual dyads either with a theoretical prediction 
or a similar organizational digraph? 
• Are mutual dyads statistically more prevalent than other kinds of dyads in the ICS? 
• Are the dyadic relationships more mutual and less asymmetrical than other comparable 
organizations? 
We apply Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method test to generate random matrices 
with a set of given parameters. Thus, testing of a hypothesis is possible to perform between the 
observed and expected values. The number of simulation adjacency matrices used for the 
expected values were 10,000 matrices.  
We showed that the total number of triads in a digraph is given by ( )3n .  
Dyad Type  Observed Expected(Mean)
 Mutual 55 35.803
Asymmetric 67 86.197
Null 544 544
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We will examine the triad census according to the Balance-Theoretic Models; the characteristics 
of six models will be contracted with the results of the column Observed in Table 31. Each 
model is gradually less restrictive that the previous ones. 
Our goal is to find statistical patterns that can be evaluated to gain knowledge regarding 
the structure of an incident command system, and as a consequence, to forecast its performance.  
Nooy et al state that unfortunately, the social network systems barely ever conform perfectly to a 
balance-theoretic model, and most of the time a type of triad occurs at least once. Nevertheless 
we must compare the triad census with the distribution expected by chance of a digraph, since  if 
a certain type of triad occurs more often, we may assert that a determined model guides the 
behavior of the complete digraph.  (Nooy et. al. 2005). 
Balance model: It represents the symmetric connections between the nodes and has up to 
two clusters in the configuration. Our emergency structure presents 30 Triad 300 and 1,266 
Triad 102 whose observed frequencies are statistically different from the expected triads 
obtained from a random digraph (Table 31), this relative difference shows a tendency toward a 
balance model. The chi-square statistic is highly significant which helps us to confirm the 
tendency. 
Clusterability model: This model is less restrictive and permits more than two clusters in 
the digraph. This configuration includes the Triad 300, 102 and Triad 003.  
In Table 31 we observe 4,363 Triad 003 and 3,268 expected Triad 003.  
Since we are studying a network centric environment, this model must be prohibited in the 
emergency organizations because   it represents the presence of clusters (components in graph 
terminology) that do not permit a distributed decision making.  
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Ranked clusters model: This model permits asymmetric connections from each node to 
all nodes on higher ranks. Notice in Table 31 the statistical difference between the observed and 
expected values of the Triads 021D, 021U and 030T-all of them can exist in this model. There 
are two more triads permitted in this model, Triads 120D and 120U; whose observed and 
expected values also are statistically different. 
The presence of a statistic difference in the triads with symmetric connections implies 
that the relationships between the nodes are not hierarchical and have high feedbacks, which 
could be critical when they are required to transmit information quickly and the decisions must 
be immediate. 
Transitivity model: In the analysis of the emergency configuration, this model introduces 
the concept of transitivity, where all the triads with a path of length two are closed from the 
initial node (n1 connects to n2, n2 connects to n3 then n1 connects to n3).  The digraph presents 
1,428 Triad 012 and the expected value is 3,044 in the model, which implies that the digraph is 
not transitive. 
Hierarchical clusters model: In addition to the previous triads, this model permits the 
Triads 120C and 210. Since asymmetric dyads exist, they are interpreted as a form of ranking in 
the organizational structure, therefore the asymmetric connections should not permit any cycles.  
According to Table 31 we compared 22 Triad 120C and 42 Triad 210 against an expected value 
of 11 and 1.7 respectively, which means that the configuration has a tendency toward the 
hierarchy.  
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Table 31: Observed and expected triad values (Report from Pajek software) 
Type  Number of triads (ni)  Expected (ei) (ni-ei)/ei Model  
 
3 – 102  1266   236.34   4.36     Balance 
16 – 300  30   0.05   654.55    Balance 
1 – 003  4363      3268.67        0.33  Clusterability 
4 - 021D  37                 236.34       -0.84     Ranked Clusters 
5 - 021U  46                 236.34       -0.81     Ranked Clusters 
9 - 030T  15                 73.38      -0.80     Ranked Clusters 
12 - 120D  18                   5.70         2.16     Ranked Clusters 
13 - 120U  17                 5.70        1.98     Ranked Clusters 
2 – 012  1428                3044.71       -0.53    Transitivity 
14 - 120C  22                  11.39         0.93     Hierarchical Clusters 
15 – 210  42                  1.77        22.75    Hierarchical Clusters 
6 - 021C  89                 472.68       -0.81     Forbidden 
7 - 111D  142               73.38        0.94     Forbidden 
8 - 111U  142                  73.38         0.94    Forbidden 
10 - 030C  6                  24.46       -0.75     Forbidden 
11 – 201  107                   5.70        17.78    Forbidden 
Chi-Square: 28914.5328*** 
 2 cells (12.50%) have expected frequencies less than 5. 
 The minimum expected cell frequency is 0.05. 
 
Network measures 
In recent years, researchers have found similar patterns in the configurations  of dense 
networks, such as chemical interactions, the Internet, citations in books, the World Wide Web,  
etc.,  and they  have generated a set of rules of  thumb for enhancing  the desired characteristics 
of robustness, tolerance to failure, adaptability, flexibility, etc. We argue that current systems 
based on command and control provide enough data for determining the desired properties of a 
standardized ICS.  
In Table 32 we showed the main properties obtained from the digraph as a whole.  
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We will discuss some of these measures and will make inferences about desired properties in a 
digraph which represents an ICS.  
According to our experiments, the number of nodes in the digraph is 37, but most of the 
time an ICS in the federal, state and local levels will have more than 100 nodes, especially if we 
include private and non governmental organizations in the process of making decisions. 
The number of connections in the adjacency matrix is 179. Care (2005) provides rules of 
thumb for military networks according to the number of nodes. He suggests: connections<<2N 
(too brittle), connections=~2N (desired value) and connections >>2N (possible overhead).  
We recommended that the number of connections will emerge as a realistic parameter 
when data coming from the database of the command and control systems can be analyzed. 
Meanwhile we should test the hypothesis of a range between 2N <connections<4N. Our 
suggestion is based on the previous analysis of the ICS and the five case studies. 
In the digraph the density is 0.13; it shows the proportion of the number of connections 
present to the maximum possible. This measure should be studied in parallel to the number of 
nodes and the ego-digraphs produced in the organizational structure, because some clusters 
might concentrate most of the connections. Nevertheless we suggest values over 0.30 might 
demonstrate a lack of hierarchy and overflow in processing data and resources. 
The average degree of the digraph is 4.78. This index should be compared with the 
degree distribution shown in Table 34, since the number of isolated and pendant nodes could 
affect the performance of the organization, especially if one of them plays a critical role in the 
whole structure.    
The inclusiveness index for both in-degree and out-degree helps us to distinguish weak 
connections. The first one has a value of 95% and the second one 100%. 
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The reciprocity index is 0.62. This is linked to the dyads census and provides an overall 
view of the feedbacks produced in the digraph.  
The transitivity index is 0.38. This enables us to characterize the whole digraph with 
tendency toward the transitivity.   
The diameter index is 6. This value is the largest geodesic distance between any pair of 
nodes in the digraph, which means that there exists at least one node that must send its data or 
resources through five nodes before arriving at the receptor node. We suggest that an ICS should 
not have path larger than 4. 
Finally the index hierarchy is equal to 0.2 and provides a strong overall measure for 
inferring the proportion of the number of nodes with asymmetric connections to all nodes.  
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Table 32: Digraph measures of the emergency organization 
Property Value 
Nodes 37 
Connections 177 
Density 0.13 
Average Degree 4.78 
Inclusiveness 1 
Reciprocity 0.62 
Transitivity 0.38 
Clustering Coef. 0.64 
Mean Distance 2.48 
Diameter 6 
Connectedness 0.79 
Efficiency 0.89 
Hierarchy 0.2 
LUB 0.99 
 
Table 33: Distribution of degree 
Measures In-degree Out-degree 
Sum 179 179 
Mean 4.83 4.83 
Std.Dev 3.41 3.33 
Min 0 1 
Max 14 14 
Number of isolated 2 0 
Number of pendant 5 4 
Inclusiveness (%) 94.59 100 
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Table 34: Node Type in the digraph 
Isolate Transmitter Receiver Carrier Ordinary 
0 2 0 1 34 
 
 
There are no nodes with degree equal to zero, and four nodes only transmit data and do 
not receive information from others nodes. One node shows in-degree and out-degree equal to 
one and it is classified as a carrier node. The others thirty-two nodes are classified as ordinary 
nodes since they have both in-degree and out-degree greater than 1. 
The digraph does not have a bridge connection that implies vulnerability because 
removing it might disconnect the digraph. 
One mode measures 
In Chapter Four we defined three sets of measures to examine the individual properties of 
the nodes: centrality; neighbor; and connection measures. In Table 35 we show twelve 
measures, which are representatives of the three sets and we describe possible influences of the 
values in the performance of the whole structure of the organization. 
By each node, the first two columns depict the in-degree and out-degree connections in 
the ICS. Maximal values such as Mayor and Incident Commander provide an initial indicator of 
the position and role of these nodes in the digraph. Minimum values such as Sensor and Red 
Cross also require attention regarding their role in the structure. The 3rd and 4th columns called 
degree centrality standardize the degree measures for comparing those with others ICS digraphs.  
Notice that the centrality index plays a fundamental role for knowing the hubs in a dense ICS, 
but it does not necessarily mean that nodes with a high centrality degree are most significant in 
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the digraph. For instance, the node Sensor has a centrality in-degree equal to 0.0 and an out-
degree equal to 0.028 and in accordance to our model most of the time this node triggers the 
alarm warning that activates the complete emergency system. 
 
Figure 44: Centrality measures of the digraph 
 
Figure 44 shows a concentric analysis of the in-degree centrality of the digraph. The 
nodes with highest values are in the center of the figure and the lowest values are in the 
periphery. Notice the position of the nodes that belong to the federal and state levels (blue and 
green nodes), they are located in the intermediate area of the figure. On the other hand, the local 
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nodes (red color) are still in the periphery of the figure with values close to zero, except the 
nodes Incident Commander and Mayor A, which are the most central with a value of 0.389. 
 
Table 35: Selected measures of each node in the digraph 
Node In 
Deg. 
Out 
Deg. 
Centrality 
In        Out 
Ego 
Size 
Ego 
Density 
Eigen 
Vector 
Closeness 
In        Out 
Min 
Cutset 
Betwee- 
ness 
 
Flow 
Btwn 
Air Operat. Chief A 4 1 0.11 0.03 5.00 0.60 0.03 0.41 0.19 0 0.05 462 
Airport Adm. A 2 2 0.06 0.06 3.00 1.00 0.07 0.35 0.22 0 0.00 224 
Area of Command A 4 5 0.11 0.14 6.00 0.47 0.06 0.39 0.23 0 0.04 624 
ECall_ Center A 8 4 0.22 0.11 10.00 0.44 0.16 0.44 0.26 0 0.06 834 
Fed.Situation Map 5 5 0.14 0.14 6.00 0.67 0.19 0.36 0.23 0 0.00 831 
Federal Gov. 6 7 0.17 0.19 7.00 0.71 0.24 0.42 0.25 0 0.02 968 
Fire Depart A 5 5 0.14 0.14 8.00 0.50 0.10 0.43 0.25 0 0.03 613 
Heliport Resources A 2 2 0.06 0.06 3.00 1.00 0.02 0.40 0.16 0 0.00 221 
HEMA 10 9 0.28 0.25 11.00 0.60 0.34 0.50 0.25 0 0.08 1341 
Hospital 1  A 3 3 0.08 0.08 5.00 0.10 0.07 0.35 0.24 1 0.06 284 
Incident Comm. A 14 13 0.39 0.36 19.00 0.22 0.22 0.57 0.27 0 0.42 1914 
Industrial Plant  A 1 4 0.03 0.11 5.00 0.50 0.06 0.31 0.22 0 0.00 186 
Intelligence A 4 3 0.11 0.08 4.00 1.00 0.05 0.39 0.22 0 0.00 513 
Liaison Officer A 0 2 0.00 0.06 2.00 1.00 0.05 0.37 0.23 0 0.00 237 
Mayor A 14 14 0.39 0.39 19.00 0.26 0.33 0.49 0.28 0 0.27 1743 
Multi Agency  A 6 3 0.17 0.08 6.00 0.60 0.16 0.42 0.24 0 0.01 473 
Multi Agency Coor. 7 4 0.19 0.11 7.00 0.67 0.20 0.42 0.21 0 0.01 825 
National Guard A 0 3 0.00 0.08 3.00 0.67 0.07 0.29 0.24 0 0.00 287 
Operations Chief A 2 5 0.06 0.14 6.00 0.60 0.05 0.39 0.22 0 0.08 593 
Police Depart A 6 4 0.17 0.11 7.00 0.62 0.11 0.44 0.25 0 0.02 749 
Private Org 1. A 1 1 0.03 0.03 2.00 1.00 0.03 0.34 0.21 0 0.00 90 
Red Cross A 0 1 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.24 0 0.00 0 
Risk Ass. A 4 3 0.11 0.08 4.00 1.00 0.05 0.39 0.22 0 0.00 485 
Sensor 0 1 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.24 0 0.00 0 
Stadium/Arenas  A 1 3 0.03 0.08 4.00 1.00 0.05 0.34 0.21 0 0.00 350 
State  Evacuation 4 9 0.11 0.25 9.00 0.56 0.24 0.39 0.25 0 0.01 876 
State  Govern. 10 7 0.28 0.19 12.00 0.42 0.28 0.51 0.24 0 0.08 1406 
State  HEMA 9 10 0.25 0.28 14.00 0.46 0.31 0.44 0.27 0 0.10 1520 
State  Situation Map 8 10 0.22 0.28 10.00 0.58 0.32 0.48 0.27 0 0.10 1219 
State  Transp. 6 7 0.17 0.19 9.00 0.47 0.20 0.41 0.25 0 0.03 1079 
State National Guard 6 5 0.17 0.14 6.00 0.67 0.20 0.40 0.24 0 0.03 813 
Task Force A1 3 3 0.08 0.08 3.00 1.00 0.05 0.38 0.22 0 0.00 338 
Task Forces A2 3 3 0.08 0.08 3.00 1.00 0.24 0.38 0.22 0 0.00 338 
Transp. Agency 6 8 0.17 0.22 9.00 0.47 0.22 0.37 0.24 0 0.01 1102 
Transport Agency A 5 2 0.14 0.06 5.00 0.60 0.11 0.37 0.23 0 0.00 346 
Weather Inf. A 4 4 0.11 0.11 5.00 0.80 0.05 0.39 0.22 0 0.00 532 
Wings Resources 4 2 0.11 0.06 5.00 0.40 0.03 0.43 0.16 0 0.01 333 
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The local connection structure of each node in the digraph is represented by the values of 
ego-size and density. Because density is inversely proportional to the ego-digraph size, (the 
number of possible connections increases rapidly with the number of nodes, whereas the number 
of connection usually is limited), Nooy et  al. (2005)  suggest considering alternative measures, 
nevertheless in the context of an ICS,  the density measures provide an intuitive glance of the 
cohesion of the local structure of a node and its dyads connection. For instance the nodes; Task 
Force A1 and Task Force A2 present a density of 1, which demonstrates a high cohesion with the 
three nodes that each one has with its dyads.  
Eigenvector centrality of a node is recursively proportional to the sum of eigenvector 
centralities of the nodes connected in the digraph. The High Emergency Management Agency 
and the Mayor A present the highest value in the eigenvector centrality of the ICS because they 
are connected to many nodes which also are well-connected.  
Closeness measure changes the concept of centrality by   the geodesic distance of the 
nodes, an issue that in an extreme event could be more significant than a traditional degree 
centrality measure. The reason is simple: a network centric environment such an Incident 
Command System requires reaching the whole emergency structure in the least amount of time 
possible. From Table 35 two nodes help us to understand this measure; the node sensor presents 
a closeness centrality in-degree of 0 because it does not interact with any other node. On the 
other hand the node State_R_Governor whose closeness in-degree value is 0.51 shows that this 
node is the best situated for quickly reaching any other nodes in the emergency organization.  
The minimal node cutset  is the node Hospital 1 A. If it is removed the digraph will be separated 
in three components. This measure enables us to identify the vulnerability of the transference of 
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flows in the ICS and to find out where the ICS could be disconnected with severe consequences 
for the whole system. 
The column betweenness centrality shows that the Incident Commander node has the 
highest proportion value (0.42) of all geodesic connections between pairs of other nodes. Notice 
the large difference with the second position obtained by the Mayor A node (0.27). This index is 
critical if we assume that the flows and resources go by the geodesic path in an ICS.  
The dependency matrix shows the dependency that the 37 nodes have among them when 
a node source sends flows to other nodes. The highest values are the connections between the 
Sensor and Hospital 1 and the Red Cross and Hospital 1, both with a value of 34. 
In order to find out the underlying data structure of the one mode measures and to reduce 
the amount of correlated indexes we applied principal component analysis to the twelve digraph 
measures. We used correlation matrix to standardize the measurements because they do not have 
the same scale. 
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Eigenanalysis of the Correlation Matrix 
 
Eigenvalue  7.9607  1.5701  0.9298  0.6433  0.3783  0.2669  0.1289  0.0670 
Proportion   0.663   0.131   0.077   0.054   0.032   0.022   0.011   0.006 
Cumulative   0.663   0.794   0.872   0.925   0.957   0.979   0.990   0.995 
 
Eigenvalue  0.0321  0.0222  0.0004  0.0003 
Proportion   0.003   0.002   0.000   0.000 
Cumulative   0.998   1.000   1.000   1.000 
 
Variable     PC1     PC2     PC3     PC4 
In_d       0.337  -0.070   0.103  -0.129 
Out_d      0.337   0.013  -0.102   0.102 
Cen_In     0.337  -0.073   0.098  -0.132 
Cen_Out    0.337   0.013  -0.107   0.089 
Ego-size   0.347   0.019   0.040  -0.147 
Ego-de    -0.125  -0.669   0.116   0.324 
Eigenv     0.302  -0.082  -0.132   0.472 
Clos_In    0.236  -0.436   0.470   0.029 
Clos_Out   0.245   0.303  -0.325   0.463 
Cutset    -0.025   0.480   0.761   0.371 
Between    0.286   0.136   0.140  -0.495 
Flow_Bet   0.347  -0.071  -0.026   0.010 
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Figure 45: Principal component analysis of Table 35 
 
The first principal component has variance 7.96 and accounts for 66% of the total 
variance. This is representative of ten measures from Table 35, except the ego-density and cutset 
indexes.  The component depicts a contrast between two groups of variables, the first is formed 
by the ego-density and cutset indexes and the second group formed by the other ten measures. 
This issue is confirmed if we calculate the Pearson correlation between each pair of variables. 
According to the test of correlation:  
H0: ρ = 0 versus  H1: ρ ≠ 0   where ρ is the correlation between a pair of indexes 
The p-values of the indexes ego-density and cutset showed values greater than 0.05 which 
demonstrate that there is no evidence of a linear relationship between the two measures and the 
other ten indexes. The second principal component has variance of 1.57 and accounts for 13% of 
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the data variability. The third principal component has a variance of 0.92 and account for 7.7 % 
of the data variability. In Figure 45 a plot of the eigenvalues associated with their component 
show the magnitude of the three selected components.  
Because of the lower value of the variance in the fourth component, we suggest that the 
data structure in Table 35 can be captured with the first three components, which represent the 
66 %, 79 % and 87% of the total variability.  
Experimental analysis 
Experiment 1: System dynamics – Discrete event simulation 
Description  
We tested the combined behavior of the object electric_power_system and the discrete 
behavior of the nodes that form the organizational digraph. The goal was to identify the most 
comprehensive mechanism for modeling the influence of continuous events over the discrete 
behavior of the nodes, particularly the parameters of the objects that generate new entities.  
Conditions 
According to our findings, we suggested two types of hybrid implementations between a 
SD and a DES model. The first was built by means of an interaction of variables, using the 
concept of dynamic simulation. The second one was built by means of an interaction of models, 
using an external control that modifies at run time the internal parameters of the nodes.  
The model with 37 nodes was set up to run during 30 time units. 
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Conclusion 
The interaction of variables required an external interface for sending the level of 
electricity s which is produced in City 1. The dynamic parameter was passed to the inter-arrival 
exponential time of the object creation, such as exponential(s/20). 
 Figure 45 shows the throughput (red curve) of the node Sensor which sends new signals 
to the rest of the emergency system according to how the level of electricity in City 1 decreases 
(green curve). 
 
 
Figure 46: Dynamic simulation by mean of interaction of variables 
 
The second implementation tested was interaction of models. This tool requires an 
interface between the SD and DES models.  
When the electrical power either fails or reaches a critical level, a set of state- transitions 
sends a signal to another set of state transitions in which reside in the node Sensor. Both state-
transitions are shown in Figure 46. Notice the strong difference comparing with the interaction 
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of variables, because by using state-transitions as an interface, the modeler must define critical 
thresholds that modify the generation of entities in the internal behavior of the node Sensor. The 
generation of entities in the time is shown in Figure 47.  
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state0
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state3
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Figure 47: Set of state-transitions between a SD and a DES model 
 
 
Figure 48: Behavior of the SD and DES simulations governs by a set of state-transitions 
 
Nevertheless both techniques provide additional tools to the modeler and permit an 
implementation of a more complete simulation than either an isolated SD or DES model.  
The interaction of variables is better situated when there exists a validation of the influence of 
the continuous variables over the discrete and vice versa.   
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On the other hand, interaction of models is well situated when the modeler does not know 
exactly how the model will evolve and requires controlling it by means of state transitions.   
Experiment 2: System dynamics—Community of states—Discrete event simulation and digraph 
analysis  
Description 
We tested a SD model embedded into the hybrid model. Since the whole   model presents 
many parameters and variables, which most of the time are difficult to control, we designed a 
high control based on the defined concept of community of states. The high control categorizes 
the data coming from different simulation techniques, and sends it to a selected composite of 
states to process and finally to generate new data which will be sent to the digraph. We will 
summarize how a social network analysis enhances the study of the performance of the whole 
model. 
Conditions 
The node tested, State_Map was defined as a instance of the class Situation_Awareness. 
The parameters were incorporated to the object State_Map according to the rules that govern the 
position of the node in the digraph. Figure 48 shows the high control formed by three composite 
states: federal, state and local. In accordance to the data received from external models, the high 
control sends the signal to a selected composite state. Notice that the interactions of the dyads 
can be governed from the high control (named as community of states). 
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Figure 49: Community of states formed between the high control and the state transition of the 
node State_Map 
 
Conclusions 
The mechanism implemented regulates the sequence of three types of simulation 
paradigms: SD- states transitions- DES. 
We concluded that the implementation of a high control is a unique form to manage the 
sequences, parallelism of actions, activation of alarms and hierarchies in a hybrid model that 
emulate an ICS. 
The high control enables a test of the diffusion of data through the complete digraph. 
Nevertheless, the complexity of the model requires a topological analysis based on the social 
network techniques previously developed.  
In order to enhance our conclusions, we summarized an analysis of the ego- digraph of 
the node State Map (Figure 49) which fired the initial alarm in the organization.  
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Figure 50: Ego-digraph formed around the tested State_Map  node 
 
The focus node has a 10 out-degree and an 8 in-degree, thus we can infer that there are 
two nodes that require to use others nodes for sending data to the State_Map. Nevertheless, in 
accordance to the concept of density, the focus node presents a high centralization 
(density=0.57), which makes sense since its role is sharing data and keeping the situation aware 
of its level. 
Table 36 depicts the geodesic paths in the ego-digraph. A preliminary analysis of the 
matrix points out the critical position of the node Multi_Agency_A due to its extended average 
geodesic paths. For instance, it requires three steps to reach the Federal_Map node, and two 
steps to send feedback to the State_Map  node.  
 
In-degree     = 8 
Out-degree  = 10 
Ego-size      = 10 
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Table 36: Geodesic path in the ego-digraph of the node State_Map 
 F.M HEMA S.G S.M S.E S.H S.T S.N M.A M.A I.C 
Fed. Map 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
HEMA 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 
State  Gov. 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
State  Map 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
State  Evac 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 2 
State HEM 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
State  Tran 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 2 
State  Nati 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 2 
Mayor A 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 
Multi Age A 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 0 2 
Incid.Comm 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 
 
 
Table 37 shows the dyads census performed over the ego-digraph; this analysis enables 
us to conjecture regarding the direct feedbacks that the eleven nodes will have in the elapsed 
time for the duration an extreme event. 
Initially, researchers in network centric environments forecasted that a maximal network 
was the best solution for sharing data and resources (mainly influenced by the computer 
networks). Our model showed that those configurations delay the flows and most of the time are 
unnecessary. For instance, the ego-digraph presents 20 mutual dyads, which proves that the 
nodes will have an immediate feedback to the data transferred. In Table 37 we infer that 16 
connections do not receive direct feedback and the data will be transferred through the others 
nodes. A statistic analysis regarding the patterns of the observed and the expected dyads could be 
made based on the data obtained from the organizational structure of an ICS. 
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Table 37: Dyads census in the ego-digraph of the node State_Map 
Number of. 
 
Observed Expected 
(Mean) 
Mutual 
Dyads 20 18.43
Asymmetric 
Dyads 16 17.56
Nulls 
Dyads 19 19
 
 
Another significant conclusion that arises from the ego analysis is that the level for 
managing the extreme event does not fit necessarily with the relationships produced in an ICS. 
For instance, in the ego-digraph the Federal_Map is a bridge between the state and federal level. 
The same case occurs with the Incident_Command which belongs to the same ego-digraph but 
corresponds to the structure of the   local levels.  
Additionally, Table 37 confirms that the node State_Map  is the ego of the digraph since 
all its geodesic paths in the matrix have a value of 1.  
The timing analysis and synchronization of the data is another advantage that produces a 
hybrid simulation merged with a digraph analysis (adjacency matrix). In Figure 50, we show that 
when the extreme event reaches an unsafe level, the composite state transfers a signal to the node 
State_Map, which is  in charge of keeping the situation aware of its organizational level.  At 
time 1, the node generates a piece of data that is transferred to its dyads. The amount of time that 
the node State_Map will take for distributing the data in the three levels of the emergency 
organization will depend on two features: the number of paths toward the nodes receptors, and 
the internal configuration of each node for processing the incoming data.  
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Figure 51: Number of entities generated in three different nodes. 
 
We can distinguish that the Federal_Gov  has a geodesic path of 2 with the State_Map 
and generated the first piece of data at time 4, which coming from its dyad 
Federal_Situation_Map.  On the other hand, the Incident_Command  node belongs to the ego-
digraph but yields the first piece of data only at time 6 (2 time units after the Federal_Gov).  
Finally, at time 11, the node named Liaison_Officer  did not yield any piece of data. 
According to our methodology we infer two possible reasons: the first is the geodesic path of 
two steps that exist between the node State_Map and the node Liaison_Officer; the second is the 
high-degree centralization that presents the node Incident_Command which is a bridge for 
arriving to the node Liaison_Officer. 
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Experiment 3: Influence of cognitive modes (Yerkes-Dodson curve) into the internal discrete 
behavior of the nodes  
Description 
By using the hybrid model, a node incorporated a subclass which represents   a 
mathematical model to understand the role of interruptions and stress in organizational collapse. 
The Yerkes-Dodson curve enabled us to demonstrate the relationship between the stress and the 
performance of the nodes. Initially the increasing stress enhances the performance of the node 
(short delay in the processes time), but after a period the performance decreases (extended delay 
in process time). The complete model was previously explained in Figure 43 (Rudolph and 
Repenning, 2002). We attempted to demonstrate that cognitive models are well situated in our 
methodology, and under an object oriented design they can enhance the validation of the internal 
behavior of the different nodes that compose an emergency management organization. 
Conditions 
To evaluate the influence of the SD model “role of interruptions and stress in 
organizational collapse” we built a class named Team Performance which was incorporated into 
the internal behavior of the node Hospital_1_A.  
According to our theoretical description of the interrelationships between a SD and a 
DES model, we tested the influence of the continuous and discrete parameters in the final 
behavior of the node. (Notice that behavior means pieces of entities processed in the nodes.) 
In execution time, the SD model took two dynamic parameters from the discrete model: 
number of resources and task arrival rate.  On the other hand, at run time, the DES model took 
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the variable Effect_Stress_Tasks to modify the delay time in the servers that process the data in 
the node Hospital_1_A.  
Conclusions 
The class Team_performance was incorporated as a subclass of the node Hospital_1_A. 
The interaction of the two types of simulations was implemented by using an interface 
based on states of transitions. We found that the feedback loops of the SD model highly 
influence the stability of the continuous variable Effect_Stress_Tasks (see Figure 43). 
In the same way, the parameters sent for the DES model produce a high instability in the 
SD model. In order to deal with this problem, we used two sets of states of transitions for putting 
boundaries on the thresholds that the model can reach. 
The internal structure of the node Hospital_1_A  is shown in Figure 51. It is an instance 
of the class Support which was defined in Chapter Four, Table 16.  
The structure of the model allowed that the node parameters were fixed according to the 
position and role of the node in the digraph. Thus the methodology is open to incorporate many 
other nodes with an equivalent internal structure but that depict different either discrete or 
continuous behaviors.  
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Figure 52: Internal structure of the node Hospital_1_A 
 
Experiment 4: Community of states – Internal node behavior 
Description 
Since many types of messages and supplies are transferred in an ICS, we tested the 
implementation of a reactive algorithm to generate different types of messages and resources 
according to the severity of the event. We also used the algorithm to modify the node capacity at 
runtime according to fixed rules between the federal, state and local levels.   
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Conditions 
By mean of community of states to modify at run time the internal parameters in the node 
named  Incident_Commander such as; type of messages, number of resources, delay time and 
queue priority. 
Conclusion 
The results showed that a hybrid model is well situated for simulating structured and non-
structured data according to fixed distribution of probabilities identified in real command and 
control systems. Nevertheless, it is necessary to create an intelligent mechanism to follow the 
sequence of the data and resources throughout the components of an ICS.  
The traditional discrete applications based on queues and servers can be enhanced by 
means of community of states but validated experiments are required for supporting the models. 
Figure 53a shows a set of passing messages, generated in the logger of the internal 
Incident_Commander structure. The types of messages are modified by a signal received from 
the either federal or state levels. Figure 53b shows how change the utilization of resources after 
receiving signals of the either federal or state levels. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 53: (a) Logger messages passing; (b) Dynamic utilization of resources 
Experiment 5: Gathering longitudinal matrices of connections and testing the dissemination of 
data and resources in the digraph 
Description  
Most of the time, an extreme event interrupts the physical infrastructure of an emergency 
organization and produces modifications in the dyads relationships of an ICS. In other cases, due 
to event evolution, new nodes are incorporated into the ICS, modifying the digraph and 
eventually producing a change in the role and position that each node plays in the emergency 
system. The dyads relationships were fixed in accordance to the adjacency matrix (Appendix B), 
and mechanisms were tested for simulating the dynamic changes of the connections at runtime.  
We tested the diffusion of entities in the system by means of alerts sent by the node Sensor to the 
node Hospital 1 A. The dissemination of the flows of data in the ICS was collected at different 
points in time.  
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Conditions 
For collecting the longitudinal digraph we tested the mechanism of states of transition 
which allowed triggering several methods for controlling the interaction of the nodes. When the 
node ni  was connected with the node nj, the adjacency matrix must show a number 1 in the 
position i,j. On the other hand, when the methods of control disconnected the association in the 
position i,j, the adjacency matrix must show the number 0. The disconnection or connection of 
the nodes was made by closing or opening the ports of the objects. 
 In order to analyze the dissemination of data and resources in time, we collected entities 
transferred in the ICS digraph at times 5, 15 and 30 units.  
Conclusion 
The simulation of the adjacency matrix presented three main problems of design and 
implementation:  
• The mechanism of states of transition was well situated to control the states of the ports 
of a small portion of established connections in the digraph. Nevertheless, an intelligent 
algorithm is required to control up to n(n-1) connections in the digraph. Moreover, the 
mechanism of control was not prepared to generate new connections at runtime, 
additional research will be necessary to deal with this issue. 
• The states of transition could manage the connection between existing nodes, but they 
were not designed to generate new nodes at runtime in the ICS digraph. The methodology 
will require the incorporation of new nodes at execution time. 
• Once the model was run, the flows were transferred between the source nodes and the 
receptor nodes, nevertheless when the connections were interrupted the flows remained in 
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the system and the entities were fed by other nodes. It is required that additional research 
be conducted for dealing with this problem. 
Table 38 shows the evolution of the dissemination of data and resources in the digraph at times 
5, 15 and 30 units.  
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Table 38: Dissemination of data in the ICS at different point in time (number of messages) 
Node Closeness 
In 
Closeness 
Out 
In 
Deg. 
Out 
Deg. 
Time = 5 
units 
Flow     Total 
Time = 15 
units 
Flow       Total 
Time = 30 
units 
Flow       Total 
1.Federal Gov. 0.42 0.44 6 7 1 7 15 105 30 210 
2.Multi Agency Coor. 0.42 0.33 7 4 0 0 5 20 10 40 
3.Fed.Situation Map 0.36 0.39 5 5 2 8 5 25 10 50 
4.HEMA 0.50 0.45 10 9 1 9 5 45 10 90 
5.Transp. Agency 0.37 0.42 6 8 0 0 5 40 10 80 
6.State  Govern. 0.51 0.42 10 7 3 21 15 105 30 210 
7.State  Situation Map 0.48 0.55 8 10 1 10 5 50 10 100 
8.State  Evacuation 0.39 0.46 4 9 0 0 5 50 10 90 
9.State  HEMA 0.44 0.55 9 10 1 10 5 50 10 100 
10.State  Transp. 0.41 0.44 6 7 0 2 4 28 10 70 
11.State National Guard 0.40 0.41 6 5 1 1 6 36 22 130 
12.Mayor A 0.49 0.57 14 14 2 28 15 210 30 420 
13.Industrial Plant  A 0.31 0.35 1 4 0 0 1 4 3 12 
14.Stadium/Arenas  A 0.34 0.34 1 3 0 0 4 12 10 30 
15.Airport Adm. A 0.35 0.37 2 2 0 0 5 10 10 20 
16.Transport Agency A 0.37 0.39 5 2 0 0 2 4 10 20 
17.Multi Agency  A 0.42 0.41 6 3 0 0 5 15 10 30 
18.National Guard A 0.29 0.41 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19.Sensor 0.00 0.30 0 1 5 5 16 16 31 31 
20.Private Org 1. A 0.34 0.32 1 1 0 0 5 5 10 10 
21.Red Cross A 0.00 0.30 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 
22.Hospital 1  A 0.35 0.42 3 3 2 6 5 15 10 30 
23.ECall_ Center A 0.44 0.48 8 4 1 4 5 20 10 40 
24.Police Depart A 0.44 0.45 6 4 0 0 15 60 30 120 
25.Fire Depart A 0.43 0.45 5 5 0 0 15 75 26 130 
26.Intelligence A 0.39 0.35 4 3 0 0 4 11 6 18 
27. Risk Ass. A 0.39 0.35 4 3 0 0 5 15 10 30 
28. Weather Inf. A 0.39 0.35 4 4 0 0 4 16 6 24 
29. Incident Comm. A 0.57 0.53 14 13 0 0 15 110 30 420 
30.Liaison Officer A 0.37 0.38 0 2 0 0 3 3 7 7 
31.Area of Command A 0.39 0.40 4 5 0 0 15 75 30 150 
32.Operations Chief A 0.39 0.37 2 5 0 0 13 13 24 24 
33.Air Operat. Chief A 0.41 0.27 4 1 0 0 14 14 23 23 
34.Heliport Resources A 0.40 0.22 2 2 0 0 5 10 10 20 
35.Task Force A1 0.38 0.36 3 3 0 0 15 45 30 90 
36.Wings Resources 0.43 0.22 4 2 0 0 6 13 21 42 
37.Task Forces A2 0.38 0.36 3 3 0 0 15 45 30 90 
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We tested the correlation between the centrality measures (the first four columns) and the 
total number of entities transferred in the ICS at different points in time. 
   The Pearson correlation provided evidence that in time 5, the total number of flows 
generated in the ICS digraph has a linear relationship with the in-degree and out-degree indexes 
(see Table 39). 
In times 15 and 30, the total number of entities generated by the node presents a linear 
relationship with the four centrality measures.  
 
Table 39: Pearson correlation between centrality measures and total number of entities 
 Closeness 
In 
Closeness 
Out 
In-Degree Out-Degree 
Total messages at time 5  0.273 0.521 0.614 0.595 
p-value 0.102 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Total messages at time 15  0.474 0.634 0.747 0.772 
p-value 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total messages at time 30  0.501 0.626 0.789 0.794 
p-value 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
The critical point in the analysis of Table 38 is the delay time in which the pieces of data arrived 
to the Incident Commander node (decision maker on site). Since the ego-digraph of the Hospital 
1 A node does not include the Incident Commander and data must pass by other nodes before 
arriving to the main node on site. Figures 54a and b show both ego-digraphs. 
 
 203
 
 
           (a)      (b)   
Figure 54: (a) Ego-digraph Hospital 1 A; (b) Ego-digraph Incident Commander 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Conclusions 
In the literature review we identified a great deal of research and models for 
understanding how an organization performs its tasks in a collaborative environment. 
Nevertheless, most of the research and models have analyzed an organization from a static 
viewpoint, and only a few simulations have been built mainly over a discrete platform. 
First hypothesis 
In Chapter One we formulated as our first hypothesis that a hybrid simulation based on 
discrete simulation, system dynamics, and agent-based modeling is an adequate platform to 
represent the dynamic sequences produced in an emergency management organization. In 
Chapter Three, that hypothesis was associated with several technical questions that addressed 
this research and whose answers are summarized below. 
What features of an emergency response organization are possible to simulate in a network 
centric environment? 
By analyzing five cases of extreme events, we determined that most of the time an 
emergency organization has a well defined plan based on procedures and alarms, and some 
more-developed organizations have an ICS.  
It was demonstrated that there exist tools for analyzing the patterns of the dyadic and 
triad relationships that are formed in an emergency management system.  
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We established that if the digraph presents enough nodes, then it is possible to obtain 
significant metrics from its adjacency matrix and to contrast those results with known behavior 
of random and scale free digraphs.  
If data is available, then the initial model of the dyads relationships can be modified by 
mean of community of states, and new measures of performance might be collected.  
From a continuous perspective, it was shown that extreme events that have a constant 
development over time can be modeled and simulated using a set of continuous variables, and 
events that are carried out in specific periods of time might be modeled as a combination of 
discrete and continuous variables.  
By using a mechanism of control (agents), we showed that the extreme events can be 
either stochastically or deterministically managed for impacting one, a set, or the whole 
organization, thus permitting us to analyze the chains of command and sequence of procedures 
based on the dyadic interrelationships of the digraph. 
Finally if cognitive models exist, they can be incorporated as objects (agents) into the 
internal configuration of the nodes and testing their influence in the whole digraph behavior. 
Is there a more suitable simulation technique for modeling the interactions among the nodes in a 
networked scenario? (Testing best candidate simulation technique) 
Throughout this research we have maintained that interactions imply the study an 
emergency organization in three forms: static, evolution, and dynamic flows. We tied those 
interactions to the three types of data defined in Chapter Three: semantic, qualitative and 
quantitative data. 
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We used a static simulation technique based on the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
method for comparing the topology of several emergency organizational structures. We 
suggested that this technique is an invaluable help for future research in this field, especially 
when data stored in the command and control system is available for analyzing the initial 
deployment of an organization. Based on the five cases of study, our findings suggest using 
semantic and quantitative data for evaluating the static organizational configuration.   
We demonstrated that the evolution of the interactions, analyzed as changes in the dyadic 
contacts between nodes, requires the inputs that provide the SD models for representing either an 
extreme event or the team performance in the nodes. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to use a 
mechanism of control, based on community of states, for regulating those interactions.  The 
timing with respect to how the digraph evolves requires quantitative data stored in the database 
of a system. 
The dynamic interactions of the dyads are discrete entities, which can be modified during 
the simulation execution in accordance with the different types of messages, tasks, decisions and 
resources that are transferred in an emergency organization.  
We tested the SD technique for modeling the interaction among the nodes, and even 
though the eigenvalue analysis of the linearalized matrix A in the system dx/dt = AX+ b provides 
good insight regarding the loops that contribute more to the system behavior, this technique 
presents three main problems for modeling a huge networked scenario. The first is that it does 
not allow modification of the flows between the dyadic interactions and a modeler is restricted to 
use only one type of entity. The second is that the number of feedback loops in the networked 
scenario might increase dramatically at certain periods, which makes it impossible to 
mathematically analyze the system’s behavior (Kampmann, Table 23, Chapter Five ).  The third 
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problem is the null capacity of the variables of state (levels) for modeling the internal behavior of 
the nodes (We propose an object oriented approach to model a complex internal behavior).  
Nonetheless, we demonstrated that an isolated SD model is well situated for performing 
reduced analysis of part of a digraph, such as in the study an ego-net (sub-graph of a focal node) 
and the behavior of its variables of states. 
Therefore, the four simulation techniques are suitable for modeling different components 
of a networked scenario, but a discrete approach is suggested for transferring entities among the 
nodes.   
How could several simulation techniques work together in a networked scenario? 
We demonstrated that SD and DES techniques are suitable for modeling several  features 
in a networked scenario that represents the three domains – physical, information and cognitive – 
but most of the time an agent mechanism will be required for controlling the relationships 
between both. That mechanism was named community of states. 
How could a model enhance its usefulness when it is combined with graph theory and social 
network analysis? 
In the simulation community, no previous research efforts have merged discrete event 
simulation technique with graph theory and social network analysis, and only a few applications 
were identified in the field of continuous simulation for understanding the feedback loops of a 
system. 
We argue that graph theory and its interpretation by mean of social network analysis 
provide tools for improving the structural analysis and future design of complex systems, 
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especially when there are social interactions into them. An ICS and an EOP are social systems 
supported in network centric technologies, and in accordance to our findings, the topology and 
interactions of those systems should be modeled with a combined approach of simulation 
techniques, graph theory, and social network analysis. 
Is it possible to combine team performance with flows and tasks carried out by nodes in a 
network centric scenario? 
Yes, it was demonstrated in two ways: continuous variables that are passed as parameters 
of the discrete objects or by using states of transition technique.  
What mechanism of control could a modeler use for controlling a hybrid simulation? 
It was demonstrated that our definition and implementation of community of states is an 
effective mechanism for controlling the whole hybrid simulation. 
Can the hybrid simulation be validated for predicting performance of an emergency 
organizational structure? 
 Additional research, surveys, and data analysis of databases will be necessary for 
validating and predicting performance in organizational structure. 
Second hypothesis 
In the second hypothesis we stated that a hybrid simulation can be combined with social 
networks analysis and linear programming in order to assess the evolution of an organizational 
structure over time, and this type of simulation is suitable for detecting bottle necks, 
quantification of reaction time, loading jobs, vulnerabilities, priorities, and synchronization, 
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among other measures of performance. This hypothesis was tied to the following operational 
questions: 
What social network metrics are more significant for designing and evaluating an organizational 
structure in a network centric scenario? 
The analysis of complex networks is a novel area, and few research efforts have been 
conducted focusing in organizational network behavior. Most of the current findings have been 
developed in the analysis of the World Wide Web, chemical analysis, and social interactions.   
Recently, Care (2005) formulated a similar question in the military arena: “If we could choose 
the type of combat network we should design, what properties should it possess?” He defined 
some of the more useful network properties and recommends values for combat networks. 
The previous statement provides orientations to this research to concentrate the analysis in the 
desired properties of the digraph that represent an emergency configuration, and we added that 
those properties are determined by the types of threats that an organization must face in a 
network centric scenario.  
For instance, using the social network classification in Chapter Four, if a community 
foresees that a local threat might quickly affect the whole local ICS, an ego-net analysis focused 
on selected nodes could likely be more useful for improving the readiness of the organization. 
On the other hand, if the event will affect a broad area and requires a collective and coordinated 
reaction of the whole ICS, the analysis should probably focus in the set of centrality and 
connection measures.  
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Does the digraph diameter increase or decrease in an organizational structure when it faces an 
extreme event?  
 Based on the analysis of theoretical digraph and the five case studies (Appendix A and 
B), we found qualitative and quantitative evidence that the “network diameter” increases when a 
organization faces an extreme event, (we demonstrated that the removal of the Hospital node 
breaks up the digraph in three disconnected components),   but experiments with real data will be 
necessary to confirm this issue. The increment of the digraph diameter will be a function of 
vector event defined in Chapter Three and the evolution of the three domains in the networked 
scenario. 
How can the position and performance of a node in the digraph determine the behavior of the 
whole organization? 
We demonstrated that the influence of a node in the ICS digraph will depend on its 
topological position and the role performed in the organization. For instance, nodes with low 
score in degree centrality could control the whole behavior of an ICS if their tasks are not 
accomplished. On the other hand, the dyads work by mean of interactions, and those are a 
function of the internal behavior of the nodes, thus insufficient measures of performance in a 
node could alter the complete performance of the digraph.  
Contributions and future research 
By means of the verification of both hypotheses and their associated questions and 
answers, this research provides a hybrid methodology that combines the three main simulation 
paradigms with a social network analysis based on graph theory.  
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 The application of this methodology to a complex social system, such as an ICS, provides 
significant insight for understanding how to design and evaluate an organization in the three 
defined domains: physical, informational, and cognitive.  
Some might argue that the models used are not representative of the three domains, in which 
case the proposed methodology is still valid for incorporating other models in the object oriented 
approach.    
Thus, we have used the principles and implementations of the main simulation techniques 
over only one architecture, and the measures of performance, results, and data yielded in the 
model can be analyzed with the classical tools of discrete simulation, system dynamics 
simulation, and social network analysis.      
 Further, the methodology can be applied to other less complex systems that require the 
incorporation of a richer approach beyond of an individual either discrete or continuous 
simulation.     
 By analyzing a networked scenario whose data is available, significant experiences and 
results can be obtained from a synthetic environment, and these experiences and results can be 
used to improve the configuration of the real system that is managed by human beings.  
 Though the system composed by humans beings and machines are difficult to validate, 
when previously established procedures exist, they can be tested for detecting vulnerabilities and 
metrics regarding loading jobs, time delays, sequences, message distribution, etc.  
 In order to continue improving this methodology, we have identified four areas for future 
research: 
• Developing an intelligent internal behavior of the nodes, in accordance with the role that 
they play in the context (cognitive models). So far, we have showed that as messages 
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flow through the organization replicating the flows of a chain of command, at certain 
periods the nodes change the types of data sent to others nodes, emulating different 
information such as decisions taken, missions for carrying out, tasks, or ordinary 
communication. An internal node behavior should incorporate a semantic analysis of the 
data sent by other nodes and make decisions based on this information. For instance, that 
data might provide information regarding the severity of the extreme event and the nodes 
processing this data in accordance to set rules. Notice the strong relationships of this 
future research for modeling and simulating an organization with the current research in 
semantic analysis of the data stored in the real systems based on information technology.  
• We suggested a set of significant metrics for analyzing an emergency organization, but it 
required more research in the database for identifying the metrics ranges in which the 
organization works better in accordance with the type and location of the extreme event, 
and those ranges can only be found out by means of an extensive collection of data and 
simulation experimentation.   
• In order to simulate a longitudinal network, the mechanisms of incorporation of new 
actors to the digraph and the interruption of the contact among the nodes must be 
validated. These challenges will still be without solution if data is not available for 
determining the required patterns that govern the contacts among the nodes.   
• Experimentation is necessary in order to find out if the hybrid model could support an 
after action review and if it is simple enough to be used by decision makers and 
stakeholders for improving their ICS and EOP. 
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APPENDIX A: DISASTER ANALYSIS 
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Oklahoma City Bombing, USA 
These features were   interpreted and summarized mainly from the following documents:  
• Case study that identified the information and communication flows affecting the 
response to the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah building. (MIPTS, 2006). 
• Oklahoma City-Seven Years Later. (MIPTS, 2006). 
The extreme event On April 19, 1995, a large bomb exploded in front of the Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City. As a consequence of the explosion, 167 people 
died.  
Features for 
modeling 
Information flows and resources flow. 
Research and reports    identified information issues from a narrative 
perspective. Critical information and critical resources used were not clearly 
shown and are mentioned in qualitative way. 
Many situations were described regarding connections among first 
responders (fire fighters, police officers, and others). The reports also 
consider how the federal, state, and local levels were involved in the 
extreme event. Nevertheless, the information available do not contain 
timing, quantitative data and location of actors. 
 
Disaster planning. 
Disaster planning must address internal communication requirements. 
The command post was implemented on time, but it must be assumed that 
this facility will be on scene within days, and then it should be put in a safe 
area. 
In the future, media must be incorporated into disaster response plans. 
The command post must have a plan to anticipate donations and volunteers. 
 
Communication system.  
As a result of the event, capacity and integration of communications 
systems were critical to a successful response.  
There was not physical damage to the telephone system but after the 
incident the demand for service overwhelmed the network. 
The problem of frequency in communication systems could have been 
solved using media broadcast. 
 
Situation awareness. 
The difficulty of conveying and sharing information among responders was 
proportional to the physical size of the response area. 
The lack of standard formats did not allow using Internet as an element to 
share data and information.  
 
Interoperability. 
Some inefficiency was produced by the lack of interoperability between 
radio equipment of Oklahoma City Municipal, the state and county and the 
federal agencies. 
The agencies and responders used different acronyms (according to their 
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knowledge) which inhibited a clear communication. 
Human Factors. 
People were working until they were ready to drop. Multiples studies have 
shown that judgment begins to erode after a person has worked 12 hours. 
For future events it was recommended to deal with this problem.  
 
Chain of Command. 
In future extreme events, the incident commander and his staff could 
improve their coordination if plans have been made and practiced in training 
systems.  
The sequence of the tasks and orders in the chain of command and local 
decision making were documented from a qualitative perspective. There are 
no quantitative data. 
It was identified that the coordination among the Governor, the State 
Director of Management, the Mayor and other agencies was critical to direct 
resources such as Police and National Guard. 
Future events require working with telephone service providers to gain 
additional capacity in the incident command chain. 
Classification for 
modeling 
Local extreme event, there were no posteriori events and it affected only a 
specific place. The authorities were involved in the problem gradually.  
Lesson Learned  Many highly detailed studies were made, but with focus on a single aspect.  
There are no quantitative data available and no study considers this issue. 
After action review showed that “planning” emerged as the most significant 
factor for responding to this type of extreme event, every community should 
have and test their plan.  
It was concluded that reinforced behavior by using a training methodology 
is the key issue for keeping the community prepared to face a new event.  
 
 
Kobe Earthquake, Japan 
These features were interpreted and summarized mainly from the document:  
• Lessons Learned from the Kobe Earthquake (Tierney, Goltz, 1997). 
The extreme event On January 17, 1995, a devastating earthquake struck the cities of Kobe, 
Nishinomiya and Ashiva in Japan; immediately numerous fires began in 
different places;  a total of 6,279 people died.  
Features  for 
modeling 
Information flows and resources flow. 
After action analysis found many delays in the mobilization of critical 
resources and the initiation of key response tasks due to lack of situation 
awareness. 
The resources of the Self Defense Force (SDF) were not 
initially mobilized until nearly 24 hours after the earthquake, because  
military forces were not  well-linked to local preparedness efforts and did 
not participate in disaster drills and exercises. 
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Disaster planning. 
Federal legislation provided an overall structure for planning and response, 
but local governments had the primary authority for disaster management. 
Each prefecture and local jurisdiction had a Local Disaster Prevention 
Council (LDPC) that is responsible for the development of area-specific 
disaster plans. 
 
Communication system.  
An accurate situation assessment was impossible due to the disruption of 
communications and transportation networks. 
 
Situation awareness. 
The interferences of communication systems and the magnitude of the 
damage to buildings and roadways made early situation assessment difficult. 
Loss of back-up power for key emergency functions increased the 
confusion.  
 
Interoperability. 
Some jurisdictions established close links with emergent groups, while 
others officially recognized their existence but engaged in only limited 
coordination, and still others allowed newly-formed 
volunteer networks to operate but avoided official contact with them. 
 
Human Factors. 
Local officials in Kobe City and Hyogo Prefecture were initially unaware of 
the magnitude of the disaster because of major communications problems 
and traffic congestion that made movement difficult throughout the impact 
area, and because so many emergency responders and public officials were 
also disaster victims.  
 
Chain of Command. 
Due to lack of effective communications links and accurate information 
from the impact area, the government failed to comprehend the severity of 
the situation for a number of hours and consequently was slow in 
committing needed resources. 
Classification for 
modeling 
A regional extreme event, there were many posteriori events as 
consequences of the initial earthquake, such as fire, explosions, and gas 
leaking. Authorities were involved gradually in the event.  
Lesson Learned  The Kobe earthquake highlighted the importance of obtaining and 
disseminating information, particularly in the immediate aftermath of a 
major earthquake or other disaster. 
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Hurricane Mitch, Central America 
These features were interpreted and summarized mainly from the document:  
• Hurricane Mitch. (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute,1999) 
The extreme event In October 1998, Hurricane Mitch, category 5, hit the coast of Central 
America, with wind at 208 miles an hour. This event caused more than 
18,000 deaths. 
Features useful for 
modeling 
Information flows and resources flows. 
Immediately after the event there was extensive international cooperation. 
Many type of supplies arrived to Central America, but their distribution was 
affected by lack of a centralized logistic control. 
Many authorities were in charge of various things at various times. 
Feedback into the planning process was not structured, and many teams, 
agencies and volunteers formulated the question: “What is the Process?” 
   
Disaster planning. 
Military and civilian coordination in the operations did not include civilian 
agencies, International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), or relevant Host Nation civilian and military 
organizations.   
 
Communication system.  
The communications, methods and means of operation and command and 
control between the various military and civilian components were 
disconnected.   
 
Situation awareness. 
Lack of unity of effort and a corresponding strategic and operational 
planning process. 
“People did not know each other and did not know what another 
organization could bring to the table and how”. 
 
Interoperability. 
Primary recommendations center on the need to clearly define civil-military 
authority relationships and supporting and lead roles that, once defined, can 
and will generate an effective interagency and multinational unity of effort. 
There was a duplication and triplication of effort by lack of coordination. 
 
Human Factors. 
Effectiveness and ultimate success in humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief operations depend on educational as well as organizational solutions. 
Doctrine was inadequate to meet the requirements of complex multinational, 
multiorganizational, and multidimensional humanitarian emergency 
situations.   
 
Chain of Command. 
Planning and implementing procedures did not work well. This issue was 
considered to be, at its base, a command and control problem.  
 218
Consensus was that pervasive ad hoc planning and implementing were 
impeded by a recurring question of “Who is in charge?”  
Because of a certain lack of clear authority lines and well-defined lead and 
supporting roles, each major actor tended to “do his own thing” and stay 
within his own “stove-pipe” organizational structure.      
Classification for 
modeling 
The extreme event involved various countries; there were many local, 
international, private and military organizations which participated by 
several months.   
Lesson Learned  There was no multinational doctrine or multinational standard for dealing 
with this type of extreme event. 
Force protection was required in areas where the law and order have been 
broken. It was necessary to ensure a proper balance between force 
protection and operational flexibility.  Failures in planning, 
command/control and organizational structure produced problems of 
coordination.  
It was identified the necessity of mechanisms and processes for the purpose 
of creating  viable models that integrate vertical and lateral planning and 
implementing processes. 
 
 
Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster, Chernobyl, Ukraine 
These features were interpreted and summarized mainly from the documents:   
• Assessment of Radiological and Health Impact. (Nuclear Energy Agency,2002)  
• The Chernobyl Disaster Its effect on Belarus and Ukraine. ( Mitchell, 1996) 
Extreme event On April 25 -26, 1986, a nuclear power accident occurred at Chernobyl, 
Ukraine. The nuclear power plant located 80 miles north of Kiev had 4 
reactors and, whilst testing reactor number 4, numerous safety procedures 
were disregarded. At 1:23 am the chain reaction in the reactor became out of 
control, creating explosions and a fireball which blew off the reactor's heavy 
steel and concrete lid. The Chernobyl accident killed more than 30 people 
immediately, and as a result of the high radiation levels in the surrounding 
20-mile radius, 135,000 people had to be evacuated.  
Features  for 
modeling 
Information flows and resources flow. 
Because there were no nearby hospitals that could treat radiation patients, 
some were taken to one hospital in Kiev, and the most severely burned were 
transported by plane to Moscow, the only city in the country adequately 
prepared for such an emergency. 
 
Disaster planning. 
According to the initial reaction of the authorities it was clear that they were 
unprepared for an accident, and they had to make decisions as the accident 
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evolved based on criteria that could have been established beforehand.  
 
Communication system 
As the event was clearly located and it spread out gradually, the critical 
infrastructure did not fail, but the kind of information transmitted did not 
allow the authorities to evaluate the severity of the incident.  
 
Situation awareness. 
Chernobyl was an object lesson in spontaneous and disorganized response 
to a major crisis. The distribution of information was limited and the 
severity of the consequences allowed to the authorities realized of the 
magnitude of the disaster.  
 
Interoperability 
Many organizations were involved in the decision making, as no clear –cut 
demarcations had been agreed and established. 
 
Human Factor. 
After the explosion, fire crews succumbed quickly to the effects of intense 
radiation. Helicopter pilots who attempted to blanket the fire with sand and 
chemicals also died, usually weeks or months later. 
 
Chain of Command. 
It was suggested a lack of  personnel specialized as staff in the chain of 
command, it delayed the process of make decisions  increased the severe  
consequences of the extreme event. 
Classification for 
modeling 
An abrupt event that involved quickly all the levels of emergency response. 
The consequences of the event were still around after months, and years. 
Lesson learned Since the disaster involved several countries, at that time there was not a 
standard system for communicating the problem beyond the country in 
which in event happened.  
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Hurricane Katrina 
These features were interpreted and summarized mainly from the documents: 
• The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina. Lesson learned (Federal Review, 2006) 
Extreme event On August 23, 2005, the most destructive natural disaster hit the Gulf Coast 
in Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama. As consequence over 1,300 people 
died, thousand were evacuated and the city of New Orleans and other 
coastal communities suffered irreversible structural damages.  
Features  for 
modeling 
Information flows and resources flow. 
“The existing planning and operational structure for delivering critical 
resources and humanitarian aid clearly proved to be inadequate to the task”. 
 “Throughout the response, Federal resource managers had great difficulty 
determining what resources were needed, what resources were available, 
and where those resources were at any given point in time”. 
“There was no effective mechanism for efficiently integrating and 
deploying these resources”. 
“FEMA’s lack of a real-time asset-tracking system, left Federal managers in 
the dark regarding the status of resources once they were shipped”. 
 
Disaster planning. 
The process for decision making was supported by the best emergency 
system, ever before designed, analyzed and documented for facing an 
extreme event. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
provides a common approach for Federal, State and Local government and 
develops and administers an integrated National Response Plan (NRP). 
There was a national response plan adopted to establish a single framework 
for managing domestic incidents. 
Nevertheless the incident systems do not “provide the necessary framework 
to manage the challenges posed by 21st Century catastrophic threats and  
the new plan created by the federal government since the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001 failed to adequately account for widespread or 
simultaneous catastrophes”. 
“At the most fundamental level, part of the explanation for why the 
response to Katrina did not go as planned is that key decision-makers at all 
levels simply were not familiar with the plans”. 
 
Communication system.  
“Hurricane Katrina destroyed an unprecedented portion of the core 
communications infrastructure throughout the Gulf Coast region”. 
“The storm debilitated 911 emergency call centers, disrupting local 
emergency services”. 
“Many available communications assets were not utilized fully because 
there was no national, State-wide, or regional communications plan to 
incorporate them”. 
“DOD brought robust communications infrastructure, logistics, and 
planning capabilities”. 
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Situation awareness. 
The specific triggers for the NRP were unclear and it was found lack of 
clarity regarding when and how an event becomes an Incident of National 
Significance. 
In the federal level “lacked real-time, accurate situational awareness of both 
the facts from the disaster area as well as the on-going response activities of 
the Federal, State, and local players”. 
“FEMA requested assistance from DOD without knowing what State 
National Guard forces had already deployed to fill the same needs”. 
 
Interoperability 
The Incident Command System (from NIMS) was the mean by which all the 
actors should have coordinated their effort and eliminated duplication of 
tasks. 
Likely the most important issue in NRP is the “concept of operation” 
applied in Hurricane Katrina. 
Concepts, principles and terminology might have provide a clear 
coordination and effectively. 
At that time,” Federal, State, and local governments had not yet completed a 
comprehensive strategy to improve operability and interoperability to meet 
the needs of emergency responders. This inability to connect multiple 
communications plans and architectures clearly impeded coordination and 
communication at the Federal, State, and local levels.” 
 
Human Factor 
There was a clear incident management protocols and procedures for all 
levels, for instance was reported: “ JFO staff and other deployed Federal 
personnel often lacked a working knowledge of NIMS or even a basic 
understanding of ICS principles”. 
 
Chain of Command 
“Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear, and often overlapping, 
roles and responsibilities”. 
Classification for 
modeling 
Event that involved simultaneously all the levels of the emergency 
management organization. The evolution of the extreme event enables a 
modeler to simulate of the emergency organizational structure behavior 
before, during and after of the Hurricane, nevertheless it is required to 
process the data stored in the database of the either the command and 
control systems or the communication systems.  
Lesson learned  Four critical deficiencies  in the  national preparedness were reported: 
1. The processes for unified management of the national response. 
2. The command and control structures within the federal government. 
3. The knowledge of the preparedness plans. 
4.  The regional planning and coordination. 
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 F M M H T S S S S S S M I S A T M N S P R H E P F I R W I L A O A H T W T 
Federal Gov. 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Multi Agency Coordina 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fed.Situation Map 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HEMA 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transp. Agency 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
State R Govern. 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
State R. Situation Map 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
State R Evacuation 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
State R HEMA 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
State R Transp. 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
State R National Guard 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mayor A 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Industrial Plant Adm. A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stadium/Arenas Adm A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Airport Adm. A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transport Agency A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Multi Agency Coor. A 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
National Guard A 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sensor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Private Org 1. A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Red Cross A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hospital 1  A 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
ECall_ Center A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Police Depart A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fire Depart A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Intelligence A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Risk Ass. A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weather Inf. A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Incident Commander A 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Liaison Officer A 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Area of Command A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Operations Chief A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Air Operat. Chief A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Heliport Resources A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Task Force A1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Wings Resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Task Forces A2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
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